Social Psychology - Daniel W. Barrett

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stimuli.

      Another distinction between the two systems is evident in the domain of emotions. For instance, if you were asked to eat a cockroach, you’d most likely experience an instant gut-level disgust reaction, especially because we associate cockroaches with dirt and garbage. This response is automatic, difficult to suppress, and a product of the automatic mind. However, after further consideration of the pros and cons of ingesting one—let’s say after it was properly sterilized, maybe even covered in chocolate, and you are offered a decent sum of money to do it—you might choose to override the initial disgust reaction and eat the cockroach (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). In this case the two systems initiated responses that were incompatible with one another, and the conscious one held sway. This example illustrates another feature of the automatic/controlled duality: Sometimes the controlled system can overrule the automatic one.

      These two components of the dual mind are sometimes called the X- and C-systems (Lieberman, 2010). The X-system is primarily reflexive, implicit, or automatic (the “X” stems from the “x” in reflexive), responding without conscious thought. In contrast, the C-system is largely reflective, explicit, and deliberative (the “C” refers to the “c” in reflective) and involves conscious thought (Lieberman,2007a; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). These two systems rely on somewhat distinct brain regions. According to Lieberman et al. (2002), the X-system (also referred to as System 1) engages in parallel processing and consists of the amygdala, the basil ganglia, and the lateral temporal, ventromedial prefrontal, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortexes. Involved primarily with conscious processes, the C-system (also referred to as System 2) is composed mostly of the lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortexes, along with the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe region.

      On the one hand, the X-system furnishes us with our ongoing immediate experience with reality and its associated cognitive processes. On the other hand, the C-system reflects on those experiences and responds to X-system processes and outputs. As suggested above, the systems are not completely independent; although the two systems work together much of the time, there are times when the C-system appears to react to, suppress, and/or overrule the X-system. For instance, a habit that is sustained by the X-system—such as swearing profusely at every red light while driving—may need to be occasionally suppressed—such as when your boyfriend’s or girlfriend’s parents are in the car.

      The conceptual distinction between automatic and controlled processes is a useful one that nicely maps onto our social experiences. However, the difference is really more of matter of gray than of black and white. It is more accurate to ask how much of a given behavior is automatic versus controlled rather than whether it is one or the other. There are actually four components of automaticity, and a given event will be considered more automatic to the extent that it is (1) unintentional, (2) occurs without conscious awareness, (3) is accomplished efficiently, and (4), once begun, cannot be controlled (Andersen et al., 2007; Bargh, 1994; Fiedler & Hütter, 2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2013). Take for example the experience of a song that keeps “playing” in your mind after you hear it blasting down the hallway in your residence. As you walk away and are no longer within earshot of the music, you find that the tune continues to cycle in your mind. This experience meets three of the four criteria for automaticity. First, note that this happens without intention: You did not consciously begin to mentally replay the song. Second, the song streams effortlessly and generally does not detract you from performing other tasks and is therefore efficient. Often, the song plays over and over with no conscious control required.

      Third, to the extent that you cannot stop “playing” this song, the more automatic it is. However, because you are clearly conscious of the song, it is not an example of pure automaticity. In contrast, take the example of the Bargh scrambled sentence study described in Chapter 1 where participants walked more slowly after being exposed to elderly related words. This behavior is purely automatic, because it occurred without conscious intent and outside of awareness (participants did not know how the words changed their behavior), was efficiently performed (little effort was required), and could not be controlled (because the participants were not aware of it).

      There are several types of automatic processes. The first consists of processes that were initially explicitly learned and later became automatic (Dijksterhuis, 2010). Take for instance learning to tie our shoes, which requires that we initially slow our thinking and movements down and watch our fingers make the proper motions. Once we have mastered the skill, we perform it without thinking. A second type of automatic process occurs when concepts that have been learned implicitly affect subsequent behavior (Andersen et al., 2007; Dijksterhuis, 2010). For instance, we can develop certain attitudes, called implicit attitudes, without conscious intent, and these attitudes may alter how we evaluate and interact with people (Dovidio, Pagotto, & Hebl, 2011; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Many Americans harbor implicit negative prejudices toward the elderly that they probably “picked up” without conscious thought (Nelson, 2009). The third category of automatic processes is priming, which was demonstrated in the scrambled sentence study mentioned in Chapter 1; here, an environmental stimulus temporarily and nonconsciously guided behavior.

      Priming: Thinking and Doing Without Knowing

      One of the ways in which social behavior can be affected outside of conscious awareness is through a process called priming. Priming occurs when a concept or other knowledge structure is automatically triggered or activated by an environmental stimulus, thereby becoming more likely to affect subsequent thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Förster & Liberman, 2007; Higgins, 1989; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014). When you read the word gun, what other concepts or words come to mind? Perhaps bullet, violence, and soldier (see Figure 3.2 on page 90)? The activation of fire engine led to the activation of other concepts that are closely associated with it in your memory, a process called spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Sansom-Daly & Forgas, 2010). In Bargh’s scrambled sentence task described earlier, words related to elderly were consciously processed and activated, and this in turn triggered the nonconscious activation of the actual concept, elderly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Bargh et al. (1996) similarly nonconsciously primed participants with neutral, rude, or polite words, and they subsequently acted consistently with that prime (see Figure 3.3 on page 90). In addition to concepts, other knowledge structures that can be automatically activated by stimuli in the environment include goals, motivations, and evaluations (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Tröschel, 2001; Hassin, Bargh, & Zimerman, 2009; Sansom-Daly & Forgas, 2010). For instance, nonconsciously activating the goal of impression formation can lead people to form more coherent impressions of a target person (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) than control individuals do.

      Recently, research on priming has come under intensive scrutiny after a number of failures to replicate what had been considered to be solid, reliable findings (Molden, 2014; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 2013). Concerns about the replicability of priming effects has led to a wider debate about what constitutes a true replication and to what extent we can expect highly context-sensitive effects to replicate across settings (Cesario, 2014). Currently the debate rages on, and it will be fascinating to watch in the coming years as researchers closely examine when and why nonconscious activation of concepts, feelings, and goals may occur.

      X-system: Primarily reflexive, nonconscious, or automatic parallel processing system

      C-system: Largely reflective, sequential, conscious, or deliberative mental processing system

      Automaticity: Extent to which a given event is unintentional, occurs without conscious awareness, is accomplished efficiently, and once begun, cannot be controlled

      Self-Reflection 3.1

      How

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