LITMIR.BIZ

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the rule of a Christian Emir. The Patriarch seemed nevertheless to have appreciated that his claims did not stand on very firm ground and so deemed it necessary, in order to strengthen his position, to add another point to his argument, mentioning that the Emir should be Maronite in view of the fact that “the Maronites inhabitants of Lebanon ... are larger [in number] than all the rest.”⁶⁶

      These two petitions from the Patriarch, the first of which was written as early as October 1840, marked the first expression of a Lebanist ideal that developed out of one basic claim: the establishment in the Mountain of a self-ruled entity whose links with the central government in Istanbul should be virtually nominal. They also represented the first appearance of the founding myth of this Lebanist ideology: an idealized portrayal of the history of the Mountain. The exceptional situation that obtained in the Mountain during the last years of the reign of Bashir II, projected into an ideal past, came to be viewed and presented as a set of established “rights” and inviolable “privileges and traditions.” This constructed tradition would become typical of most Maronite, and later secular, Lebanist literature promoting the establishment of an autonomous or semi-independent entity in Mount Lebanon. With a view to basing their claim on legitimate historical grounds, many Maronite and Lebanist writers reproduced and elaborated on the theme of an idealized traditional Emirate. A process of rewriting history, involving the obscuring of certain historical facts in order to convey an ideal picture or the misrepresentation of certain historical situations, was hence initiated.⁶⁷

      These idealized historical constructions were meant to support specific political plans and programs. They thus reflected the different claims and the specific contingencies to which they corresponded, varying, as will be shown, according to circumstances and to the audience they were meant to reach. Hence, the nature of the relationship between the projected—and allegedly historical—Lebanese entity and the central government in Istanbul fluctuated between virtual independence, when prospects seemed promising, or when the targeted audience appeared receptive, to integration into the Ottoman Empire accompanied by some degree of autonomy, when the outlook for such plans seemed less assured or the targeted audience more discerning.

      The Maronite Patriarch was induced to formulate his demands for the confirmation of Shihabi rule in Lebanon by the planned Ottoman reorganization of the recovered Syrian lands. The political void prevailing in the Mountain after the demise of Bashir II encouraged Mgr Hubaysh to raise crucial political issues directly with the Porte. He was hence challenging the prerogatives of the old political class and introducing himself as a major political figure, since he claimed to represent the majority of the population of the Mountain. His claim, moreover, could not be separated from his bid to preserve the status quo ante, the legal confirmation of which would have constituted a victory for the Maronites, sanctioning the ascendancy they had managed to gain during the last years of Bashir II's reign. As already mentioned, this situation had obtained under specific circumstances, and the head of the Maronite Church seemed to have realized that it was greatly endangered by the demise of Bashir II, the return of the exiled Druze muqata'jis who aspired to restore their former rights and powers, and by the plans for Ottoman reorganization. The Maronite prelate was also availing himself of promises advanced to the insurgents by British and Ottoman officials on the ground during the 1840 rebellion, guaranteeing the preservation of the “ancient rights and privileges of the Mountain.”⁶⁸ In this context, mention may be made of the exhortations of the foreign consuls and nationals mentioned previously, as well as Bourrée's plan, which might well have influenced the program advanced by the Patriarch.⁶⁹

      Three obstacles, however, hindered the Patriarch's project. (1) The Ottoman government had conflicting aspirations for a general centralization of the Syrian provinces, aiming at the abolition of local centers of power. Mgr Hubaysh tried to counter this policy in Lebanon by regularly addressing to the Porte petitions similar to the one mentioned, or others countersigned by as many Maronites as he could mobilize, in an attempt to convey the impression that his aspirations genuinely represented those of the Maronites. He also sent a special political envoy to Istanbul, Abbot Nicolas Murad, and relied extensively on French diplomatic support in the Ottoman capital.⁷⁰ (2) At the same time, the return of the Druze muqata'jis claiming their old rights in the Mountain and the confirmation of their previous political supremacy directly threatened Mgr Hubaysh's plans. To thwart their ambitions, he struck at the root of their power by challenging their political and judicial rights over their Christian tenants. (3) Finally, and more important, the Patriarch had to grapple with the disunity of the Maronites who, in spite of his assurances to the contrary, still needed to be constituted into, and directed toward, a political community claiming its rights.

      Up until then, as has been seen, the Maronite feeling of identity had not carried political significance. It did not constitute in itself a rallying force or a recognized basis for effective political solidarity. While the process of growing communal antagonism that emerged during Bashir II's rule had exacerbated feelings of differentiation and competition between Maronites and Druzes, it did not constitute in itself a sufficient incentive and appropriate framework for the unification of the Maronite community. The Maronites had not, over previous centuries, acted as a united political community, and no regionwide channels for the mobilization of the whole community existed. In the segmented political system that had prevailed until then the Maronites of the northern, central, and southern districts had had different historical and political experiences and were included in separate client networks. Furthermore, the dislocations that had affected this community for more than a century had engendered new interests and lines of divisions within the community. Several forces in the community had divergent projects and ambitions: the Maronite muqata'jis aspired to restore the “old order of things” and sympathized therefore with the Druze muqata'jis, whereas the power of the latter was contested by the Maronite clergy and peasants. Finally, Maronites were divided on the more specific issue of restoring Bashir II. Some Maronites, like the clergy, the family and supporters of the Shihabi Emir, and some enriched merchants and peasants, had indeed benefited from the rule of Bashir II and developed vested interests in the system that then obtained.⁷¹ However, other Maronite parties, like the muqata'jis who had lost their estates and the Maronite peasants, overburdened with heavy taxes and afflicted by other forms of extortion, were more preoccupied with their own problems and interests than with a unification of the community in order to confirm or restore the rule of the Shihabs—and, more specifically, Bashir II.⁷² The question of unifying and conciliating, as much as possible, these different regional, social, and political interests remained therefore unaddressed. Clearly, a Maronite political community, identifying itself as such and collectively defending its threatened interests, as perceived by the Church, still needed to be forged. For that, a political program, based on a Maronite sense of identity, needed to be elaborated and a feeling of solidarity geared toward a recognized general interest developed.

      The Patriarch hence undertook to present such a program and rally his community around it. On March 29, 1841, he assembled the main leaders of the community and had them sign a pact, promising that they would henceforth “form one body, act towards one sole aim and work as a single hand in all matters relating to our interests and to the general welfare.” Toward this aim, the pact specifically tackled the issues dividing the Maronite community, providing for a more equitable distribution of taxes, respect for the authority and rank of notables and shaykhs in return for fairer treatment of commoners, and the selection of representatives, or wakils, for each district in order to facilitate contacts and coordination between all. The signatories finally swore that “their present union will last forever. [None] should seek to break it or alter it; ... nor time, nor the succession of the days, nor the great questions of the century, nor the misfortunes or the disasters. . . .”⁷³

      So much insistence on the henceforth everlasting unity of the Maronites and their unbreakable solidarity could only point to an attempt to conceal the divisions of the community and the deep concern and apprehensions of the Patriarch. By March 1841, the fate of the Shihabi Emirate was seriously compromised by the defiance of the Druze muqata'jis who challenged the principle of the selection of a governor from the Shihabi family,⁷⁴ hence contesting the legitimacy of the whole system, by the schemes of the Ottoman government that was trying to reimpose its direct rule over the Mountain, and by the weakness of the Emir Bashir III himself. Furthermore, the attempt to

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