LITMIR.BIZ

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the restoration of a Shihabi prince, the embodiment of this abhorred “feudal” system, and representative of the old order.

      

      It was therefore reluctantly that Béclard was brought, on the express injunctions of his minister, to abandon a plan he favored and to defend another about which he held grave reservations. His mission in this sense was facilitated by the fact that in the last phase of the negotiations, when the commission had put aside the plan for Syria and was working on one for Lebanon only, Béclard was not as isolated as he originally had been. Indeed, an intense diplomatic offensive by the French minister for foreign affairs had in the meantime laid the ground for acceptance by the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian governments of the principle of the establishment of a unitary Christian government over the entire Mountain. His British colleague was then outnumbered and unwillingly rallied to the last plan devised, providing for a semi-autonomous united Lebanon administered by a Christian governor. The question of whether the governor should be a native or not was left open for negotiations in Istanbul between the European ambassadors and the Porte. But, even after the commission's adoption of this last option, favored by his government, Béclard remained of opinion that “establishing a strong government for the Mountain is possible—I can say with complete assurance—only if Syria is administratively detached from the rest of the empire. Only a strong central authority in Damascus can guarantee that the new situation in Lebanon will be maintained.”³⁹

      The setting of the Lebanese question within the general Syrian context had therefore imparted an altogether different scope to the problem. It brought the two leading commissioners to seriously question the opportunity of confirming the so-called privileges of the Mountain. Béclard and Dufferin were of the opinion that an improvement in the administration of the entire Syrian province represented the appropriate formula to guarantee a better and more secure future for the Christians of this region in general, and those of Lebanon in particular.⁴⁰ The two commissioners perceived the main danger facing the Christians of the province as stemming from a deficient administration, detrimental to its Christian and Muslim populations alike, rather than from the presumed fanaticism of its Muslim population. They believed that an improvement in living conditions under a strong and secular government, which would endeavor to assimilate them on the basis of equal civil and political rights, regardless of religious differences, would gradually and necessarily attenuate the current tensions and animosities and eventually ensure the emergence of a harmonious polity. This solution sought to ensure the security of all of the Christians of the region through the welfare of all of its inhabitants.

      In other words, this view posited that the security of the Christians could not be guaranteed against, but in conjunction with, that of the Muslim population. Religious differences should not be accentuated but toned down through the application of the principle of the assimilation of the diverse populations under one beneficial government, whereas the confirmation of religious differences, through their institutional and geographical sanction, would only lead to more conflicts and wars. Moreover, the establishment of a separate Christian entity along the coast could not solve the problem. It could only pit the Christians living in this new state against those of the Muslim interior and endanger the fate of those living inside and outside that state.⁴¹ In addition, it begged the question as to why the Christians of the interior should not benefit from the guarantees and privileges granted to those on the coast.

      In contrast, the establishment of an independent Christian Greater Lebanon, disconnected from its Muslim Syrian interior, was then energetically defended by the commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary Force, by most French publicists, and by the Maronite clergy. It was based on another perception of the Lebanese and Syrian questions that commanded a different sort of solution. Its emergence at that time opened up another episode in the development of the “Franco-Lebanese dream” that had fascinated certain Maronite and French circles for years past.

      THE FRENCH EXPEDITION

      The first detachments of the French Expeditionary Force reached Beirut at the beginning of August 1860. Officially, its mission consisted of helping the Ottoman authorities reestablish law and order, in coordination with the special representative of the Sultan, Fuad Pasha. From the start, however, this specific and straightforward task was shrouded in ambiguity and misunderstandings. The novelty of the force's role, consisting of a sort of peace-keeping mission avant l'heure, was quite perplexing for this epoch. The force was not sent to wage war against any enemy. Nor was it to intervene in or stop any ongoing fighting since hostilities had already ended by the time of its landing. Military speaking, its presence was therefore unnecessary. It was only meant to assist the repressive and pacificatory efforts of the Ottoman authorities, if and where need be. Ultimately, given the reluctance of Fuad Pasha to allow it to play any significant role, the French force proved redundant.

      The mission of the French force was essentially moral and preventive. Its dispatch was understood by its proponents as a symbolic warning from Europe to the perceived fanatical population and a sort of guarantee against the recurrence of new massacres. But, the mere presence of these French troops, as well as the political activity of its commander-in-chief, General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, conferred much more significance to this unprecedented European military enterprise in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire than its limited character warranted. Local Maronite circles and French officials and publicists also contributed to the enhancement of the import of this experiment.

      For many Frenchmen, the dispatch of French forces augured a more interventionist French policy in the Levant. Catholic circles, outraged by the massacre of Christians by perceived fanatical Muslims, cried out for vengeance. For them, retribution was to be twofold. It would avenge the blood of the recently slain Christians and would by the same token allow redress for the Crusaders’ debacle. Their views hardly disguised their feeling that a new round in the long-standing conflict between Christian and Muslim worlds had been opened. They hinted at the persistence of a certain Western historical vision and worldview imparting a religious character to the conflict between West and East and to the renewed appeal of the Crusader episode. The French press, as well as many contemporary pamphlets and narratives, were full of these kinds of allusions. Hence, the renowned Orientalist and future ambassador to Istanbul, Melchior de Vogüé, wrote on the eve of the arrival of the French forces in Syria: “It is as Christians, as adversaries of Islamism, that the Maronites, the peaceful residents of Damascus and other places, were massacred; it is as Christians that we must avenge them. The Cross has been deeply wronged; now it is the Crescent's turn. The whole of Christian civilization has been challenged; let it show its power.”⁴² As for the publicist Baptistin Poujoulat, the analogy between the departing French forces and the Crusaders, was crystal clear: “What did our ancient Crusaders intend to do in the East? Exactly what the expeditionary army of 1860 is going to do: wage war against Muslim barbarity. Let there be no mistake, then: the French soldiers . . . are also Crusaders. The aim of the West's expedition to the East in the Middle Ages was no different from the aim of today's expedition: to drive Islamism back into the desert, where it should always have remained.”⁴³ With more verve still, some were dreaming of a new Godeffroy de Bouillon who would soon enter Ste. Sophie,⁴⁴ or of the revival of the Frankish kingdom in the Levant and the restoration of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople.⁴⁵

      Even Napoleon III, who did not share the blind enthusiasm of Catholic circles, for whose satisfaction he had mainly undertaken this adventure in the Levant, could not prevent himself from alluding to these glorious and momentous historical events in an address to the departing French soldiers: “You are not going to wage war against any nation but to help the Sultan bring back to obedience subjects blinded by a fanaticism from another century. You will do your duty in this land far away, rich in memories, and you will show yourselves the dignified children of those heroes who gloriously brought the banner of Christ to that land.”⁴⁶ Beaufort, for his part, admonished his soldiers at the beginning of their mission, reminding them that in “these famous lands Christianity was born, and Godeffroy de Bouillon and the Crusaders, General Bonaparte, and the heroic soldiers of the Republic honored themselves. There you will find again glorious and patriotic memories.”⁴⁷

      For their part, some French liberal circles, less sensitive to these overwrought religious sentiments, were advocating

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