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The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. James H. Blount
Читать онлайн.Название The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
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isbn 4057664137654
Автор произведения James H. Blount
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Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and emphasize on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made in lucid language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek. General Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first American troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May 1st, and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat as a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United States of retaining the Philippines. “I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey,” says General Anderson in the North American Review for February, 1900, “that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured.” He adds: “Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request.”
General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the Filipinos—1300 at one clip in the month of June at Olongapo.50 These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented the Filipinos from taking until Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon, he promptly sent Captain Coghlan with the Raleigh and another of his ships to the scene of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the German “Hoch der Kaiser” etc. or words to that effect, and made him go about his business and let our ally alone. Then Captain Coghlan took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them over to Aguinaldo by direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as well as the test of, an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring into the partnership something you lack. The navy had no way to keep prisoners of war. There can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey’s original notions about meeting the problems presented by his great victory of May 1, 1898, had been followed, we never would have had any trouble with the Filipinos; nor can there be any doubt that he made them his allies and used them as such. They were very obedient allies at that, until they saw the Washington Government was going to repudiate the “alliance,” and withhold from them what they had a right to consider the object and meaning of the alliance, if it meant anything.
The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the National Geographic Society in Washington, “We blundered into colonization.”51 As we have seen, Admiral Dewey repeatedly expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the Filipinos were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more capable of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part of the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong as the gateway to the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the carrying trade of the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at Manila by way of rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that the taking of the islands was a dubious step from a financial standpoint, and a still more dubious one from the strategic standpoint of defending them by land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or any other first-class power. At this late date, when the passions and controversies of that period have long since subsided, is it not perfectly clear that after he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey not only dealt with the Filipinos, until the army came out, substantially as Admiral Sampson and General Shatter did with the Cubans, but also that he did all he properly could to save President McKinley from the one great blunder of our history, the taking of the Philippine Islands?
1 Hearings on Philippine affairs, Senate Document 331, part 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1901–2, proceedings of June 26–8, 1902.
2 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2927.
3 The Senate Document has it backwards “left Mirs Bay for Hong Kong,” clearly an error.
4 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2932.
5 Cong. Record, April 17, 1900, p. 4287.
6 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2928.
7 Ib.
8 S. D. 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.
9 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2937.
10 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2934.
11 Ib., p. 2967.
12 See pp. 2928 and 2956, S. D. 331, part 3.
13 S. D. 331, pt.3, p. 2965.
14 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
15 Ib., p. 2936.
16 Ib., p. 2940.
17 See letter of H. Irving Hancock, American war correspondent in the field, dated Manila, May 3, 1899, published New York Criterion, June 17, 1899. This Hancock interview with General MacArthur was quoted in debate on the floor of the Senate on April 17, 1900 (see Cong. Rec. of that date), and was corroborated by General MacArthur himself as substantially correct in that officer’s testimony before the Senate in 1902, S. D. 331, pt. 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1942, in answer to questions put by Senator Culberson.
18 Rev. Clay Macaulay, who afterwards made that statement in a letter to the Boston Transcript.
19 S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
20 S. D. 208, part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 7, 8.
21 Cong. Record, December, 1897.