LITMIR.BIZ

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costs of using one’s own military by increasing popular or elite support for the use of force against the target. If the target appears to be the aggressor, a crisis might also lower the reputational and diplomatic costs of using force. Nevertheless, though the foreign power’s expected costs of using military force may drop, this will not necessarily lead to a decision to impose regime change. In the absence of domestic opposition, a major event or crisis might prompt policymakers to use greater military force, but that force will be in pursuit of a settlement, not regime change.

      The death of a US service member in Panama, which precipitated the 1989 US invasion there, illustrates the role crises can play in the decision to pursue regime change. Prior to the invasion, the Bush administration had steadily increased pressure on Noriega to democratize but had stopped short of threatening direct military force to remove him. The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warned that a military confrontation might lead to another Vietnam-style quagmire.⁵⁷ The Bush administration’s policy abruptly changed, however, when a US service member died after a run-in with Panamanian soldiers on December 16, 1989. The service member’s death not only offered a casus belli but also helped convince the Defense Department and the JCS that the military costs of removing Noriega would be low compared to the cost of leaving him in power. As Colin Powell, chairman of the JCS at the time, explained to the president, “There will be a few dozen casualties if we go…. If we don’t go, there will be a few dozen casualties over the next few weeks, and we’ll still have Noriega.”⁵⁸ Yet, though the service member’s death influenced the timing of regime change and the manner in which it was imposed, it was not the primary cause. Had Noriega enjoyed strong domestic support, he would have been far more costly to remove and also possibly less combative. Under these circumstances, the service member’s death would have been far less likely to trigger an invasion aimed at regime change.

      The events and crises that give rise to regime change are often a consequence of the targeted leader’s domestic political weakness. Targeted leaders, in the course of resisting the foreign power’s demands, may adopt confrontational behavior that sets the stage for a crisis. Noriega, for example, had responded to US pressure by delivering fiery speeches, increasing harassment of US citizens, and declaring war on the United States.⁵⁹ His nationalist rhetoric and attempts to play upon anti-US sentiments were measures designed to boost his popularity and weaken his domestic opposition. But his posturing also heightened tensions with the United States and ultimately led to the crisis that prompted the Bush administration to invade.

      Not all events or crises stem from the target’s domestic political vulnerability. In some instances, exogenous events or crises elsewhere in the world can prompt policymakers to undertake regime change in the target state. For example, the failure of the US congress to ratify the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty (SALT II) in 1979 influenced the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan by convincing Soviet leaders that détente was crumbling. The Soviet leadership concluded that there was no need to worry about how an invasion would affect relations with the United States since those relations were already deteriorating.⁶⁰ Regime change can also occur without a previous crisis or confrontation with the targeted leader. A foreign power may decide to remove a seemingly conciliatory leader because the foreign power anticipates this leader will renege on cooperation. France, for example, overturned the 1964 coup that ousted Gabonese leader Léon M’ba, despite the new government’s assurances that it would maintain a pro-French policy. French President Charles de Gaulle anticipated this new government would be less accommodating than M’ba had been in satisfying French demand for uranium.⁶¹

      In sum, when a foreign power confronts a domestically weak target, a major event or crisis can play a role in the ultimate decision to impose regime change. The event or crisis not only prompts policymakers to reassess their policy options, but it can also lower the expected costs of using military force. Events or crises may arise from the target’s defiant behavior or they may be unrelated to it. Either way, although crises and events may hasten a regime-change decision, they do not cause it. That decision still depends on the targeted leader’s domestic opposition and the effect that opposition has on the foreign power’s expected costs of bargaining and regime change. This suggests the following hypothesis:

      H1a3: When a foreign power confronts a domestically weak leader, a major event or crisis can serve as a catalyst for the decision to impose regime change.

      Responses to the Threat of Regime Change

      Targeted leaders may be able to anticipate when their resistance to a stronger power’s demands will lead that state to use their domestic enemies against them. How they respond in these instances depends on the immediacy of the foreign power’s threat to impose regime change. When the foreign power plans to use direct military force and mobilizes for an invasion, the threat of regime change is more immediate and thus more credible. A targeted leader might then offer partial or temporary compliance to defuse a crisis and forestall an attack. The target’s cooperation can also increase the diplomatic and domestics costs of regime change for the more powerful state by making the target appear conciliatory and the aggression against it unwarranted.

      When the stronger power plans to use indirect or covert force, however, its threats to impose regime change are more remote. The foreign power’s regime-change operations may not only take longer to succeed, but they may also be less likely to succeed, because of the foreign power’s reluctance to use direct force. Given this longer time horizon and lower odds of success, the targeted leader (if he or she suspects the foreign power has plans for regime change) is likely to adopt defensive measures to increase the costs of regime change and force the foreign power to negotiate. Targeted leaders, for example, may crack down on their domestic opposition to eliminate any alternative to their own rule. Other defensive measures include attempts to align with an adversary of the foreign power, as Cuba did during the Cold War, or to acquire nuclear weapons, as North Korea ultimately did.⁶² These measures will not only shore up the target’s defenses against FIRC, they may also enhance its ability to resist the foreign power’s coercive pressure.

      The defensive policies of Albanian chief of state Enver Hoxha demonstrate how indirect or covert threats of regime change can end up exacerbating a targeted leader’s defiance. Yugoslavia attempted to topple Hoxha after he refused to join a Yugoslav-dominated union in 1946. Hoxha responded by exploiting the rivalry between Stalin and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito to secure Soviet protection.⁶³ Stalin ordered the construction of a military base in Albania and also sanctioned Hoxha’s elimination of his internal rivals.⁶⁴ After Stalin’s death, Hoxha came under pressure from Moscow to mend relations with Belgrade. He managed to survive subsequent Yugoslav and Soviet covert attempts to oust him by preemptively purging his opponents. By the 1960s, he was able to exploit another rivalry—this time between the Soviet Union and China—to gain Chinese assistance.⁶⁵ In all, Hoxha succeeded in making regime change infeasible for his foreign enemies. By threatening it, Belgrade and Moscow had inadvertently made Hoxha more difficult to control. Indeed, he was the only leader of a Warsaw Pact state to successfully withdraw from the treaty during the Cold War.

      In short, threats to impose regime change can be self-defeating when they lack immediacy or credibility. Insincere regime-change threats, whether made to please a domestic audience or to coax the target to the bargaining table, may only encourage that target to take defensive action. Even when committed to the target’s overthrow, if the foreign power relies on covert or indirect military action, the target is likely to respond by acquiring arms, aligning with a rival power, or cracking down on domestic opponents. These measures can make the targeted leader more difficult not only to overthrow, but also to coerce if they reduce the target’s vulnerability to foreign military and economic pressure. In sum, my argument implies the following hypothesis:

      H1b2: A targeted leader is more likely to adopt defensive actions when the foreign power threatens regime change but does not signal the intention to use direct force.

      Additional Explanations

      The theories that offer the most complete explanation for FIRC can explain not only why states would want to remove a foreign government but also why they would bear the costs of doing so. Not all theories do. Many arguments in the literature on regime

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