LITMIR.BIZ

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with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.⁸⁷

      A person having good character gets enjoyment from acting virtuously. That is, a virtuous person attains a kind of psychic harmony. Desires also come into play in the sense that a person who, for instance, has a generous character truly wants to be that way.

      Aristotle states that the twin excellences of reason and character are closely linked. We cannot have one but not the other. “It is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue.”⁸⁸ Since Aristotle does not explicate the precise way in which the two virtues are interdependent, scholars differ on this point. One view emphasizes practical wisdom (phron

sis), the intellectual virtue related to action, as the decisive disposition.⁸⁹ Another view lays stress on the inclination to have the right sort of feelings.⁹⁰

      Certainly Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is central to understanding the virtues of character.⁹¹ A virtue of character is an action-directing disposition to strike a state of equilibrium, or mean, between two extreme emotions in particular situations. For example, when faced with danger, courage is a person's disposition to attain the mean between foolhardiness and cowardice. It is not that the extremes by themselves determine the mean. Rather, the mean is determined by extremes relative to demands presented by some given situation, which includes facts concerning the person facing that situation. Additionally, it is by way of the idea of the mean that we grasp the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom because it requires a reasoned outlook on a set of circumstances to attain the mean. The concept of the mean also supplies a basis for differentiating genuine virtues from natural dispositions or emotions.

      The exercise of the intellectual virtues, including practical wisdom, is not merely something of instrumental value. As components of the fulfilled human life, the intellectual virtues as well as the virtues of character are each morally significant in their own right. Because they are part and parcel of the good life, there's no difference between selecting virtuous actions for their own intrinsic worth and selecting them as a pathway to happiness. Granted, both the nonrational and rational components of the soul are motivators of virtuous action. Yet just because the reason-holding portion of the virtuous person aims at virtuous conduct because it is good, constituting part of the good life, it does not follow that it is selecting such conduct simply as a route to happiness.

      It is reasonable to take Aristotle as holding that the virtues of character make up a whole, meaning that, like buying tickets for a subscription concert series, you cannot have one of them unless you have them all. So displaying the virtue of generosity involves more than just giving the proper measure to the right person at the appropriate juncture for the right reason. It would also be necessary to have obtained what is being passed around in conformance to the other virtues, for instance, justice. Similarly, the courageous individual needs temperance so as to not overreach by being reckless. And the temperate person requires courage to resist the temptation of peer pressure. Hence the person of virtue needs to consolidate the various virtues into a unity, allowing each of the virtues to display their respective value. Prudence plays a role in each virtue and in turn depends on all of them to keep from being more than just a mean-driven excuse for risk avoidance. Armed with such a disposition, a person of prudence will reckon into a given circumstance the requirements of the various virtues in order to craft a well-arranged verdict about how to act.

      Having merged the virtues of character into a concordant totality, could different virtues impose competing demands, pulling in different directions? For Aristotle, such dilemmas need not pose a threat to the excellent individual's virtue. When pressed to make a choice between distasteful alternatives, going with the least abhorrent one does not imperil your character, albeit you may experience a sense of remorsefulness for making the choice.

       Raising Existential Thoughts

      If you are consciously deciding that you wish to be a good person, are you thereby deciding the sorts of desires and emotions that you want to have? Based on the linkage of a good character to having the right kind of dispositions, it would seem that this would be the case. But on what basis should you decide what kinds of things you want to enjoy and desire in the first place? To be frank, if you take this route of inquiry, you are raising some deep existential questions for yourself. When I am getting to know my students at the beginning of a semester I ask them to write on a card what they want to do in their career, and what kind of lifestyle they want to have. “What are your objectives, both business and personal, and why,” I inquire. “Are you interested in just making money? Or is there something beyond that you are after? Do you want a career-driven lifestyle where work is everything, or a more balanced lifestyle where work matters but is not necessarily the end-all-and-be-all? Is there anything that might lead you to prefer the one lifestyle to the other?” Then I probe further with a string of almost mind-numbing questions: “Can you tell me what, deep down, you desire your desires to be?” “What do you actually want your inner wants to be?” “What do you prefer your preferences to be?” “What are you interested in being interested in, and why?”

      These questions matter. Sometimes people reflect back on their careers with a profound sense of regret of the sort depicted in Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Illich. They question whether they have really lived a good life. It occurs to them that, given the chance to do it all over again, perhaps they could find a way to devote more of their time to family life, or to be less occupied with their own self and more concerned with others. A person who has attained great financial achievements yet has fallen short of living a genuinely good life may have gotten shortchanged by being devoted to the kinds of considerations parodied in Sinclair Lewis's Babbit ⁹²—materialism, conformity, and false values—instead of being guided by reflection and contemplation.

      There is something exceedingly difficult about confronting such questions. Yet when you consider that the culture of the firm where you work sometimes exerts an enormous influence on your character, the task of selecting where you are going to work includes selecting the kinds of desires that you are likely to be fostering. This kind of choice is almost like selecting your character in advance. A choice about the character of the company you want to work at, and the line of occupation you will pursue, figures into a choice about the character of the person you wish to become. It is, in the end, an existential choice of the sort we will discuss further in Chapter 2 (“Authenticity and Freedom”).

      Opting to work at a particular company having a reputation for a virtuous culture might incline you to wish to become honorable and forthright as you imbibe that culture day in and day out. Making a decision in favor of some other firm, like the ruthless stock brokerage company portrayed in the movie Boiler Room, might lead you to prefer being cold-blooded and opulent. But how do you arrive at the knowledge beforehand of what sort of person you wish to become? Making a choice such as that is not what we would normally call a “rational” decision. (It is for this reason that we will look at the Sartrean account of character and the freedom of choice that lies at the heart of human existence in the next chapter.)

      For Aristotle, being reared in a good community constitutes the chief means of becoming virtuous. What the community considers as important influences what is taken to be virtuous. From childhood, a person starts to understand what courage is all about by being shown that certain kinds of actions exemplify courage, while others exemplify cowardice. Then, over time, a person acquires a habit of behaving courageously.

      Having a virtue requires using rationality and knowing what is important, being attuned to one's values. For instance, a person does not acquire the virtue of courage simply by going around mimicking courageous individuals. It is necessary for a courageous person to understand what she values. Only in this way can she be in a position to make a rational assessment of what degree of risk is called for to preserve what she deems important.

      While ethics depends on rationality, it bears a greater resemblance to endeavors such as navigation⁹³

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