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obligation” to the Western reader rather than the author (see “Howard” and also Lingenfelter). The debate about distorting reality, too, is instructive. In Hegel’s sense (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences 1: The Logic 2.8.112), it is not advisable to “look upon the world before us in its immediacy as something permanent and positive,” since what we can regard as Being is “the superseding of all that is immediate”; owing to the principle of negativity, immediate reality or the given carries the seeds of its dissolution, as the forms of phenomenal reality are contingent (see Zhang Shiying, and also for instance Button 192, 219–20). This is also a vital way to think of the query about representativity, or a notion of mainstream reality. Song Binghui vindicates Mo Yan’s creation of “a symbolic mixture rich in meaning” which features a “genuine concern for human nature as engrossed in the specially Chinese social-historical reality” (9); “existents and events of Mo Yan’s narratives do have their reference in the real world” (10).24 We would agree that fetters of “conventional realism” would not allow the writer to address significant real-world concerns.

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      Our topic leads straight into the dispute about “skewing” the culture of one’s country. Such a practice would amount to a failure to give access to significant realities, to authentic or typical conditions. The accusation can bring about an impasse in representation as well as personal trouble. It is a form of “crisis in the correspondence between the representing discourse and the represented world” (with a suspicion that the writer is rendering little more than his/her own “aim and agenda,” as voiced by Khan and Qureshi), technically speaking a “shift from alloreferential to self-referential semiosis” (Nöth 10, 14). Further above, we have warned against treating a fictional work of art as an ethnographical document essentializing a culture. Yet the accusations against authors (in the previous section) show that non-ethnographical aesthetical representation is sometimes taken as if it was merely an opposite extreme, and is accordingly accepted only within narrow limits. Beyond what Winfried Nöth accounts for, there is a risk of losing the referent in such altercation when the depicted conditions’ reality is disputed and/or attention shifts away from them and toward the manner of representation. The Maghreb Page Editors, indeed, confidently proclaim that Daoud constructs “a non-existent space as the object of analysis.”

      We have heard, in the context of our first response, that literature represents “typical deficits, blind spots” within “dominant systems of civilizatory power” (Zapf). Yet critical assessments of the kind we refer to suggest it is mainly the writers themselves who reveal “blind spots,” whether or not they appear to be co-opted in a commodification culture. Adjudicating the dispute adequately would involve extensive, neopositivistic field research in each target country. A number of social research projects have been carried out (see for instance Churchill 118 and 244 for Afghanistan), so that we can and will compare their results with the fictional works and sometimes with legal culture to provide a more comprehensive picture of this complex topic. We can and will also compare the fictionally depicted conditions between works, for an assessment whether any of them are isolated cases. We do remain aware that social science studies as such can be equally liable to the charge of “blind spots”; for major research methods of intercultural and intergroup communication, for instance, it is well said that “each paradigm has its own meaning and rhythm much as is the case with different genres of music” (Ting-Toomey and Dorjee 49). Yet this does not mean that each is, accordingly, more concerned with its internal harmony than with its study objects. Formulating necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, as in a coherence theory of justification, is a challenging requirement both for social and literary inquiries.

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      We have referred, in our first approach, to authors’ contribution to a “remembering of erased and forgotten experiences and voices.” When authors delineate or expose honor- and face-induced violence, the question arises whether they are speaking about, or speaking for, those who are less privileged: hardly less than the latter preposition, the former is a mediated act, however legitimate we may understand the enterprise to be, and amounts to shaping others’ subject positions. When Ayfer Tunç for instance speaks about Western publishers’ expectation of stories “about lives ruined” (“Literature”), there is not much patent emphasis on speaking “for.” Because in our time the struggling masses “know perfectly well, without illusion,” Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault can diagnose “the indignity of speaking for others” (see Foucault, “Intellectuals” 207, 209). Yet we might take heed of the lingering effects of Gayatri Spivak’s suspicion that “[t];the social sciences fear the radical impulse in literary studies” (19). Literature subjects a character/person to being imagined “without guarantees, by and in another culture” in a Teleopoiesis of both distanciation and proximity; literary training is “the irony of the social sciences, if irony is understood as permanent parabasis” addressing its audience (Spivak 52).

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      This somewhat difficult statement becomes more transparent, surely, when we understand it as picking up the question “Who is speaking to whom” which we have touched on, in our second approach, and which has both conceptual and empirical relevance. The preposition has further implications than “about” and “for.” The narratives we are studying create fictive addressee positions with indexical orientation signs,

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