LITMIR.BIZ

Figure 3. Policy Positions of the External Opposition, Internal Opposition, Leader, and Foreign Power

      The disadvantage to installing the leader’s internal rivals in power is that they may share some of the deposed leader’s policy preferences. The leader’s internal rivals compete with the leader for the same set of supporters and so will tend to promote policies that will satisfy those supporters. For partial regime change to be worthwhile for the foreign power, the foreign power must convince the leader’s rivals not only to overthrow the leader but also to abandon some of their traditional supporters and move closer to the foreign power’s policy position. Figure 3 shows the conditions under which the foreign power may see advantage in partnering with the internal opposition. In this scenario, the external opposition (EO) is too weak to help the foreign power (FP) impose full regime change. The leader (L) maintains power by appealing to a critical number of supporters (S) whose policy preferences lie between S_Left and S_Moderate (e.g., within range 1).⁷ Members of the leader’s internal opposition (IO) compete with the leader for power by attempting to lure some of the leader’s supporters into a new coalition, for example, within range 2. Because this coalition also includes new supporters with preferences closer to the foreign power, the rival can make concessions to the foreign power that the leader would refuse (i.e., policies lying within the portion of range 2 that does not overlap with range 1).

      The foreign power can often convince the leader’s rivals to undertake a coup by exploiting their desire for power. Much like the external opposition, the rivals may only need the promise of material support to move against the leader. In some cases, rivals from within might already be willing to oust the leader, and they seek only the foreign power’s tacit support. Generals in South Vietnam, for example, had attempted to oust President Ngo Dinh Diem several times before seeking American support in August 1963. President John F. Kennedy and his administration needed only to consent to the plot and withdraw US support for Diem to facilitate the coup against him.⁸ Although a targeted leader can attempt to buy off his or her rivals by offering them greater political power or perquisites, the leader cannot compete with offers from a foreign power to help the rivals take power for themselves. As a result, the leader cannot easily preempt his or her internal rivals from conspiring with the foreign power to stage a coup.

      To orchestrate a successful coup, the foreign power and the leader’s rivals require the cooperation of two pivotal players. First, the target state’s military must be convinced either to acquiesce to or lead the coup. Otherwise, the targeted leader could simply use the military to preempt or overturn the coup. Second, the foreign power must also convince at least some of the leader’s supporters to abandon the leader. Without their support, the rival may not be able to acquire a sufficiently strong political base to seize power.

      To obtain the cooperation of these two groups, the foreign power often attempts to drive a wedge between them and the leader. Although the primary interest of most leaders is to retain power, the supporters and military are more interested in retaining the goods the leader provides them.⁹ The state seeking regime change can often weaken the leader’s ability to provide these goods by using economic sanctions, covert political action, propaganda, and displays of force.¹⁰ Though the military and supporters of the targeted leader might remain loyal under the status quo, if these measures damage their interests sufficiently, both parties may conclude that they are better off abandoning the leader. In some cases, the leader’s supporters may not even be aware their defection will facilitate a foreign-backed coup. In Chile, for example, US President Richard Nixon tried to undermine popular support for the democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, by using sanctions to “make the economy scream.”¹¹ Although these measures failed to secure Nixon’s immediate goal—to prevent Allende’s inauguration—the administration continued its economic pressure, combining it with covert political action to divide Allende’s supporters and organize his opposition.¹² These efforts helped generate resentment toward his regime, which encouraged his opponents in the military to move against him.¹³

      Once a critical number of the leader’s supporters become willing to accept the foreign power’s demands, hypothetically, the leader could reshape his or her coalition, abandoning supporters that oppose the foreign power and picking up ones who do not. The leader might then be able to appease the foreign power without suffering domestic political punishment. However, the foreign power may not accept the leader’s concessions, because once it withdraws its threat, the leader could cease cooperation, reverting back to the status quo ante or, at the very least, offering incomplete compliance. The Soviet Union encountered this problem during its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow had launched the invasion anticipating that it would prompt pro-Moscow Czechs to oust the reform-minded Czech leader Alexander Dubček. But when it became apparent that hardliners lacked the following to do this, the Soviets arrested Dubček and his fellow reformers, brought them to Moscow, and pressured them to accept Soviet demands for “normalization.”¹⁴ Although Dubček was returned to power and gradually began overturning the reforms, his pace was too slow for Moscow. When an anti-Soviet riot erupted six months later, Moscow insisted on regime change. It used the threat of another invasion to demand Gustav Husák be installed. Husák had been among the reformers brought to Moscow and had since adopted the view that conceding to Moscow’s demands was an unfortunate necessity. Once in power, he became a loyal ally to Moscow, purging the party of its reformers and completing the process of “normalization.”¹⁵

      Convincing a member of the internal opposition to construct a new coalition closer to the foreign power’s policy position, however, may not be enough to make regime change worthwhile for the foreign power. Just like the former leader, these new leaders could also face political pressure to abandon their new coalition and revert to the status quo ante. They are less likely to reverse course, however, when they transform the state’s political institutions. By rewriting the rules governing access to power, new leaders can diminish the political influence of the former regime’s supporters and guarantee that of their new coalition. Accordingly, they become more likely to comply with the foreign power’s policy preferences over the long term because their ability to maintain power now depends on satisfying constituents who support those policies. As a result, foreign powers

Скачать книгу