COSSAC - Stephen C. Kepher

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asked for clarification regarding the last point, feeling that “as early as possible” was not particularly precise from a planning standpoint. His question went up to the CCS, and their answer—1 May 1944—came back in mid-May, after being discussed at the next interallied conference in Washington, D.C. (TRIDENT).

      At the Washington conference, the basic Casablanca priorities were restated. Under “Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept,” there was listed, in conjunction with the use of the heavy bomber weapon in what was named the Combined Bomber Offensive, the resolution “that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with a target date of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.”41 This was far short of being an ironclad commitment to a cross-Channel assault. It was still just one available option of many, but it did allow Morgan to move forward.

      The Combined Chiefs noted in their response to Morgan that his report was to be considered at the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in mid-August. Working backward from that date, the CCS would need to have the outline plan for both the cross-Channel assault and the “return to the Continent in case of German disintegration” by 1 August to allow time for them to consider the recommendations. Following from that, the due date to the British COS would be 15 July—Morgan reported to the Combined Chiefs who had authorized the staff, but through the British COS, his immediate superiors, who therefore had a right of first veto on any proposal.

      While waiting for the official directive formally appointing him, Morgan knew he had the choice of either waiting for the paperwork to arrive or to “indulge in intense activity guided by common sense and one’s personal predilections.”42 He chose the latter course. He found an unoccupied room in Norfolk House, which was a modern, purpose-built office building, and talked the management into assigning it to him. It happened to be the room where he first met Eisenhower. He also prevailed upon the various organizations located in Norfolk House to provide him with clerical help when needed. At this point his staff consisted of “Bobbie, my aide-de-camp; my motor driver, Corporal Bainbridge, whom together with his car I had frankly stolen from 1st Corps headquarters; and two batmen [personal orderlies].”43 Morgan would readily confess to a weakness for the unconventional, and this new assignment was certainly beginning in a most unconventional way.

      Morgan was summoned to a lunch at Chequers on 4 April so that Churchill could take the measure of the man. The prime minister showed his guests the film Desert Victory and insisted that this demonstrated the way to defeat the Germans. Morgan demurred, noting that while war in the African desert and war in northwest Europe may have things in common, there were also certain differences to be considered. Churchill let the comment pass and notified the War Office that Morgan “would do.”

      In his room at the Mount Royal Hotel one evening during this period, Morgan gave thought to his new situation as he took his bath. His new title was unwieldy; those with whom he was to work and to lead needed to be motivated and to sense that there was real change. This group would clearly need the creation of some esprit de corps. One element that would help would be a name that would unify the small band that was to be formed. It needed to have a martial sound yet needed to be vague enough that no one would be able to figure out what the job was by the name alone. His mid-bath inspiration was to title himself and his group COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander). And so COSSAC he became.

      — 4 —

      TO PLAN THE RECONQUEST OF EUROPE

      As Morgan surveyed his office in Norfolk House on the first day of his new assignment as COSSAC, he noted that he had taken possession of “a couple of desks and chairs … a few sheets of paper and a pencil that someone had dropped on the floor.”1 He was starting from zero, which, under the circumstances, at least meant a fresh start.

      Morgan was an enthusiastic “Westerner” who believed that an early reentry into the Continent starting in northwest France was the proper strategic direction. He did not agree with the more opportunistic approach of senior British leaders. While he believed the principle of “flexibility” can have many advantages, “especially when one’s resources are slender … [,] it is well to be flexible only if, [in the end] there is the firm intention to do something definite.” He went on to say that he and some of his colleagues suspected that the “British authorities had at this time no real plan for the day when they would have to stop being flexible.”2 His approach made it easier to work with his American allies and to recruit like-minded officers from both the British Empire and the United States.

      While he was temporarily reliant on the kindness of strangers for his clerical needs, he moved quickly to recruit the highest level of planners for the jobs at hand, trusting that they, in turn, would attract others with whom they had successfully served. Morgan had been in the Staff Duties Directorate in the War Office in 1936–37, so he knew or knew of most of the officers who might be both available and desirable for these positions. His long service in India would also be useful as fellow veterans of Indian service would make their mark. As he said, “When it came to creating the British Army portion of the COSSAC staff the War Office … [gave] me practically carte blanche, with the result that the British Army component was able to hit its stride in amazingly quick time.”3

      He did have a fight with Brooke to get Maj. Gen. Charles West for operations (whom Morgan knew well from their long service together in India), and it took some time to get Maj. Gen. Nevil Brownjohn, who took over supply and came over from Paget at Home Forces. Brig. Kenneth McLean, the senior British Army planner, was another old friend of Morgan’s from India—he married the woman who had looked after Morgan’s children there. All three played important roles in creating OVERLORD. West and McLean were both engineers and combat veterans. According to Ray Barker, West had a “keen analytical, engineering mind that could analyze a problem and get to the roots of it … [,] an ability to reduce it to fundamental terms at first…. McLean was a hard, pragmatic Scot,” while West had a calmer temperament.4 McLean was described by Morgan as someone who knew all the tricks of the trade and was a “weaver of plots beyond compare and, moreover, an expounder of same, who appeared in the next few months before crowned heads and chiefs of state, justifiably earning universal applause.”5 He had previously spent time on the Planning Staff in Whitehall and at Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ).

      Representatives from the other services of both nations, particularly the U.S. contingent, arrived more slowly and suffered from higher turnover rates for a variety of reasons. McLean noted that in the spring and summer, “the American Air Force and Navy came very little into the planning picture. They changed quite frequently and had little continuity in their work.”6 Barker agreed with this assessment, noting that the U.S. Army Air Forces sent over good men who didn’t stay for very long. Of the U.S. Navy’s representatives, Barker’s evaluation was that they didn’t send their best men.7

      Morgan observed that while senior British officers were noticeably less enthusiastic about the project than their American counterparts, it was just the opposite among the more junior officers. The British officers signed on at once while some Americans didn’t see the point in associating with what looked like a predominantly British staff for a possible operation that could become a dead end. Still, most of those who joined soon shared the enthusiasm and sense of common purpose that comes from being part of a group that must produce something of importance and is given not quite enough time or resources to produce it.

      General Brooke had discussed the organization of what was evolving into the COSSAC staff with Gen. Frank M. Andrews, commanding general of ETOUSA, on 26 March.8 This in turn led to soon-to-be major general Barker being designated as deputy chief of staff for COSSAC (or Deputy COSSAC, as he was called), although for a while he also continued as the operations officer at ETOUSA.

      Barker and Morgan met for the first time at Norfolk House in early April. As Barker explained, “As a natural thing the small group that I had been working with on the planning for ROUNDUP—the ‘ROUNDUP Planners’ they called us—we just re-designated ourselves and were absorbed into COSSAC. And a group of

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