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Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2. Charles S. Peirce
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isbn 9780253016669
Автор произведения Charles S. Peirce
Жанр Философия
Издательство Ingram
XII
Proof.—For call 0,
x belongs to the class zero.
∴ by definition 4
Corollary 1.—The same reasoning applies to arithmetical multiplication.
Corollary 2.—From Theorem x and the last corollary it follows that if
XIII
XIV
These do not hold with arithmetical operations.
General Scholium.—This concludes the theorems relating to the direct operations. As the inverse operations have no peculiar logical interest, they are passed over here.
In order to prevent misapprehension, I will remark that I do not undertake to demonstrate the principles of logic themselves. Indeed, as I have shown in a previous paper, these principles considered as speculative truths are absolutely empty and indistinguishable. But what has been proved is the maxims of logical procedure, a certain system of signs being given.
The definitions given above for the processes which I have termed arithmetical plainly leave the functions of these operations in many cases uninterpreted. Thus if we write
we have a series of identities whose truth or falsity is entirely undeterminable. In order, therefore, fully to define those operations, we will say that all propositions, equations, and identities which are in the general case left by the former definitions undetermined as to truth shall be true, provided they are so in all interpretable cases.
On Arithmetic
Equality is a relation of which identity is a species.
If we were to leave equality without further defining it, then by the last scholium all the formal rules of arithmetic would follow from it. And this completes the central design of this paper, as far as arithmetic is concerned.
Still it may be well to consider the matter a little further. Imagine, then, a particular case under Boole’s calculus, in which the letters are no longer terms of first intention, but terms of second intention, and that of a special kind. Genus, species, difference, property, and accident, are the well-known terms of second intention. These relate particularly to the comprehension of first intentions; that is, they refer to different sorts of predication. Genus and species, however, have at least a secondary reference to the extension of first intentions. Now let the letters, in the particular application of Boole’s calculus now supposed, be terms of second intention which relate exclusively to the extension of first intentions. Let the differences of the characters of things and events be disregarded, and let the letters signify only the differences of classes as wider or narrower. In other words, the only logical comprehension which the letters considered as terms will have is the greater or less divisibility of the classes. Thus, n in another case of Boole’s calculus might, for example, denote “New England States”; but in the case now supposed, all the characters which make these States what they are being neglected, it would signify only what essentially belongs to a class which has the same relations to higher and lower classes which the class of New England States has,—that is, a collection of six.
In this case, the sign of identity will receive a special meaning. For, if m denotes what essentially belongs to a class of the rank of “sides of a cube,” then
These considerations, together with those advanced on page 55 (§12) of this volume, will, I hope, put the relations of logic and arithmetic in a somewhat clearer light than heretofore.
1. Thus, in one point of view, identity is a species of equality, and, in another, the reverse is the case. This is because the Being of the copula may be considered on the one hand (with De Morgan) as a special description of “inconvertible, transitive relation,” while, on the other hand, all relation may be considered as a special determination of being. If a Hegelian should be disposed to see a contradiction here, an accurate analysis of the matter will show him that it is only a verbal one.
Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension
P 34: Presented 13 November 1867
§1. That these Conceptions are not so Modern as has been represented
The historical account usually given of comprehension and extension is this, “that the distinction, though taken in general terms by Aristotle, and explicitly announced with scientific precision by one, at least, of his Greek commentators, had escaped the marvellous acuteness of the schoolmen, and remained totally overlooked and forgotten till the publication of the Port-Royal Logic.”1 I would offer the following considerations to show that this interpretation of history is not exactly true. In the first place, it is said that a distinction was taken between these attributes, as though they were previously confounded. Now there is not the least evidence of this. A German logician has, indeed, by a subtle misconception, considered extension as a species of comprehension, but, to a mind beginning to reflect, no notions seem more unlike. The mental achievement has been the bringing of them into relation to one another, and the conception of them as factors of the import of a term, and not the separation of them. In the second