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and philosophy of medicine? Interdisciplinary research, which constitutes part of this work, enables to answer this question negatively.

      Obviously the mainstream in historiography often leads to the study of the history of medicine beyond the general context of the development of natural science, global social and cultural processes, which in actuality have had a certain influence on the mindset of scholars and their research program. For example, the subject of substantive discussions becomes the fact itself of referring to the work of ancient and medieval scientists as “scientific”. Researchers who refuse to recognise Hippocrates, Galen or Avicenna as scientists refer to the modern-day definition of the concept of “science”, which involves the use of the experimental method and language of mathematical explanations.

B. Russell defines the concept of “science” as knowledge above all. It is widely accepted that this is knowledge of a special kind, which seeks to find general laws linking multiple separate facts. However, the view of science as knowledge is gradually being sidelined by the view of science as a force which controls nature. A person of science (Russell does not mean everyone, as many people of science are not scientists—he is talking about a person of science as he should be)—is an attentive, careful and consistent person. He only relies on experience in his conclusions and is not prepared to make sweeping generalisations. Such person does not accept theory just because it is elegant, symmetrical and is synthetic in nature, but examines it in detail and in real applications.2

According to André Comte-Sponville, science is a collection of knowledge, theories and hypotheses relating to the same subject or same field (for example, nature, living beings, the Earth, society, etc.). Science not so much states as it constructs this knowledge, in line with historical context, logically organising or proving it (to the extent to which it can be proven), achieving for it, if not universal, at least group recognition from competent minds (this is what distinguishes philosophy from all other sciences because the clash of competent minds is possible in philosophy), finally recognising that all sciences, except mathematics, are empirically falsifiable. Add to this the fact that the scientific approach usually counterposes the so-called common sense (scientific knowledge is not always self evident), and the following simplified definition could be made: science is an organised collection of verifiable paradoxes and corrected errors. An integral part of the essence of science is progress because science develops through “conjectures and refutations”.3

      Clearly, the given definitions (there are many such definitions) are fully applicable to the works of scientists from the ancient world. However, it is clear that the physics of Aristotle is different from the physics of Newton or the physics of Einstein.

      Today, the so-called standard conception of science is generally accepted. According to this conсeption, science and scientific knowledge are characterised, first of all, by objectivity. The world of natural phenomena is considered factual and objective. The goal of science is the precise description and explanation of objects and phenomena, processes and relationships existing in nature. Secondly, science establishes (this particularly guarantees objectivity) the laws of nature. Thirdly, scientific knowledge is formed in the process of impartial gathering of facts and relationships between them, the establishment of empirical laws based on said gathering of facts and further elaboration of scientific theory based on said laws.

      The objectivity of scientific knowledge, in my opinion, is clear for the doctor who draws knowledge from a physiological experiment and clinical practice.

      The scientific (even in the modern understanding of medicine or, for example, mathematics) nature of the actions and discourse of great doctors of the past is often so obvious that the term “protoscience” has gained a foothold in professional literature. It is generally used to describe the entire period of development of natural science, when the time before the advent of scientific revolutions is referred to as the “protoscientific” or “prescientific” period. Therefore, on one hand, the value and historical role of the work of scientists in the ancient and medieval ages is recognised, and on the other hand, the dissimilarity between the work of Aristotle or Soranus of Ephesus and the modern type of scientific research is also stated.

      Active discussion over the clear definition of the concept of “protoscience” itself continues. I think T. Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shift is key in understanding the structure of scientific revolutions. This theory is also subject to constant review and certain criticism. Against this backdrop, it is often quite difficult to discern ontological and gnosiological links between events and protoscientific methods and the modern-day development of certain disciplines.

When K. Popper’s book titled Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge4 came out, the term “protoscience” got a somewhat disparaging shade of meaning—“pseudoscience” or “something, which is not real science”. Furthermore, the understanding of the history of natural science before the 17th century as the development of some “not exactly scientific ideas”, taking cue from K. Popper, is typical for many historians working in the second half of the 20th century. This is a part of presentists methodology ‒ to think only modern science is real.

      I use the term “protoscience” following another, long-standing historiographical tradition under which certain works of ancient scholars are taken as ideas that are ontologically very close to modern ideas. I argue that they may be considered as partially commensurable with them. Remember, according to the modern conception of science, rationality, objectivity, reproducibility and verifiability, logical rigour, preciseness and logical interrelation of various elements are considered the hallmarks scientific knowledge. These characteristics are sometimes supplemented with utility, which reflects the essence of science as part of culture. These attributes are characterised by the ideals of scientific rigour. The task of science is to reveal patterns and general principles which facilitate not only the observation and stating of facts, but also their explanation. Such an approach defines very stringent requirements for historians and philosophers: the scientist must articulate inferences based on the analysis of sources.

      When it comes to the fundamental methodological difference between the modern science and protoscience in the ancient world, two principal points are normally highlighted: the experimental method of studying specific natural phenomena and mathematical processing of the obtained data. The latter involves systematisation and description of observable phenomena using mathematical formulae and equations. But here another question arises: from this perspective, can modern-day medicine be considered science? After all, to this day, mathematical explanation of observable processes has not become part of the everyday practice of the doctor. Furthermore, I can boldly predict that it never will.

A fundamental division of modern science and science of antiquity has become general in historiography (it is considered as a result of the scientific revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries). Brief analysis of the numerous arguments of supporters of this point of view shows that they relate primarily to questions of the methodology of knowledge: in their opinion, it was believed in antiquity that the comprehension of the world around was possible only through notion sciences (philosophy and mathematics)—natural (intrinsic) was contrasted with technical (artificial, created by man)5. In particular, it is suggested that science of antiquity adhere to the “empirical” method of studying nature, in contrast to the “experimental” method inherent in modern science. This thesis is generally illustrated by examples from the history of physics and, sometimes, mathematics.

On the other hand, the judgment of early Ionian physics (6th century BC), as the starting point of nature research nucleation from a rational methodology, also became general in modern historiography. In this case, the rationalism of ancient science means the union of astronomical, biological, etc. phenomena by not mystical, but natural physical causes. The three natural sciences specialties—mathematics, astronomy and medicine—are considered to be the most ancient; its appearance is directly related to the early Ionian physics. As early as the beginning of the 4th

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