LITMIR.BIZ

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Admiralty, whose members recalled the loss of one of their first submarines. While engaged in fleet maneuvers in 1904, the A-1 was accidentally rammed by a steamer and sank with all hands. It would take another six years before the Admiralty once again considered the potential use of submarines as significant elements in naval engagements; there was, at that time, no thought of submarines as a threat to commerce. In 1913, as Germany’s intentions were beginning to be felt throughout Europe, Fisher had cautioned the Admiralty that the U-boat would likely be used against commercial shipping, but the idea was dismissed as utterly repugnant by the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill.¹³

      Fisher was also known as a vocal proponent of modernization, and had alienated some of his peers who were deeply entrenched in centuries-old naval traditions … modernization was not always embraced. But the potential blockade of Britain by a “modernized” fleet of U-boats became a reality in February 1915 when Kaiser Wilhelm’s Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Hugo von Pohl, announced that the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel, were considered a war zone, and that as of February 18, mercantile shipping encountered in this area would be sunk, and without warning. Submarine warfare would now be directed primarily against commercial vessels, affecting Britain’s lifeline—just as Fisher had forewarned nearly a year prior to the war.¹⁴

      Lord Balfour was ready to put the BIR to work. A former First Sea Lord with a reputation of having a forceful personality had accepted the chairmanship. In his acceptance letter, Fisher replied that “German mines and submarines have walked ahead of us by leaps and bounds.”¹⁵ Fisher emphasized that among the most pressing issues were submarines and antisubmarine devices; Balfour was anxious to place the BIR in Fisher’s hands. On September 14, 1915, the primary goals Balfour envisioned for the BIR were provided to Fisher:

      1. To concentrate expert scientific enquiry to certain scientific problems the solution of which is of urgent importance to the naval service;

      2. To encourage research in a number of directions in which it is probable that results of value to the Navy might be obtained by organized scientific effort, and to consider schemes and suggestions put forward by inventors and other members of the general public.¹⁶

      The BIR was organized into six sections: airships and general aeronautics; submarines and wireless telegraphy; naval construction; anti-aircraft equipment; ordnance and ammunition; armament of aircraft, bombs, and bomb sights. Committees and sub-committees were formed, and, it was hoped, Britain could match Germany’s technological advantages, which that country had benefitted through connections between their academic researchers and the military.¹⁷

      Now with Admiral Sir John Fisher at the helm, a team of prestigious scientists were selected to serve on the board’s various committees, including Nobel Laureate Sir Ernest Rutherford. A colleague of Rutherford, physicist Henry Moseley, would have been an ideal candidate for membership, but had joined the Royal Engineers as a communications officer. Moseley was killed by a sniper on August 10 during the disastrous Gallipoli campaign. There was an obvious need to provide an avenue for Britain’s scientists to serve their country, not in the trenches, but in the laboratories. Another BIR member, Professor William H. Bragg, more than his colleagues, understood the urgency to work toward a rapid conclusion to this devastating war. His youngest son, Robert, also died in August at Gallipoli, while his other son was an officer serving in France.¹⁸

      MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE FORTH

      A noteworthy occurrence … was the removal of the entire establishment, or what remained of it, from Granton to Hawkcraig, and in December, 1915, the Service was first known as H.M. Experimental Station, Hawkcraig.¹⁹

      As Lieutenant Wilson from Commander Ryan’s staff pointed out, the Admiralty took notice of the hydrophone work Ryan had accomplished, resulting in the establishment of an official experimental station. As early as February, 1915, the Admiralty had provided Ryan with the Tarlair, from a class of vessels known as “drifters,” to support his off shore experiments.²⁰ Commander Ryan, who had been working initially at Inchkeith, now had what he wanted—recognition of his hydrophone work by the Admiralty and a vessel to expand his ability to conduct realistic operations in the Forth. At the beginning of 1915, Ryan, headquartered in a small building on Edinburgh’s Granton Pier, had a staff of six Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) officers and twenty chief petty officers.²¹ There was a lot of activity in the Firth of Forth during the winter of 1915.

      A commercial vessel known as a “drifter” was commissioned HMS Tarlair and provided to then Commander Ryan for his experimental work in the fall of 1914. (Wilson, 1920)

      The Admiralty’s first priority was to use the hydrophone as a defensive technology, and Ryan was their primary hope. Beginning in February, Ryan had tested his concept of mounting a hydrophone on a tripod set on the sea bottom, connected by cable to shore. By March the first hydrophone station was operating at Oxcars, a small island in the Forth, just south of Hawkcraig Point. This station was soon replaced by two other experimental shore-based stations in the Forth: one on the island of Inchcolm, the other at Elieness along the north shore near the entrance to the Forth.²²

      The Admiralty, of course, was delighted with Ryan’s rapid progress with this stationary submarine detection system, and the decision was made to expand his research, beyond what could be accomplished at Edinburgh’s Granton Pier. He must have been pleased when Hawkcraig Point was selected, as it provided access to an underwater environment much more appropriate for his submarine detection system development. Located along the northern coast of the Forth off the small fishing village of Aberdour, the water between Hawkcraig Point and Inchkeith Island allowed testing his ideas under conditions similar to where German ships and submarines might be operating.²³ In modern terms, Ryan could perform the technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) and operational evaluation (OPEVAL) of any system he might devise, and Ryan’s creativity led to many such systems.

      The Admiralty authorized the construction of a small building at Hawkcraig, known as “the Number One hut,” which was completed by the summer of 1915, and by the end of the year, the Hawkcraig Admiralty Experimental Station was born (see page 41). Lieutenant H. W. Wilson (RNVR), who served on Ryan’s staff throughout the war, recalled this new facility:

      As a direct consequence of the erection of this hut, from this time afterwards, most experimental work was carried on from the north side of the Forth, and as the star of Hawkcraig waxed, so that of Granton, as a hydrophone base, waned … It was [in Number One hut] that the Captain’s marvels might be viewed, [which] drew hosts of distinguished visitors to our base, whether British or foreign, and it was certainly possible to detect a mystified awe on the countenance of the illustrious stranger, as he issued from Number One …²⁴

      CHAPTER 3 SIGHS OF A LOVESICK MERMAID

      The first step necessary was a considerable increase in the instructional facilities for training listeners both for the increased number of shore stations and for the large number of vessels that were fitted for hydrophone work …

      —Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War, 1921¹

      Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral John R. Jellicoe, was confident in the work being carried out at the Admiralty Experimental Station at Hawkcraig, but understood the need for the listeners to be properly trained. That would eventually happen, but from his now fully functioning and staffed station at Hawkcraig, Ryan continued with operational trials of his shore-based hydrophone listening stations throughout 1916, monitoring the sounds of passing vessels. The goal, however, was not just any vessel—rather a submerged, hostile submarine attempting to infiltrate a river, harbor, or when approaching any strategic waterfront infrastructure. The Admiralty, anxious to exploit the potential of this new technology, had been increasing the scope of Ryan’s work to include the use of hydrophones on surface ships.

      The summer marked the

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