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of understanding the relationship between the theses. That said, this is a substantive disagreement (one that I happen to agree with Soames and Burgess on), rather than the methodological one which Burgess thinks helped make the paper inappropriate for presentation.⁵ Hence, Burgess’ claiming that Smith’s work falls prey to R3 falls prey to his own R1—in thinking that Smith has confused endorsing and introducing part of NTR, he has failed to consider the important interconnections therein.

      With R1 coming into the discussion, we should turn to it. Again, my goal with respect to R1 is to show that there is something odd about Burgess saying it should rule out Smith’s work, because it would also rule out much of Soames’ historical work (and much good history). Remember, Burgess claims that the way R1 contributed to Smith’s work being such that it “should never have been taken seriously as a contribution to historical scholarship” was because “[Smith] attempts to reduce a complex philosophical theory to a list of a half-dozen discrete points” (Burgess 1998, 125). Unfortunately, Soames’ most well-known and recognized contribution to the history on these matters—Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: The Age of Meaning—does this as well.

      

      On the first page of chapter 1, Soames reduces the philosophical work of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations to several discrete views on three discrete topics.⁶ The discrete topics are:

      (i) a critique of what Wittgenstein regards as the dominant referential conception of meaning, and a proposal to replace it with a conception in which to use language meaningfully is to master a certain kind of social practice; (ii) a critique of the previously dominant conception of philosophical analysis, and the substitution of a new conception of analysis to play the central role in philosophy; and (iii) the development of a new philosophical psychology. (Soames 2003b, 3)

      Now, I would argue that Philosophical Investigations is a more complex work than Naming and Necessity (and that is meant as a criticism of Wittgenstein, not Kripke). That said, I do not think this means that there is anything wrong with Soames’ work.⁷ This is what analytic philosophy does at its best—it breaks complex views into the simplest pieces possible and their interrelations. So, again, holding that R1 should rule out Smith’s historical work would also rule out Soames’ own historical work and much good work on the history of philosophy. We find a similar issue in relation to R4—Burgess’ worry that Smith conducts his investigation using “especially ambiguous” terms such as “direct reference” and “necessity of identity.”

      Burgess’ R4 would rule out much of Soames’ historical work (and much good history). In fact, every class I took on the history of twentieth century analytic philosophy, which covered matters related to this debate, involved similar use of the terms “direct reference” and “necessity of identity.”

      The Discipline Broadly

      Now, remember that my goal is not to make charges against Kripke, Soames, Burgess, or any isolated individuals. My goal is to show that analytic philosophy has institutional problems with gender and to use the lack of recognition that Ruth Barcan Marcus has received as an example of that. The point of focusing on Soames and Burgess has been to start a pattern of showing lack of recognition, which is connected to under-citation and under-engagement with Marcus’ work. To continue that pattern, let us turn to the broader literature.⁸

      As I mentioned in the introduction, one of the things that I think warrants marking off a new phase of the analytic movement in the mid-1990s was the development of a self-conscious subfield of the history of analytic philosophy. Consistent with this increased self-reflection, there has also been a notable increase in work dedicated to metametaphysics and meta-philosophy. Because of their connection to NTR, both of these literatures provide a valuable resource for our discussion. Table 1.1 shows some of what we learn by looking at representative examples from these literatures (please note that the numerals in the Kripke and Marcus columns for histories of analytic philosophy and books on meta-philosophy represent numbers of pages on which they are discussed, while the numerals for the anthologies of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of language represent the number of works anthologized).⁹

      So, across these eighteen works, we find 361 pages dedicated to discussion of Kripke’s work and just forty-four pages of discussion of Marcus’ work, with eight anthology entries of Kripke’s work and none of Marcus’ work. With just what has been admitted about Marcus’ contributions so far, this should seem problematic. That said, I will return in the next chapter to some more of Marcus’ contributions that I hope will bolster this case.

      For now, I think it will be helpful to look at one further reference point to see something of the pattern of oddities in the discipline’s reception of Marcus’ work. One way to bring the whole discipline under the microscope is to look at the number of citations Marcus’ work has received—as done in table 1.2. To give us a baseline, I will include the five most-cited works of Kripke’s next to the five most-cited works of Marcus’. Also, so as to not be seen as begging the question, I include some philosophers who were ranked around Ruth Barcan Marcus in the poll that Brian Leiter ran on his blog in January 2015 asking philosophers to rank the most important Anglophone philosophers between 1945 and 2000.¹⁰

      

      Note that, despite finishing one spot below Alasdair MacIntyre and one spot above Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ruth Marcus has been cited thousands of times less than either of them. Since one might worry that this has to do with the areas of philosophy that the relevant thinkers worked in, I also included David Kaplan, who worked in very similar areas to Marcus. Despite finishing nine spots below Marcus in the Leiter poll, Kaplan too has been cited thousands of times more than Marcus.

Table 1.1 Insufficient Recognition and Engagement

      Furthermore, notice that Thomson, the only other woman on this list, has the second fewest citations. Again, to try to compare apples to apples, I included R. M. Hare in the list, a fellow ethicist working at relatively similar times. Despite her finishing five spots above Hare, Thomson has thousands fewer citations. I claim that we are hard pressed to plausibly explain this insufficient recognition, insufficient engagement, and insufficient citation in any other way than gendered injustice. It is toward making good on that claim that we now turn.

Table 1.2 Insufficient Engagement and Citation

      §1.4 Kukla on Discursive Injustice

      With the case for the existence of these oddities behind us, we can finally turn to an explication of the notion of discursive injustice. Kukla defines it as follows:

      DEF’N: One is a victim of discursive injustice when they “face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled to perform” simply because they are a member of a disadvantaged group. (Kukla 2014, 440)¹¹

      That is, Kukla’s work is an application of Austin’s (1962) theory of speech acts. Like speech act theory, generally, we begin with the distinction between saying something—the locutionary act—and the actions we engage in by saying something—the illocutionary acts. Once we recognize that there is a difference between locutionary and illocutionary acts, we should also realize that there is a difference between perlocutionary failures. Sometimes the audience does not grasp the locutionary content, other times they do not grasp the illocutionary force. Furthermore, there are times when this incorrect uptake can alter the illocutionary structure of the original speech act. Finally, within this class, there are times when that inability to produce the rightfully intended illocutionary force/act happens because of incorrect uptake due to a marginalized social identity of the speaker. These are the discursive injustices.

      To make discursive injustice as clear as possible, Kukla begins with examples of the genus of which discursive injustice

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