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Northern Ireland’s ’68. Simon Prince
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isbn 9781788550383
Автор произведения Simon Prince
Издательство Ingram
Consequently, O’Neill made the pleasing discovery that his fears about Wilson’s intentions had been exaggerated. Following a courtesy visit soon after the election, O’Neill met Wilson on 19 May 1965 ‘to get down to realities’.201 The British Prime Minister’s recollection was that he had only been ‘anxious that the … Unionist Government under … O’Neill should be encouraged to press on with their programme of ending discrimination’.202 Acknowledging the Stormont premier’s achievements and suggesting rather than demanding further reform became the established pattern for later meetings. On 5 August 1966, Wilson and Jenkins ‘expressed understanding of [O’Neill’s] position [but] explored serious lines along which further progress might be achieved’.203 The British ministers raised the possibility of appointing an ombudsman to examine claims of discrimination in the allocation of public housing, the current state of electoral reform, and the feasibility of Stormont passing a religious relations bill. The debate, however, was perfunctory. This enabled O’Neill to wriggle out of making specific commitments. Indeed, he was able to convince the British that it was ‘politically impossible to make further moves at present’. Jenkins simply insisted that ‘any pause should be of short duration’ and warned that ‘a return to unenlightened policies could mean Westminster “taking over”’.204
O’Neill’s success in claiming that the rise in extremist activity demanded a temporary halt to his reform programme reflected the recent IRA scare. In December 1965, O’Neill had alerted Soskice that he had ‘been advised by the R.U.C. that preparations are on foot for an early assumption of I.R.A. activities in Northern Ireland’. He stressed that the intelligence that had been acquired included ‘refer-ences to the perpetration of I.R.A. outrages in England’.205 As the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising approached, Soskice became increasingly nervous. ‘Information received from both Scotland Yard and the Northern Ireland Government’, he told Wilson in early April 1966, ‘shows that the threat is a real one.’ The British government responded by sending over ‘an additional infantry battalion ostensibly for training’.206 Violence did follow in the wake of the Easter Rising commemoration, but it was perpetrated by loyalists rather than Republicans. Westminster was therefore reluctant to weaken O’Neill’s position still further and risk this perceived reformer being replaced by a reactionary. A memorandum written in preparation for the talks outlined London’s thinking:
O’Neill has pursued a markedly more liberal line than his predecessors … there is no doubt that … O’Neill is running some political risk … Any action taken by the Westminster Government that implied that the present Northern Ireland Government did not enjoy its confidence would encourage the extremist elements which are opposed to the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. It would also have an effect on the Unionist Party itself and would probably bring more extreme elements there also.207
The Stormont premier, however, confessed to his Cabinet that by playing to Westminster’s sympathy for his difficulties he had merely ‘bought time’.208
Following the September 1966 revolt, O’Neill recognised that he had to protect himself against the criticism that he was selling out Ulster to the Labour government. Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister therefore arrived at Downing Street in January 1967 with his rivals, Faulkner and Craig. Wilson and Jenkins were joined by Alice Bacon, the Home Office Minister responsible for Northern Ireland. Greater familiarity with the region on the British side – limited though that still was – coupled with the presence of Stormont’s most chauvinistic ministers led to a fractious exchange. According to O’Neill, the sniping actually began as they filed into the Cabinet room:
‘Have you got no vices?’ the Prime Minister enquired [of Faulkner]. ‘I see you drank nothing at lunch.’ ‘I’m not against smoking and drinking,’ Brian replied. ‘It is just that my father gave me £100 not to drink till I was 21.’ ‘Oh, I see,’ said Wilson, ‘you’re earning the next £100 now.’ It was some time before Brian regained his composure.209
Bacon opened her assault by discussing how the Unionist government had responded to the memorandum on citizens’ rights. She stated that the Stormont Cabinet ‘had seemed convinced of the merits of the present [local government electoral] system’ and that Craig ‘was reported to have defended the principle of tying the franchise to a property qualification’. Craig countered that the question of universal adult suffrage should be addressed only after the review of local government had been completed. He nevertheless indicated that following the restructuring his preference would still be for a property based franchise. This clumsy admission led Wilson to ‘enquire … whether the present system would still be thought right if it produced a different political result’.210
O’Neill might have calculated that his rivals would relax their resistance to his strategy after personally witnessing Labour ministers pushing for reform. Indeed, O’Neill’s reluctance to confront opposition within the Cabinet and the wider party encouraged him to exploit British pressure as justification for change. During the subsequent Cabinet meeting, Faulkner acknowledged that ‘Wilson had clearly threatened’, while Craig noted that ‘pressure on the local government franchise would continue’. The pair, however, remained convinced that warnings about a possible intervention were hollow and that serious concessions were thus unnecessary. Faulkner’s ‘own impression’ was that ‘if the critics of Northern Ireland could be satisfied about alleged discrimination in housing and employment’, Westminster ‘might press less hard’ for universal adult suffrage. Craig – even after the mauling he had received at Downing Street – continued to hope that the existing franchise ‘could be defended by reference to the process of local government reorganisation’.211 Although their reasoning lacked sophistication, O’Neill’s rivals probably assessed Britain’s willingness to intervene more accurately than he did. Ironically, O’Neill’s liberal image had allowed Faulkner and Craig to obstruct reform without fear of sanctions. If a Faulkner or Craig premiership had been equally recalcitrant, Wilson might well have resorted to financial blackmail.
At one stage, the British Prime Minister had admittedly threatened that ‘within a period of about three years’ ‘Parliament would insist on interfering more and more with the internal affairs of Northern Ireland’. This menace, however, was not intended to speed up reform. Instead, it was designed to promote ‘an arrangement’ ‘whereby the British Parliament and Government would refrain from interfering at all … provided that Northern Irish members of … Westminster … observed the same discretion on voting on matters appertaining to Britain’.212 Wilson had not forgotten how the twelve Unionist MPs had conducted themselves during the first seventeen months of the Labour government. With an overall majority of only three, the ministry’s survival was made still more precarious by the Unionists voting with the Conservatives on exclusively British questions. In early 1965, Wilson had even consulted the Attorney-General about the possibility of restricting their voting rights.213 Following the August 1966 meeting, the Stormont Cabinet had responded to the ‘considerable resentment on the Labour side’ by agreeing to exercise ‘more control over the activities of Ulster Unionist Members’.214
The ‘greatest surprise’ of the January 1967 summit had therefore been ‘Wilson’s reiteration of the theme of the Ulster Members’.215 The Labour leader was so obsessed with this precursor