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toward free exchange have been subject to constant interrogation. In the early nineteenth century, the optimism of an Adam Smith or a David Ricardo was already being denounced on the grounds that the underlying vision of the wealth of nations was an abstraction. In France, Germany, and the United States, the calls for adopting systematic protectionism were thus heeded by governments for social and political reasons as well as economic ones. “Where industry is concerned, we are conservatives, protectors,” according to François Guizot, the leading figure in French political liberalism of the period.1 He was concerned that free exchange would lead, as he put it, to “introducing a disturbance into the established order,” and for that reason he and his friends defended “national work” against “cosmopolitan competition.” In Germany, in 1841, the economist Friedrich List published Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, which was to prove profoundly influential for the future of his native land. List proposed the creation of a customs association (Zollverein) to encourage the political unification of the country through the establishment of a protected economic zone. His aim was in no way doctrinal: for him, protectionism was a circumstantial instrument for the “industrial education of the country.”2 The same thing held true in late nineteenth-century America, which limited foreign imports in order to ensure the rise of its own manufacturing industry.

      From the protectionist perspective, the reign of free exchange and the globalization that comes with it are not evaluated solely from the standpoint of the economic and social balance sheet that can be drawn up, either globally or on specific points. They are denounced, first of all, as being vectors of the destruction of the political will. They are accompanied by a transfer of the governing authority to anonymous mechanisms, which precludes the possibility that peoples can have sovereignty over their own destinies. They sketch out a world presumed to be governed by “objective” rules, a world that rejects as incoherent the very idea of an alternative to the existing order.3 This dispossession is aggravated by the rise in power of independent authorities that develop wherever the reign of free trade and globalization has taken hold. Where European populisms are concerned, the European Union appears as the symbol and laboratory of this perverse confiscation of popular power by expert reasoning and the invisible hand of the market. From the populist standpoint, the EU illustrates in exemplary fashion the installation of a “government by numbers” that is superseding the exercise of political will.4

      This political and democratic understanding of protectionism is also directly tied, in populist discourse, to an analysis of immigration. The development of an immigration policy is described as a process imposed on the country by the dominant classes in their quest for cheap labor, without explicit validation by any democratic decision.7 Thus, for populists, immigration entails an unacceptable bypassing of the popular will; it is the product of a capitalist strategy that has led to a downgrading and a weakening of the autochthonous popular classes. Extended to renewed control of migratory flows, the protectionist imperative is thus also viewed as contributing to a reinforcement of popular sovereignty. Here again, the political notion of sovereignty is wholly inseparable from the way economic and social questions are approached in the populist vision.

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