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       Immanuel Kant

      THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

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      2017 OK Publishing

      ISBN 978-80-7583-770-7

      Table of Contents

       Preface

       Introduction. Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason

       First Part. Elements of Pure Practical Reason

       Book I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason

       Chapter I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason

       Chapter II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason

       Chapter III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason

       Book II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason

       Chapter I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally

       Chapter II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception of the “Summum Bonum”

       Second Part. Methodology of Pure Practical Reason

       Conclusion

      Preface.

       Table of Contents

      This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to criticize the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile.

      With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought, without assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed impossibility of what it must at least allow to be thinkable should endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism.

      Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistence and objective reality; that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law.

      It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if it could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and preserve the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred to, but in fact our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. Those who boast of such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, but to exhibit it publicly that it may be tested and appreciated. They want to prove: very good, let them prove; and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms again in order to seek in the moral use of reason, and to base on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of which speculation cannot adequately prove.

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