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blacks, she will be “confine[d] . . . to the white basis of representation.” ⁵⁴ It is difficult to dispute Justice Harlan’s conclusion that §2 “expressly recognizes the State’s power to deny ‘or in any way’ abridge the right . . . to vote.” ⁵⁵ Were this doubtful, doubts are dispelled by the “blinding light” of the legislative history.⁵⁶ Since that is disputed by Van Alstyne and Justice Brennan, the evidence must be permitted to speak for itself, unfiltered by a commentator’s paraphrase.

      Bingham, a leading Republican member of the Joint Committee, the pillar of the neoabolitionists, said, “we all agree . . . that the exercise of the elective franchise . . . is exclusively under the control of the States . . . The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power of regulating suffrage in the several States.” ⁵⁷ Instead, as he said of a predecessor proviso, it “offers an inducement to those States . . . to make the franchise universal.” ⁵⁸ On the Senate side, Chairman Fessenden said of an earlier provision, H.R. No. 51, couched in terms of racial discrimination respecting suffrage, “It takes the Constitution just as it finds it, with the power in the States to fix the qualifications of suffrage precisely as they see fit . . . If in the exercise of the power you [States] have under the Constitution you make an inequality of rights, then you are to suffer such and such consequences.” ⁵⁹ When illness prevented Fessenden from explaining §2, Senator Howard stated: “The second section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise with the States, and does not meddle with that right.” Later he added: “We know very well that the States retain the power which they have always possessed of regulating the right of suffrage . . . the theory of this whole amendment is to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with . . . the States.” ⁶⁰ Senator Yates of Illinois recognized that “we do not obtain suffrage now”; Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin stated, the “amendment proposes to allow the States to say who shall vote”; Senator Poland of Vermont would have preferred that “the right of suffrage had been given at once,” but realized it was not “practicable”; Senator Howe of Wisconsin likewise preferred to say “no man shall be excluded from the right to vote” to saying “hereafter some men may be excluded from the right of representation.” ⁶¹

      In the House, Blaine of Maine stated, “The effect contemplated . . . is perfectly well understood, and on all hands frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a large representation in this House, based on their colored population, so long as that people shall be denied political rights. Give them the vote or lose representation.” ⁶² Conkling stated that the Joint Committee rejected proposals “to deprive the States of the power to disqualify or discriminate politically on account of race or color” and preferred “to leave every State perfectly free to decide for itself . . . who shall vote . . . and thus to say who shall enter into its basis of representation.” “ [E]very State,” he reiterated, “will be left free to extend or withhold the elective franchise on such terms as it pleases, and this without losing anything in representation if the terms are impartial to all.” And he summed up, “every State has the sole control, free from all interference, of its own interests and concerns,” spelling out that if New York chose to withhold suffrage, “her right cannot be challenged.” ⁶³ Stevens, co-chairman of the Joint Committee, stated that the right of a State to disfranchise “has always existed under the Constitution” and the proposed “representation” provision “acknowledges it.” He repeated that “the States have the right . . . to fix the elective franchise” and that the proposed representation provision “does not take it from them.” In fact, he preferred the reduction of representation to an “immediate declaration” that “would make them [Negroes] all voters”; he did not “want them to have the right of suffrage” until they had been educated in “their duties . . . as citizens.” ⁶⁴ Although Garfield expressed his “profound regret” that the Joint Committee had been unable to “imbed . . . [suffrage] as a part of the fundamental law of the land,” he stated, “I am willing . . . when I cannot get all I wish to take what I can get.” ⁶⁵ Similarly, John F. Farnsworth of Illinois stated, “I should prefer to see incorporated into the Constitution a guarantee of universal suffrage; as we cannot get the required two-thirds for that, I cordially support this proposition as the next best.” ⁶⁶

      Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts congratulated the Joint Committee for “waiv[ing] this matter in deference to public opinion,” and George F. Miller of Pennsylvania stated, “This amendment will settle the complication in regard to suffrage and representation, leaving each State to regulate that for itself.” ⁶⁷ Against this mass three Democrats raised the possibility in the House that the amendment might affect suffrage qualifications.⁶⁸ On the other hand, leading Democrats—Senators Reverdy Johnson and Garrett Davis—better understood that it left suffrage to the States.⁶⁹ These historical materials, which by no means exhaust the quotable statements,⁷⁰ seem to me, as to Robert Dixon and Ward Elliott, “overpowering,” “overwhelming.” ⁷¹ In discreetly skirting the issue the Court tacitly acknowledged their unimpeachability. The rebuttal thus eschewed by Chief Justice Warren was undertaken by Professor Van Alstyne, and it emboldened Justice Brennan to pick up the cudgels in a later case, Oregon v. Mitchell.

      Before examining the Warren and Brennan opinions it is desirable to consider in this setting the argument against reapportionment and its relation to suffrage.

Supplementary Note on Suffrage

      My view, echoing that of Justice Harlan, is that the framers excluded suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment. Consideration of the opposing view will be facilitated by encapsulating a few striking evidential items. Section 2 of the Amendment provides that if suffrage is denied on account of race, the State’s representation in the House of Representatives shall be proportionately reduced. Senator William Fessenden, chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, explained that this “leaves the power where it is but tells them [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise the power wrongfully, such and such consequences will follow.¹ Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, to whom it fell to explain the Amendment because of Fessenden’s illness, said,

      We know very well that the States retain the power . . . of regulating the right of suffrage in the States . . . the theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with . . . the States, and not to assume to regulate it by any clause of the Constitution.²

      Howard is confirmed by the Report of the Joint Committee, which drafted the Amendment: “It was doubtful . . . whether the States would surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached.”

      

      In consequence the committee recommended Section 2 because it “would leave the whole question with the people of each State.” ³ It was this “gap” in the Fourteenth Amendment that led to the adoption of the Fifteenth, which prohibited discrimination with respect to voting on racial grounds.⁴ The Fifteenth, the Supreme Court said, testifies that suffrage was not conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment.⁵ Justly did Justice Harlan conclude after his own exhaustive survey of the debates that the evidence was “irrefutable and still unanswered.” ⁶ Commentators are widely agreed that suffrage was excluded from the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁷

      My reliance on Senator Howard and others indicates to William Nelson that I read “the intention of the authors and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly,” that is, as “not intended . . . to grant blacks voting rights.” ⁸ Yet he notes that “the statement most frequently made in debates on the Fourteenth Amendment is that it did not, in and of itself, confer upon blacks . . . the right to vote.” ⁹ The saving phrase “in and of itself” presumably reflects his fondness for newspaper articles, which prompted him to criticize Alexander Bickel because “Bickel did not spend time examining newspapers systematically,” ¹⁰ as if such articles could overcome unequivocal statements in the debates.¹¹

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