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more than an acknowledgment of contemporary reality, but it also suggests that Herodotus is not a simple determinist with a cyclical view of history.

      Herodotus clearly has his own times in view, and particularly the rise of the Athenian Empire and the resulting tensions in the Greek world which culminated in the battle for archē in the PELOPONNESIAN WAR (esp. 8.3; 6.98; prolepses extend as far as 430 BCE: 7.137), and some scholars have read the work as closely foreshadowing those developments (Raaflaub 1987) and as warning the Athenians that their empire will share the fate of its predecessors (Moles 1996). Certainly there are disquieting elements in the closing chapters, in which the Athenians carry the war into ASIA, impale ARTAŸCTES (a Persian punishment: see MUTILATION) and stone to death his innocent son (9.114–21: the annalistic formula at the end of the passage positively invites meditation on the sequel), and already after the Battle of Salamis THEMISTOCLES had begun to extort money from other Greeks (8.111–12; note the Andrian rebuff in terms of their poverty), though the complexities of the passage, including evocation of the TROJAN WAR, the differences between Greece and Persia which contribute to Herodotus’ explanation of the outcome of the war, and the ambiguities surrounding Persia’s failure already noted all leave scope for a more open‐ended reading of this enigmatic and not obviously closural sequence (Boedeker 1988; Dewald 1997; and see END OF THE HISTORIES).

      Indeed, while on one level Herodotus indubitably takes a moralizing view of empire, he also recognizes it as a comprehensible human drive explicable in terms of a variety of factors which are not mutually exclusive. Beyond the natural will to power and the desire to expand, attacks on neighbors may be pre‐emptive and motivated by concern for self‐preservation (1.46; 7.11), or else envisaged as retaliatory (1.73, 75; 7.8.β, 11 and see RECIPROCITY and VENGEANCE: revenge on the Athenians for the burning of the temple of CYBELE in SARDIS is a recurrent motif in Xerxes’ campaign, e.g., 8.68, 102, 140.α; cf. 6.101), while the cases of Darius (3.143) and Xerxes (7.8) show that individual kings may feel, or come under, pressure to take imperial initiatives for personal reasons, to present themselves as worthy and manly rulers and to live up to their predecessors, influenced by a perception that expansion has become a national tradition (which indeed might to some extent reflect authentic Persian ideology: Harrison 2015). These reasons are often combined, as when Darius plans to use revenge on the Athenians as a pretext (prophasis) for subjecting those Greeks who had not given EARTH AND WATER (6.94), and in the most fully developed cases, those of Croesus and Xerxes, the full range of human motivations are simultaneously in play, alongside the broader theological and cosmic patterns generated by Herodotus’ thinking about GODS AND THE DIVINE.

      SEE ALSO: Athens and Herodotus; Causation; Conquest; Date of Composition; Wealth and Poverty

      REFERENCES

      1 Boedeker, Deborah. 1988. “Protesilaos and the End of Herodotus’ Histories.” ClAnt 7: 30–48. Reprinted in ORCS Vol. 1, 359–78 (slightly revised).

      2 Dewald, Carolyn. 1997. “Wanton Kings, Pickled Heroes, and Gnomic Founding Fathers: Strategies of Meaning at the End of Herodotus’s Histories.” In Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature, edited by Deborah H. Roberts, Francis M. Dunn, and Don Fowler, 62–82. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Reprinted in ORCS Vol. 1, 379–401.

      3 Fisher, Nick. 2002. “Popular Morality in Herodotus.” In Brill’s Companion to Herodotus, edited by Egbert J. Bakker, Irene J. F. de Jong, and Hans van Wees, 199–224. Leiden: Brill.

      4 Flower, Michael A., and John Marincola, eds. 2002. Herodotus: Histories Book IX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

      5 Fornara, Charles W. 1971. Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

      6 Harrison, Thomas. 2015. “Herodotus on the Character of Persian Imperialism (7.5–11).” In Assessing Biblical and Classical Sources for the Reconstruction of Persian Influence, History and Culture, edited by Thomas Harrison and Anne Fitzpatrick‐McKinley, 9–48. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

      7 Immerwahr, Henry R. 1966. Form and Thought in Herodotus. Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press.

      8 Moles, John L. 1996. “Herodotus Warns the Athenians.” Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 9: 259–84.

      9 Raaflaub, Kurt A. 1987. “Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History.” Arethusa 20: 221–48.

      FURTHER READING

      1 Lateiner, Donald. 1989. The Historical Method of Herodotus. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

      ARCHELAOI, see DYMANATAE

      ARCHELAUS (Ἀρχέλεως, ὁ)

      CHRISTOPHER BARON

       University of Notre Dame

      Legendary Spartan king, son of AGESILAUS (1), member of the Agiad royal house of SPARTA. Herodotus mentions Archelaus in the GENEALOGY he provides for LEONIDAS before the Battle of THERMOPYLAE (7.204).

      SEE ALSO: Agis son of Eurysthenes; Teleclus

      FURTHER READING

      1 Vannicelli, Pietro, and Aldo Corcella, eds. 2017. Erodoto. Le Storie, libro VII: Serse e Leonida, 555–56. Milan: Mondadori.

      JOHN O. HYLAND

       Christopher Newport University

      Archery carried powerful symbolic associations in both the Ancient Near East and Greece. Achaemenid Persian reliefs avoid the image of the king in combat, but show him with bow in hand, confronting defeated enemies (BISITUN) or watching over loyal subjects (Naqsh‐i Rustam). Royal darics and sigloi minted in western Anatolia show the royal archer in more active stances, drawing his bow in Type II, and advancing with bow and spear (Type III). Herodotus is well aware of the bow’s associations with Persian masculinity and royal might (1.136.2; 3.30.1; 5.105.1). Greek perceptions of archery included the divine and heroic (APOLLO, ARTEMIS, HERACLES, and Odysseus), although a negative connotation, perhaps alluded to by HOMER (Il. 11.385–87), grew more common in the classical period.

      In practice, units of archers formed important components of Ancient Near Eastern ARMIES. Regular Persian infantry were armed with both bow and spear, and some Persian CAVALRY carried bows instead of, or in addition to, javelins. Bowmen were common in early Greece, and although they declined in number during the later ARCHAIC AGE, some continued to support hoplite spearmen during the PERSIAN WARS (van Wees 2003, 170–71; Davis 2013). In 479 BCE, ATHENS’ archers helped HOPLITES repel Persian cavalry at ERYTHRAE in Boeotia, and PAUSANIAS requested their aid (too late) at PLATAEA (9.22.1, 60.3). Unfortunately, Herodotus does not number them; THUCYDIDES claims that Athens possessed 1,600 archers in 431, compared with 29,000 active hoplites and reservists (2.13.6–8).

      Archers’ greatest advantages were

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