LITMIR.BIZ

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in Tring, I thought, ‘Nobody saw it! Nobody can have seen it!’

      Perhaps Luis had been doing some paperwork, or talking to the FIFA delegate—as you do—when the head-butt happened. Perhaps he saw something in his peripheral vision, looked up and saw Materazzi on the floor. In those circumstances, I would have expected my experience to have told me from Zidane’s posture that he was the culprit. I would have said to the assistant referee, ‘Did he just hit him?’ And I would have looked at the TV monitor near me for a replay, urgently.

      I believe that if I had been the Fourth Official it would have been right to turn to look at the TV, in terms of natural justice and the spirit of football. Zidane and I had a good relationship and I loved refereeing matches in which he played. But he deserved to be sent off against Italy in the World Cup Final. If he had escaped punishment, the World Cup would have ended in farce, because everyone would have known that there had been a major injustice. And think of the implications if, after getting away with his crime, Zidane had scored the winning goal. Certainly, at the time, implications like that would have been going through the minds of every FIFA man and woman at the Final.

      At home in Tring, I put myself in all the refereeing roles. I played out all the scenarios in my mind. In my versions, they all ended with the Fourth Official using the TV replay.

      THE REF’S DECISION

      What I conclude from the 2006 Final is that, despite FIFA’s protestations about not allowing video replays, technology or anything to intrude on the sanctity of the referee’s decision-making on the pitch, there are times when a more pragmatic approach is called for.

      The alternative view is that it would be OK to allow a serious error to be made in a World Cup Final—a mistake which would be known by anyone and everyone watching a television, but not by the referee out there in the middle of the pitch.

      Think about the two most flagrant examples of mistakes about goals of recent years, both considered in the previous chapter. They were Reading’s ‘phantom goal’ at Watford on 20 September 2008 (when the ball went wide of the posts yet a goal was awarded) and the incident involving Pedro Mendes of Spurs at Old Trafford on 4 January 2005 (when his shot clearly entered the goal but no goal was given). If something like either of those were to happen in a World Cup Final, surely FIFA should ensure that the Fourth Official was aware of it and that he alerted the referee straightaway, even if that meant not sticking rigidly and pedantically to their rules about using TV replays.

      My contention is that FIFA would be sensible and put the credibility of their competition ahead of a narrow-minded adherence to rules. Violent conduct that the referee misses should not be allowed to go unpunished, just as Zidane did not get away with it in 2006. I also believe, 100 per cent, that FIFA should prevent a reoccurrence of what happened to me in 2006—and I suspect that they will never let it happen again.

      I accept total responsibility for showing my yellow card three times to Croatia defender Josip Simunic, instead of sending him off after two. But if it happens again to some other poor sap, and if, as in my case, neither of the referee’s assistants nor the Fourth Official realizes, then someone with access to the television coverage will respond. A message will be sent to the Fourth Official, and, through him, to the ref. I am convinced about that, because my mistake caused FIFA such embarrassment.

      I have another conclusion from the Zidane scenario and it is this. If we can envisage situations when FIFA would be forced to consult TV replays (even if they look at them surreptitiously) then why pretend otherwise? Why do they say, not only ‘No technology’ but also ‘No experiments on technology’? Why do nothing, when they could really do something open and helpful? It is madness.

      WORLD CUP STATS: 2006

      QUALIFICATION TOURNAMENT: This was the first World Cup in which the holders were not given automatic qualification to the finals. Germany were guaranteed a place as hosts but 198 teams contested the remaining 31 places.

      FINALS: 9 June to 9 July. The thirty-two teams were divided into eight groups of four. The eight group winners and the eight group runners-up qualified for three rounds of knockout matches which produced two finalists.

      HOSTS: Germany

      MASCOTS: Goleo (A lion wearing a Germany shirt with the number 06) and Pille (a talking football)

      FINAL: Italy 1, France 1 (after extra-time), Italy won 5-3 on penalties

      MATCHES PLAYED:64

      GOALS SCORED: 147

      ATTENDANCE: 23,353,655

      TOP SCORER: Mirolsav Klose (Germany, 6 goals)

      HOME NATIONS: England, the only home nation to reach the finals, did so as winners of their qualifying group. In Germany they were unconvincing in wins against Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago (the smallest country ever to have reached the finals). A draw against Sweden was sufficient for England to top their group again, however, and they were 1-0 winners in the round of 16 match against Ecuador. In their quarterfinal they were beaten on penalties by Portugal.

      YELLOW CARD FOR THE LAW

       WHAT do the Laws of the Game say about Fourth Officials? Nothing at all. They are not mentioned in the 17 actual Laws. But there is a page devoted to them in the additional information section in the booklet of the Laws of the Game. It says, the Fourth Official ‘must indicate to the referee when the wrong player is cautioned because of mistaken identity or when a player is not sent off having been given a second caution, or when violent conduct occurs out of the view of the referee and assistant referees.’

       Note that it does not say that the Fourth Official has to see the violent conduct with his own eyes. There is nothing in the letter of the Law which stipulates that the Fourth Official cannot consult a TV replay. In fact, there is nothing anywhere in the Laws, or in any of the additional information, which mentions TV replays at all, let alone specifically precludes their use.

      SLOW WAY TO SUCCEED

      Zinedine Zidane’s jibe about giving his shirt to Marco Materazzi started the verbal exchange which ended with the Italian flat on the floor, but the Frenchman gave me one of his shirts without a fight—although not without some shameless begging on my part. I tell the story inSeeing Red, so now let me just say that the shirt is on the wall of my study in my home, in Tring, in Hertfordshire (guarded by Toffee, our dog, in case you were wondering).

      I am immensely proud to have that shirt because, regardless of how his career ended, ‘Zizou’ was a wonderful player. I am proud of the fact that I was considered good enough to referee several games in which he took part. I am very lucky that I was able to see his sublime skills at close hand.

      It is said that great players have more time on the ball and in my experience that is certainly true. In Zidane’s case, the extra time came from his anticipation, his speed of thought and his great technical ability. Before a pass reached him, he had already looked and thought ahead. He knew what he would do when the ball got to him. And when it did reach him, there was no fumbling or dithering. His first touch was sufficient to control the ball or to move it on in the direction he wanted it to go.

      All of that meant that, although the modern game is played at a frenetic pace, Zidane had an unhurried tranquillity. When he wasn't nutting people, of course.

      Good referees also try to give themselves time. They try to anticipate where and when incidents will happen, and try to think in advance about giving themselves a good view of those incidents. Then, when something happens, they try to give themselves a moment to think before reacting.

      THE RELUCTANT VIEWER

      The 2006 World Cup Final in Berlin

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