LITMIR.BIZ

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to pre-emptively oust the foreign military and white mercenaries from the Katangese Gendarmerie’s order of battle. The logic of the surprise UN offensive was to outwit them now rather than having to overpower them later. Operation Rampunch, which became known as ‘Operation Rum Punch’ by the English-speaking peacekeeping forces, was the UN’s first direct response to the ever increasing belligerent behaviour of the Katangese. The UN was taking the mercenary fuel from the Katangan fire to contain the Congolese flames.

      All mercenary, foreign military and paramilitary forces were targeted for arrest. It was an attempt to reduce the kinetic-effect potential of Tshombe, his Katangan regime and his mercenary-led military force. By defusing his military power and prowess it was intended to cause him to seek a negotiated settlement more earnestly. For the previous six months (January to July 1961) peace talks had – frustratingly – not yielded the desired results and Irishman Dr Conor Cruise O’Brien, appointed as UN Special Representative in Katanga by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, was charged to deliver a solution to the reintegration of Katanga back into the Congo. Thwarted by Tshombe’s evident determination to keep Katanga independent, Cruise O’Brien was equally – and as stubbornly – determined to bring the secession to an end. Tshombe and his overseas advisors were hoping to outlast the UN initiative, knowing the UN for its part was in the early days of pioneering its peacekeeping policies, making them match their on-the-ground coordination of military, political and diplomatic strategies. The Katangan secession was backed by European commercial patronage, whose own interests lay in ensuring that Katanga’s wealth did not fall into the hands of Congolese nationalists. A more forceful posture was required to demonstrate that the UN was serious about ending Katanga’s succession and Operation Rampunch was launched.

      Well organised and effective, the UN caught many of Élisabethville’s mercenaries off-guard with no casualties suffered or inflicted and very few shots fired. The pattern was the same throughout Katanga and initially it was a resounding success; all of the operation’s military objectives were achieved, the majority of the mercenaries were captured, Godefroid Munongo, the interior minister, was placed under house arrest, and control of a number of installations was wrestled from Gendarmerie hands. In staging a show of strength, the UN had demonstrated their willingness to forcibly implement the resolution of 21 February and – temporarily at least – seized the initiative from Tshombe.

      Meanwhile, on 4 August in north Katanga, another Irish unit, the 1st Infantry Group, took over command of Kamina Base. Their tasks were airfield defence, defending the base and its approaches, general administration of the base and protection of the Kilubi Dam and its hydroelectric station, located some sixty miles north east. In pursuance of that task, B Company, 1st Infantry Group, had taken over Kilubi on 16 August. Lieutenant Michael Minehane (later Major General and Force Commander, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFYCYP) 1992–94) remembers:

      Things took a serious turn from the 19 August onwards when headquarters in Leopoldville organised what was known as Operation Rampunch. This was [the] UN’s plan to haul in all the white mercenaries in Katanga, detain them and repatriate them. For us, that required the immediate setting up of a Detention Centre in Kamina and it also meant that we must be prepared for the hostility which it would give rise to in the Kamina area. The Detention Centre was prepared and our defences were upgraded in anticipation of the inevitable reaction that it would provoke. Detention started in all of Katanga on 28 August and within days we were hosting 150 men [as prisoners]. Tension mounted in Kamina and in the rest of Katanga. Detaining that many rogues created problems for us and we were happy to see a couple of Sabena 707s airlift them out of Kamina between the 9 and 14 September. By 14 [September] we had serious concerns about the intentions of the gendarmerie battalion in Kaminaville.

      Our unit had its first experience of action within days. Nobody in their wildest imaginings could have forecast that an attack would come from the air, but it did! A [Katangese Air Force (FAK)] Fouga jet appeared over the base and indicated to our observation tower that he intended to attack us. The pilot discussed likely targets and his general intentions with the staff of the tower. We had to consider some form of defence against this unexpected threat. The best we could come up with was our Vickers MMGs, which were mounted by our two artillery officers in an anti-aircraft mode for which they were never intended and ill suited. Nonetheless, fire was directed at the Fouga on its next visit. In all, the Fouga paid us about six visits during which he strafed airport buildings and defensive positions. On his second visit to us the pilot indicated that he intended to do damage, that the joking was over. Sure enough he selected a DC-3 on the runway and offloaded his hardware on it. He scored a bull’s-eye and the plane went up in flames. This was pretty serious and we were left to ponder the future without defence against a developing and serious threat. He represented our very first taste of warfare, our first shots fired in anger. It was truly a benign introduction to fighting but for any soldier it was a singular experience.

      Katanga Gendarmerie on mobile patrol.

      Courtesy of the Military Archives, Dublin

      Sporadic fighting had broken out in Élisabethville [and during] the following days there [were] heavy exchanges of fire in the city. At Kamina [Base] we were aware of rumblings to the south in Kaminaville. Troops were assembling and their area of interest could only be the strategically important airbase at Kamina. They were eventful days and for me they were about to become even more eventful. My area of responsibility within the company was the support weapons, i.e. MMGs and our tiny 60mm mortars. The company was commanded by Commandant Kevin MacMahon and my platoon was commanded by Captain Thomas Hartigan.

      On the late evening of 14 September 1961 I was called to Kevin’s office where I received a brief, to the effect that the Swedes at Kaminagate [sic] were under attack by the Gendarmerie, and were in dire need of support. Since mortars were my business, Kevin instructed me to get on up there and give them a hand. Mortars come in a variety of sizes. At 60mm, my three mortars were the smallest made and not likely to impress the Swedes as serious support. We had to help them and soon I was on my way with a crew of Sergeant McCabe, Private Jack McGrath and others.

      We rendezvoused with a guide at about ten in the evening and some three miles south of the base. I remember it as a beautiful moonlit night and I vividly recall all the sounds of an African evening, especially the crickets. I remember too, as we moved towards the Swedish position, the voice of a Swedish radio operator in our vehicle, calling to his base: ‘Alpha Rudolf, Alpha Rudolf, kum, kum.’ Movement forward to the Swedish position was eerie and worrying, since we were in totally strange territory. However, we were led in safety by our Swedish guide. We were extremely happy to find prepared mortar trenches located in a very suitable place just to the rear of the Swedish forward trenches.

      Early in the day a company-sized detachment of Gendarmes had tried to penetrate the base along the road. The Swedes fought well and held off the attack. The Gendarmerie took casualties and backed away, leaving behind a large truck laden with ordnance. As dawn broke I was able to observe the truck some 300m from our positions. Its driver was dead in the cab and on top of the cab was another dead soldier who had been manning a machine-gun mounted atop the cab. As the light improved it was possible to see that the Gendarmerie were making serious efforts to recover their truck and its ordnance. By that time my crew was set up and ready for whatever came our way. The Swedish commander came and talked to me about neutralising the truck with mortar fire. I advised him that while he was asking the impossible, we would give it a go. The mortar is essentially a neutralising weapon. It is not a pin-point target weapon. Even the idea of targeting a truck at the distance seemed fanciful. In true artillery style we bracketed the truck – one round just beyond, then one round short and the next landed smack, bang on the truck. The Swedes were delighted and, needless to say, full of admiration for our skills (good fortune)!

      On the first day of Operation Rampunch 73 mercenaries were arrested in the province – 41 by the Irish – and by 8 September, 273 non-Congolese personnel in the Katangan Gendarmerie (mercenaries and Belgian officers) had been repatriated, with some 65 awaiting a similar departure. In all, more than 75 per cent of known mercenaries in Katanga were arrested and flown out by the UN. ‘The game was up’ was how matters were generally perceived

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