COSSAC - Stephen C. Kepher

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other U.S. and British planners grew increasingly frustrated throughout the fall of 1942. In December a British major general, John “Sinbad” Sinclair, an officer in the Royal Horse Artillery who had started out in the Royal Navy, joined the planners. Sinclair and Barker finally got down to what Barker felt was constructive planning.31

      On New Year’s Day 1943 Barker and Sinclair agreed that they had accumulated large amounts of data, information, intelligence, and tentative plans, and they felt it was necessary to “produce something that would bring it all to a head and come up with a definite conclusion and a definite recommendation.”32 What they produced on their own initiative became known as Operation SKYSCRAPER.

      SKYSCRAPER, an outline plan submitted to the Combined Commanders on 18 March 1943, was an impressive document and unambiguous about its purpose. The first sentence reads, “The object of this paper is to obtain decisions on certain major points which must govern not only the planning for a return to the Continent against opposition, but more particularly the organization, equipment and training of the Army in the United Kingdom during 1943.”33 Barker and Sinclair note that the plan had not been approved by the Combined Commanders nor had all the details been worked out. That is, they acknowledged that it was their idea to create the document and send it up the chain of command, and it was not the result of a directive to generate another study.

      They go on to make the point that “it is generally agreed that the original ‘ROUNDUP’ plan is not a feasible one and some other basis is therefore necessary.” Unlike earlier plans, Barker and Sinclair proposed a landing concentrated on the beaches in front of Caen in Normandy as well as landings on the Cherbourg Peninsula. Starting with the premise of a landing against determined resistance, not a weakened or demoralized enemy, they estimated the initial assault force at ten divisions afloat and up to four or five airborne divisions, plus commandos, engineers, and other special troops. They also estimated the numbers of all the specialized landing craft that would be needed.

      While their scenario involved three distinct phases from initial landings to the capture of Antwerp, the key message to the Commanders and the COS comes toward the end of the summary. First there is an acknowledgement of the size of the force contemplated or the “bill” for the operation. They acknowledged that the bill “is a large one, and obviously not to be accepted lightly.” They go on to state, “A warning must, moreover, be sounded with regard to the degree of opposition which could be overcome if the ‘bill’ is met, and the resources provided. The ‘bill’ is for THE MINIMUM RESOURCES LIKELY TO PROMISE SUCCESS AGAINST APPRECIABLE RESISTANCE…. The margin between success and failure would be very narrow.”34 Because they were not presenting a plan to deal with weakened German forces on the brink of collapse, the margin would always be narrow for troops fighting their way ashore from the Narrow Sea.

      The most remarkable part of the plan comes at the end of the summary, when Barker and Sinclair demand that the COS make a clear and unequivocal choice:

      An invasion of the Continent in the face of German opposition is such a specialized problem that there is no chance of undertaking it successfully without careful preparation over a long period…. The decision as to whether or not we prepare the Army specifically for this purpose cannot be deferred…. The rock bottom of it all is, however, this: knowing the very great difficulties in provision of resources, for what are we to plan and prepare?

      If we are to plan and prepare for the invasion of Western Europe against opposition it must be on the understanding that the resources considered necessary are fully realized and that it is the intention to provide them. Given that knowledge, we can go ahead on a reasonably firm basis.

      If, on the other hand, it is clear that such resources can in no circumstances be provided, then it would seem wise to accept at once that invasion against opposition cannot be contemplated….

      In conclusion, a decision on the points raised … is a matter of urgency as a basis for planning and preparation. As already pointed out, to defer the decision is to decide not to be ready.35

      Paget sent the plan to the COS, who did not respond directly, although they noted that some of the assumptions regarding the scale of German resistance were vague. With the dramatic changes in circumstances that were occurring across the broad European Theater in 1943 (which are addressed in chapter 7), it could hardly have been otherwise. Paget believed that the COS were “unfavourable to the plan because of the huge bill for resources.”36 SKYSCRAPER did, however, make up a significant part of the stack of papers that Ismay gave Morgan to read before presenting to the COS. Morgan, having read SKYSCRAPER and the other material, made a recommendation in mid-March that clearly convinced the august body of senior officers that he was the person for the job. What exactly did he say?

      While he made no attempt to delve into strategy or tactics, Morgan argued that it was necessary for the staff to be a completely joint and combined British-American effort in every detail from the very beginning. It needed to be slotted into the existing chain of command but be independent enough to seamlessly become an operational headquarters when the time came. More importantly, Morgan stressed that the prior habit of separating planning from execution could not continue. It would be necessary “for all concerned to throw their hearts over the jump and make up their minds there and then that the campaign had already begun, that there should be no question of producing just another plan to be a basis for future argument.”37

      In the absence of a supreme commander, all that the commander would need must be provided for: forces, a supply system, command and control systems, and, most importantly, “a plan of action both basically sound and yet sufficiently elastic to admit of variation as might be necessitated by developing circumstances.”38 This was a somewhat elaborate way of saying that the plan needed to be good enough to be approved but capable of modification by the commanders as needed without disruption to the basic concept. Morgan also recommended that the senior planners hold the rank of major general and not brigadier as they would have to interact on a daily basis with the War Office and other ministries. To get those ministries to respond, it would be necessary to have sufficient rank to gain and keep their attention.

      Morgan had trained troops for amphibious assaults and had planned amphibious operations. As commander of 1st Corps, he was known to Mountbatten and Combined Operations. He had also successfully, if briefly, worked with American forces, and that was not a universal accomplishment. At the time it was widely believed that the supreme commander would be British, with an American deputy, and so it made sense for the chief of staff to be British as well. All of this led to the British COS agreeing on 1 April that Morgan was the man for the job, however the job was going to be defined.39

      Notwithstanding Morgan’s impression of the COS’ reaction to his recommendations and Mountbatten’s congratulations, his appointment to head this new planning staff did not come at once. It took about a month to work out details of Morgan’s appointment and for the CCS to issue the directive to him that outlined his responsibilities. Formally issued on 26 April, it was made available to Morgan in draft form in advance, and the British COS authorized him to act on the assumption that approval of his appointment would occur. The key elements of the directive read:

      The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to appoint, in due course, a Supreme Commander over all United Nations forces for the invasion of the Continent of Europe from the United Kingdom.

      Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander or his deputy, you will be responsible for carrying out the above planning duties…. You will report directly to the British Chiefs of Staff….

      You will accordingly prepare plans for:

      (a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning down the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and U.S. Eighth Air Force.

      (b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

      (c) A full scale assault

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