LITMIR.BIZ

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to me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his confidence, I should prefer that every important naval movement should pass a Cabinet review. Today, for instance, [Charles] Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear Admiral, and I have sent him off to cruise in the West Indies [in quest of Confederate commerce raiders]. All this has been done without Cabinet consultation, or advice with anyone except Seward and the President…. My instructions to our naval officers – commanders of squadrons or single ships – cruising on our blockade duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I have communicated them freely to each [member]….

      So in regard to each and all the Departments; if I have known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has not been in Cabinet consultations. Seward beyond any and all others is responsible for this state of things. It has given him individual power, but at the expense of good administration….

      In the early days of the Administration all the Cabinet officers were absorbed by labors and efforts to make themselves familiar with their duties, so as rightly to discharge them. Those duties were more onerous and trying with the great rupture that was going on in the Government, avowedly to destroy it, than had ever been experienced by their predecessors.

      Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were thus absorbed in preparing for impending disaster, the Secretary of State spent a considerable portion of every day with the President, instructing him, relating interesting details of occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his political notions. I think he has no very profound or sincere convictions. Cabinet meetings, which should, at that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were infrequent, irregular, and without system. The Secretary of State notified his associates when the President desired a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unadvisable to the Premier – as he liked to be called and considered – that the members should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little concerted action.

      Each head of a Department took up and managed the affairs which devolved upon him as he best could, without much knowledge of the transactions of his associates, but as each consulted with the President, the Premier, from daily, almost hourly, intercourse with him, continued to ascertain the doings of each and all, while imparting but little of his own course to any. Great events of a general character began to impel the members to assemble…. The conduct of affairs was awkward and embarrassing, and after a few weeks the members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be better advised on affairs of government for which they were measurably responsible to the country. They advised meetings on stated days for general and current affairs, and when there was occasion, special calls would be made. The Secretary of State alone dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it inexpedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare the time; but the President was pleased with the suggestion, and concurred with the rest of the Cabinet. [It was agreed that the cabinet would regularly meet at noon every Tuesday and Friday, with special meetings called at other times as needed.]

      The form of proceeding was discussed. Mr. Seward thought that would take care of itself. Some suggestions were made in regard to important appointments which had been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of State taking the lead in selecting high officials without general consultation. There seemed an understanding between the Secretaries of State and Treasury, who had charge of the most important appointments, of which the President was perhaps cognizant. Chase had extensive patronage, Seward appointments of character. The two arranged that each should make his own selection of subordinates. These two men had political aspirations which did not extend to their associates…. Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this arrangement, but it was one of the mistakes of his life.

      Without going farther into details, the effect of these proceedings in those early days was to dwarf the President and elevate the Secretary of State. The latter also belittled the sphere of his associates so far as he could. Many of the important measures, particularly of his own Department, he managed to predispose of, or contrived to have determined, independent of the Cabinet….

      Between Seward and Chase there is perpetual rivalry and mutual dislike. Each is ambitious. Both had capacity. Seward is dexterous; Chase is strong. Seward makes constant mistakes, but recovers with a facility that is wonderful and often without injury to himself; Chase commits fewer blunders, but perseveres in them when made, often to his own serious detriment.

      April 17, 1863: But little was before the Cabinet, which of late can hardly be called a council. Each Department conducts and manages its own affairs, informing the President to the extent it pleases. Seward encourages this state of things. He has less active duties than the rest of us, and watches and waits on the President daily, and gathers from him the doings of his associates and often influences indirectly their measures and movements, while he communicates very little, especially of that which he does not wish them to know.

      June 30, 1863: The President did not join us to-day in Cabinet. He was with the Secretary of War and General [in Chief Henry] Halleck, and sent word there would be no meeting. This is wrong, but I know no remedy. At such a time as this, it would seem there should be free, full, and constant intercourse and interchange of views, and combined effort. The Government should not be carried on in the War or State Departments, nor ought there be an attempt of that kind.³

      September 29, 1863: No matter of special importance; nothing but current business in Cabinet. Seward and Stanton were not present. The latter seems to make it a point recently not to attend. Others, therefore, run to him. I will not. Military operations are of late managed at the War Department, irrespective of the rest of the Cabinet…. The President spends much of his time there. Seward and Chase make daily visitations to Stanton, sometimes two or three times daily. I have not the time, nor do I want the privilege, though I doubtless could have it for Stanton treats me respectfully and with as much confidence as he does any one when I approach him, except Seward. But I cannot run to the War Department and pay court. Chase does this, complains because he is compelled to do it, and then … becomes reconciled.

      December 31, 1863: The Cabinet, if a little discordant in some of its elements, has been united as regards him [Lincoln]. Chase has perhaps some aspirations for the place of Chief Executive. Seward has, I think, surrendered any expectation for the present, and shows wisdom in giving the President a fair support. Blair and Bates are earnest friends of the President, and so, I think, is Usher.⁴ Stanton is insincere, but will, I have no doubt, act with Seward under present circumstances.

      March 25, 1864: Chase … remarked [at today’s cabinet meeting] that nothing could be expected where there were no Cabinet consultations and no concerted action. Stanton and the President were in consultation at the time in a corner of the room. This is no unfrequent occurrence between the two at our meetings, and is certainly inconsiderate and in exceeding bad taste.

      April 22, 1864: Neither Seward nor Chase nor Stanton was at the Cabinet meeting to-day. For some time Chase has been disinclined to be present and evidently for a purpose. When sometimes with him, he takes occasion to allude to the Administration as departmental – as not having council, not acting in concert. There is much truth in it, and his example and conduct contribute to it. Seward is more responsible than any one, however, although he is generally present. Stanton does not care usually to come, for the President is much of his time at the War Department, and what is said or done is communicated by the President, who is fond of telling as well as of hearing what is new. Three or four times daily the President goes to the War Department and into the telegraph office to look over communications.

      April 26, 1864: Neither Chase nor Blair were at the Cabinet to-day, nor was Stanton. The course of these men is reprehensible, and yet the President, I am sorry to say, does not reprove but rather encourages it by bringing forward no important measure connected with either.

      July 25, 1864: Blair is sore and vexed because the President makes a confidant and adviser of Seward, without consulting the rest of the Cabinet. I told him this had been the policy from the beginning. Seward and Chase had each striven for the position of Special Executive Counsel; that it had apparently been divided between them, but Seward had outgeneraled or outintrigued Chase. The latter was often consulted when others were not, but often

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