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The Listeners. Roy R. Manstan
Читать онлайн.Название The Listeners
Год выпуска 0
isbn 9780819578372
Автор произведения Roy R. Manstan
Жанр Прочая образовательная литература
Серия Garnet Books
Издательство Ingram
Wilson ended his letter to Germany with the following: “The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles [of international law] into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.”15 This would not be the last time the President had to admonish and threaten the Imperial German Government. Because of Wilson’s increased antagonism toward Germany, there would be a significant change within his Government. On June 9, his pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned. Bryan felt that there was some merit in Germany’s objections to Britain’s blockade, and that Wilson, representing a neutral country, should have been more evenhanded. Bryan had preferred expressing some level of protest against restrictions on the free passage of neutral ships bound for German ports imposed by Great Britain. He was succeeded by Robert Lansing who, while also objecting to Britain’s blockade, felt that the United States would eventually enter the war as an ally of Britain. Within the German Admiralty, however, there were also objections that went beyond the blockade, pointing out Britain’s conduct after the loss of Lusitania:
It was particularly striking how the English Press persisted in representing the loss of Lusitania not so much as a British, but as an American misfortune. One must read the article in The [London] Times which appeared immediately after the sinking of Lusitania (8/5/1915) to realize the degree of hypocrisy of which the English are capable when their commercial interests are at stake. Not a word of sympathy or sorrow for the loss of human life, but only the undisguised desire (with a certain satisfaction) to make capital out of the incident in order to rouse the Americans and make them take sides against Germany.16
In his memoir, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who had replaced Hugo von Pohl as Chief of the Admiralty in January, 1916, expressed his disdain for what he considered the use of this tragedy as a propaganda tool. It was not propaganda, however, that was changing attitudes across America. The reality, which included those 124 American lives, was a realization that remaining neutral in a war that threatened democratic societies was becoming a bitter pill and increasingly untenable as the months went by, as U-boat predation on unarmed merchant vessels continued.
CHAPTER 7 AMERICA AWAKENS
On the 24th of March, 1916, at about 2.50 o’clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkstone to Dieppe.
—President Woodrow Wilson1
On April 18, 1916, with these words in his opening paragraph, President Woodrow Wilson delivered his ultimatum to Germany’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow. Sussex was a cross-channel steamer, which had made this passage between England and France many times. The vessel, which did not transit via routes used by troop transports, was well-known, was unarmed, and only carried civilians. Although reports varied, there may have been in excess of eighty passengers lost in the attack. The torpedo destroyed the bow section forward of the bridge, yet Sussex remained afloat and was towed into Boulogne Harbor. There was no question that a German U-boat and not a mine was the cause, there being fragments of the torpedo found within the Sussex hull.
Wilson’s ultimatum continued: “[T]he Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft … in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations.”2
Less than eleven months had passed since the sinking of Lusitania. President Wilson, who had been continuously frustrated by German promises made and broken, ended by putting the German Government on notice: “If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines … the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.”3
The passenger ferry Sussex torpedoed while crossing the English Channel. (Wikipedia)
Wilson’s ultimatum was delivered to Germany’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1916. The following day, Wilson addressed Congress, with an explanation of his blunt message to Germany: “…despite the solemn protest of this Government, the commanders of German undersea vessels have attacked merchant ships with greater and greater activity … in a way that has grown more and more ruthless, more and more indiscriminate …” Wilson then ended his address to Congress, reiterating his ultimatum to Germany that “if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by use of submarines,” the next step would be for the United States to sever diplomatic relations, an act that would surely be followed by a declaration of war.4
Gottlieb von Jagow, responding from Berlin on the fourth of May to Wilson’s ultimatum, continued to complain of Britain’s blockade of neutral shipping destined for German ports. “In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warships, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare…. Moreover, Great Britain again and again has violated international law, surpassing all bounds in outraging neutral rights …”5 Nonetheless, Germany relented and von Jagow relayed the following decision by the Imperial Government:
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance. [original emphasis]6
The German Admiralty, in particular Reinhard Scheer, understood that once their submarines were required to operate in accordance with prize law, there would be little chance of forcing Britain to capitulate due to a lack of food and fuel. This opinion was shared by his submarine commanders, including Walther Schwieger, who declared that under these conditions there would be “little chance of decisive results.” Yet, Scheer relented to the new policy and instructed his submarine fleet to redirect their unrestricted warfare operations to now target naval vessels, including transports and armed merchantmen.7
German officials understood, however, that in spite of this latest agreement, the United States would soon enter the war; these diplomatic threats and promises were simply a tactic to stall the inevitable. In fact, Germany was quite willing to cease her policy of unrestricted warfare against commercial shipping. The respite provided an opportunity to intensify the production of long range cruiser submarines: “the monthly rate of commissioning new boats was never so favourable as between April 1916 and January 1917, averaging ten new craft per month…. In addition, fifty-two large and eighty-nine small boats were either under construction or about to be delivered.”8
As U-boat activities subsided, Allied navies also became overconfident in the effectiveness of their antisubmarine capability. This was based on not fully understanding the reasons that Germany had agreed to this slackening of attacks against commercial shipping. “It was both convenient and consoling to presume that counter measures were at last proving effective. For that complacent optimism a bitter price had, a year later, to be paid.”9 The high price of complacency would become evident when Germany unleashed her most destructive U-boat campaign in February, 1917.