LITMIR.BIZ

      The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came foul, and was due to the Guerrière's musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports.

      The Guerrière lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one midshipman.

      The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr. George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize, and the Constitution remained by her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she was in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the Guerrière on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, "have treated us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle."

      The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayed condition of the Guerrière; mentioning in particular that the mainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she was considered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke," it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she could take a ship in half the time the Shannon could. The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practically over; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was also asserted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her first broadside fell short, but so, under similar circumstances, did the first broadside of the United States. None of these causes account for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of such superior force—nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2—that success would have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the British ship was fought; but the execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. The gunnery of the Guerrière was very poor, and that of the Constitution excellent; during the few minutes the ships were yard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side, [Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.] five sheets of copper beneath the bends. The Guerrière, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and exchanging broadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, her fire was much more harmless than it would have been if she had kept more steady." [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Treatise on Naval Gunnery" (London, 1851), p. 454.] The Constitution was handled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid being raked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision and rapidity of his fire had gained. "After making every allowance claimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamanship in the approach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war." [Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173.] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, something must be allowed for the decayed state of the Englishman's masts, although I really do not think it had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell; and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the American crew was absolutely new, while the Guerrière was manned by old hands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship of Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combat showed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain Hull would probably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerrière was not so weak as she was represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mounted two more main-deck guns than the rest of her class; thus carrying on her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the 30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of the Constitution. Characteristically enough, James, though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet refuses to count the two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the Guerrière's main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns were used very effectively, when the ships got foul, and caused more damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together.

      [Illustration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris' autobiography and the log of the Guerrière: the official accounts apparently consider "larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeable terms.]

      Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; and in his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasons for his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by permitting the Americans on board to quit their quarters." Coupling this with the assertion made by James and most other British writers that the Constitution was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British ship was defeated because the Americans on board would not fight against their country, and that the American was victorious because the British on board would. However, as I have shown, in reality there were probably not a score of British on board the Constitution.

      In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every one must admit that there was a great superiority in force on the side of the victors, and British historians have insisted that this superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successful resistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity between the combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number of encounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can be best shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1, 1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate Sybille, captured the French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an action of two hours and ten minutes. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France." O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171.] In actual weight the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the victorious Constitution or United States. [Footnote: See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.]

      There are later examples than this. But a very few years before the declaration of war by the United States, and in the same struggle that was then still raging, there had been at least two victories gained by English frigates over French foes as superior to themselves as the American 44's were to the British ships they captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the Phoenix, 36, captured the Didon, 40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force being: [Footnote: Ibid., lii, 425.]

      On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, captured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon.[Footnote: Ibid., in, 499.] Comparing the real, not the nominal weight of metal, we find that the Didon and Piedmontaise were proportionately of greater force compared to the Phoenix and San Florenzo, than the Constitution was compared to the Guerrière or Java. The French 18's threw each a shot weighing but about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of 1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the Constitution's spar-deck 32's.

      That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate is shown by the action of the British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate Chlorinde, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James, vi, 391.] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463 pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French

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