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Grierson, I present him as a theorist with a distinct character and intellectual background. It is true that Rotha's argument in general follows the same examples Grierson used in his own essays such as “The Russian Examples” and “First Principles of Documentary” (Grierson 1971: 121–132; 145–156). Nevertheless, I argue that Rotha can still be distinguished from Grierson in his incorporation of dialectical thinking – or the collision between two or more categories that are mutually exclusive or self‐contradictory – into the theoretical debates on documentary. And for this very reason, he deliberately replaced Grierson's famous definition of documentary (“the creative treatment of actuality”) with his own formula (“the creative dramatization of actuality”), despite his animosity to what he called the “story‐film.” Consequently, both wartime and postwar Japanese criticisms revolved mostly around Rotha's particular usage of the term dialectics (benshōhō).

      Finally, in contrast to Nornes' restriction on the contemporary reception of Rotha in wartime Japan, I address more insightful and creative interpretations of his theory emerging in the postwar period. Film historians have acknowledged that the ways in which Japanese critics adopted Rotha's theory before the end of World War II were highly biased due to the period's peculiar ideological setting. For instance, the documentary critic/filmmaker Noda Shinkichi wrote in 1967 that “it is not until the end of the war that Rotha's theory received proper criticism,” because, he added, most wartime Japanese critics and filmmakers appropriated the idea of documentary for the sake of militaristic nationalism (Noda 1973: 334–335). This temporal gap also indicates a significant shift in the attitude of Japanese critics toward the general value of Rotha's writings: no longer deeming it necessary to follow Rotha's original intentions, those postwar commentators tended to use him as a practical point of reference for the development of their own documentary theories.

      At first glance, Tsumura's counterargument seems reasonable to the extent that he rightly criticizes his fellow Japanese critics' lack of “critical mind” (hihyō seishin) toward film theories imported from the West and provides a point‐by‐point critique of Rotha's text by revealing its logical flaws (Tsumura 1940: 109). However, the true incentive for Tsumura to write this essay was Rotha's relentless attack on all cinematic forms other than documentary. It is true that Rotha indicates in his introduction that he has no intention “to decry or limit the functions of the cinema as entertainment” (Rotha 1936: 15–16), but in the pages that follow he repeatedly stresses his opposition to the commercial use of the medium and the industry's exclusive reliance upon sugar‐coated delusive stories:

      The fact is that under the limits defined by the present commercial system, entertainment cinema cannot possibly hope to deal either accurately or impartially from a sociological point of view with any of the really important subjects of modern existence. It is my contention, moreover, that whilst developed under the demands of financial speculation alone, cinema is unable to reach a point where its service to public interest amounts anything more valuable than, as Mr. Blumer has it, an emotional catharsis.

      (Rotha 1936: 46)

      Absolutely furious at this one‐sided judgment, Tsumura responds with a similarly aggressive rejection of Rotha's book project as a whole:

      In other words, Rotha's book is very brave and heroic. While praising the documentary that is based on materialist socialism as the most valuable future form of cinema, it in turn smashes fiction film [geki eiga] into smithereens and verbally abuses it everywhere and as much as possible. Moreover, the way he assaults fiction film is totally reckless and idealistic, and I must confess that this is one of the reasons that gave me the guts to present my criticism of Paul Rotha.

      (Tsumura 1940: 111)

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