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      P1: There exist identity statements between proper names which are known a posteriori (Frege’s Puzzle). P2: All identity statements between proper names are necessary (necessity of identity). C: There exist identity statements between proper names, which are necessary and known a posteriori.

      6. It is also worth noting that Soames too breaks down the significance of Kripke (1980) into six “most important aspects” (Soames 2003b, 336).

      7. In fact, this fits very nicely with my own explication of Wittgenstein’s philosophy from LaVine and Tissaw (2015). I hope to address the differences between my views and Soames’ on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in future work. These differences focus primarily on the understanding of Wittgenstein as having a deflationary conception of philosophy.

      8. Importantly, I am here just spelling out some of the details behind Marcus’ own point that “There remain lengthy bibliographies and historical accounts of intensional and modal logic as well as interpretations of modalities where reference to my work is absent, but that is gradually being corrected” (Marcus 2010, 83).

      9. It should be noted that there is a very unfortunate unrepresentativeness of these examples in that all of these works were published in English. As a monoglot English speaker, this is one of the areas where my book will simply unqualifiedly suffer. That said, this can also be seen as part of a further internal critique of the discipline which has a similarly problematic reliance on English.

      10. The results of this poll can be found at https://civs.cs.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/results.pl?id=E_70df4a00cd504826, accessed June 12, 2019.

      11. As Kukla notes, there are nontrivial issues about the metaphysics of speech acts built into this definition. That said, we can leave these aside here, since these could be avoided and the same points about discursive injustice made with the following definition:

      DEF’N: One is a victim of discursive injustice iff a speech act fails to occur simply because they have a social identity which has been traditionally marginalized/oppressed. For further discussion, see LaVine (2016b).

      12. After all, a failed proposal would seem to change the nature of our relationship. It would also make it a sore subject if others brought up marriage around us, etc. In this case, though, it seems that none of this would be true. This suggests that no proposal ever actually happened.

      13. For further discussion of the ways in which women are given norms which cannot be possibly satisfied at the same time, see chapter 1 of Haslanger (2012). We will discuss this more in chapter 2 of this book. So, while Kukla does not take a stance on how common this phenomenon is, it seems to me that part of the value in her work is giving a name to, and framework for discussing, something which is all too common. It is not just philosophers who notice this, either. Novelist and public intellectual, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, has a very interesting discussion, with similar examples, of similar matters on pp. 21–24 of Adichie (2014).

      14. Many thanks to Cole Heideman for this example.

      15. Again, this type of occurrence is clearly not limited to gender—I have seen this phenomenon occur with people of color, younger academics, etc. It is also not limited to the profession of philosophy. Adichie discusses a very similar example, saying “I have another friend, also an American woman, who has a high-paying job in advertising. She is one of two women in her team. Once, at a meeting, she felt slighted by her boss, who had ignored her comments and then praised something similar when it came from a man” (Adichie 2014, 23).

      16. For anyone who does find it to be a shock, I suggest reading through https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/.

      17. Also relevant here is the fact that this obituary even being published in the first place required serious campaigning on the part of some feminist philosophers and friends of Marcus’.

      18. For further discussion of this, see https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/01/11/new-analysis-offers-more-evidence-against-student-evaluations-teaching and http://benschmidt.org/profGender/#%7B%22database%22%3A%22RMP%22%2C%22plotType%22%3A%22pointchart%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22return_json%22%2C%22search_limits%22%3A%7B%22word%22%3A%5B%22genius%22%5D%2C%22department__id%22%3A%7B%22%24lte%22%3A25%7D%7D%2C%22aesthetic%22%3A%7B%22x%22%3A%22WordsPerMillion%22%2C%22y%22%3A%22department%22%2C%22color%22%3A%22gender%22%7D%2C%22counttype%22%3A%5B%22WordsPerMillion%22%5D%2C%22groups%22%3A%5B%22department%22%2C%22gender%22%5D%2C%22testGroup%22%3A%22D%22%7D as well as Fan et al. (2019) “Gender and cultural bias in student evaluations: Why representation matters.”

      19. In fact, we can find other examples of this just from the history of analytic philosophy and just sticking to gender. For instance, Rachael Wiseman and Clare MacCumhaill argued in their 2017 Women in the History of Philosophy Lecture that failure to treat Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch as a philosophical school has been connected to something like discursive injustice. See https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/research/womenhistoryphilosophy. Also, in chapters 3 and 5 I will discuss how Susan Stebbing’s importance to the history of analytic philosophy has been under-recognized. I also think this has something to do with discursive injustice.

      20. It is important to note that Berges does also use Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice as part of her explanation (Berges 2015, 385–87).

      21. One type of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice, defined by Miranda Fricker in the following manner:

      DEF’N: “Testimonial injustice happens when a speaker receives a deficit of credibility owing to the operation of prejudice in the hearer’s judgement.” (Fricker 2013, 1319)

      I believe we can explain the fact that, for example, Princess Elisabeth is not usually taught or anthologized along with Descartes in early modern philosophy research and teaching via testimonial injustice. I hope to be able to address this in future work.

Chapter 2

       The History (and Future) of Logic (and Ethics)

      §2.0 Overview of the Chapter

      This chapter will focus on the second subdiscipline, which gets placed at center stage in what I call “analytic philosophy the method”—namely, logic. While I am adopting a general policy of discussing formalisms and technicalities as little as possible, this chapter will be the one that discusses minutiae in more detail than any other. That said, the point of this chapter is to show that there can be significant emancipatory potential in sometimes doing so. In order to motivate sticking with this discussion of the minutiae, I begin with a number of thoughts that most clearly express the motivations of my own study of logic. First, John Mohawk on the founding principles of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy—the rightful stewards of every bit of land I have ever lived on, be it John Mohawk’s own Seneca people in Buffalo, the Oneida people in Vernon, the Onondaga people in Syracuse, or the Mohawk people in Potsdam:

      If you do not believe in the rational nature of the human being, you cannot believe that you can negotiate with him. If you do not believe that rational people ultimately desire peace, you cannot negotiate confidently with him toward goals you and he share. If you can’t negotiate with him, you are powerless to create peace. If you can’t organize around those beliefs, the principles cannot move from the minds of men into the actions of society. (Mohawk 1989, 221)

      Building on this very same idea of logic as tool for peace in the very same year, yet discussing very different temporal and cultural contexts, John Corcoran says,

      

      many exemplary moralists, including Socrates, Plato, Kant, Mill, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, showed by

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