LITMIR.BIZ

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glancing around, though some showed no reaction.

      – So, what are we dealing with, what is the problem: the Perimeter system is known in Europe and the United States as the "dead hand". It is a complex of automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike, created in the USSR at the height of the Cold War. It is designed for guaranteed delivery of combat orders from higher levels of control to command centers and individual launchers of strategic missiles on alert, in case of emergency, when communication lines may be damaged. The Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the armed forces with nuclear weapons. It was created as a backup communications system in case key nodes of the Kazbek command system and communications lines are destroyed by a first strike in accordance with the U.S. concept of "limited nuclear warfare." Let me tell you about the Kazbek system right away. It is known to the general public thanks to the Cheget subscriber complex, or nuclear suitcase. The Cheget subscriber complex is a retaliatory strike tool. It is activated only after receiving a signal of a missile attack on Russia. First, a signal is received from the early warning system about a missile attack. It is checked by the duty general of the command center in Solnechnogorsk. Only then is the Kazbek system put into combat mode. The suitcase contains communication equipment with the General Staff and the command of the Strategic Missile Forces. Hereinafter I will use the abbreviation RVSN. Roughly speaking, it is a telephone, but the information is transmitted not by voice, but by encrypted symbols. It is impossible to block communication. There are three Chegetas on permanent duty: the Head of State, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. There are also duplicate ones. "The main button" in the suitcases is there – it transmits to the command centers of the Strategic Missile Forces a code authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. But missiles will be launched only if commands to do so are received from all three consoles. As I said, the total number of suitcases is more than three, the system is duplicated, but only a very narrow circle of people know about it. In addition, they are changed, checked, repaired. How many of them there are, only Department "C" knows.

      Yuri Vasilyevich thought for a couple of seconds and said:

      – The only time Cheget was used was on January 25, 1995, after the world's largest meteorological missile, the Black Brant XII, was launched from an island off the coast of Norway. Its flight trajectory resembled that of an American Trident ICBM fired from a submarine. Its final destination could have been a high-altitude nuclear explosion, disabling Russian missile warning radars. The Norwegians' notification of the missile launch got lost in the Foreign Ministry, and the next day Boris Yeltsin said that for the first time he used his briefcase for emergency communication with military advisers. This is a very interesting story in terms of why this happened. I will tell you about it separately, because, as one knowledgeable general said, it was a surprise only for Boris Yeltsin. By the way, I can say that if anyone thinks that such situations are funny, he is very mistaken. To give you an example, let me tell you about some of these situations. Do you remember those very radio sockets in old apartments that broadcast two programs? They were of great importance as a stand-alone, power-independent civil defense warning system in the USSR. There was a similar system in the U.S., and it was regularly tested to make sure it worked. All radio and television stations sent out test messages with alarm codes to check the operability of communications. This was and is handled by a special center at NORAD, i.e. the North American Aerospace Defense Command. At 9:33 a.m. on a February Saturday morning in 1971, a teletype operator at the National Civilian Warning Center ran an erroneous message into the system accompanied by the code Hatefulness, which meant a real emergency, not a drill. 5,000 radio stations and 800 television transmission centers received a message that read, "Attention! This is an emergency message coming directly from the President of the United States. Immediately cease normal broadcasting and begin broadcasting emergency messages beginning with the appropriate code. Stand by for further instructions." Panic broke out across the country and lasted for nearly 40 minutes until a retraction was issued.

      Those gathered continued to listen intently.

      – Here's another similar incident. Once at 8:50 a.m. computers in three U.S. command centers at once – in NORAD, in the Pentagon and in the Reserve Command Center in Maryland – sounded the alarm: "The United States has been subjected to a massive nuclear strike by the USSR. For the next six minutes, the fate of the world was decided. A Threat Assessment Commission consisting of senior officers from all three centers was immediately convened. ICBM launch sites received advance warning of the strike and instructions to prepare a retaliatory strike. Ten fighter-interceptors took to the air on alert, while others prepared for immediate departure. A so-called "doomsday plane" even took to the air, intended for the high command and the president, who would be able to command troops even if all ground command centers were destroyed.

      The Threat Assessment Commission worked quickly and smoothly: all reports were cross-checked and data from long-range radar stations and space satellites were received, none of which confirmed the launch of even one Soviet missile. The system was rebooted and the alarm was declared false. The investigation revealed that the cause of the false alarm was a mistake by an Air Force command center officer who ran a training program simulating a full-scale Soviet attack on a computer included in the NORAD unified command system, which caused the general alarm. This possibility was later eliminated by physically separating the training and combat systems.

      Yuri Vasilyevich spoke without stopping, confidently and clearly.

      – Another similar case, again related to the NORAD center. One day, in the middle of the night, the computers of the Strategic Air Command and the Pentagon received messages from this center about the launch of missiles on U.S. territory. The counter of launched missiles suddenly changed its value and began to show 002 or 200 attacking missiles. The duty officers were alarmed, and an alert was declared. Pilots took their places in the bombers, the engines were started, the launching points of missiles "Minuteman" received instructions for a retaliatory strike. Minutes counted. A decision from the Risk Assessment Commission was required to launch a retaliatory attack. And the counter continued to go crazy – the "zeros" and "twos" kept changing places. This raised doubts about its serviceability. Then the control messages from the early detection stations were checked, which showed no threat. The alarm was canceled and the counter was reset. Three days later, the situation was exactly the same, and then the Commission was able to find the cause – it was a defective microchip in the computer system NORAD, costing only 46 cents, which arbitrarily changed the values of the counter because of a failure in its own electronic circuit. So a penny electronics could have destroyed the entire humanity… The point of my digression is to emphasize once again that the world is fragile, people are emotional, computer systems are imperfect.

      There was another case on the subject of the nuclear suitcase. It was 1991, during Yeltsin's hunting trip to Zavidovo near Moscow. When we were sailing on a boat on the lake, one foreign guest kept looking at a black suitcase at the bottom of the boat. He thought it was nuclear. He tried to stay away from the suitcase, trying to sit on the edge of the boat. When they opened the suitcase on the island and took out two bottles of vodka and pickles, the guest laughed for a long time.

      Some of the staff, hearing the story for the first time, chuckled. The colonel was silent for a moment and continued:

      The F Division officer, a thin man with a shrewd eye, raised his hand, gesturing that he wanted to ask a question. The chief looked at him, nodded his head.

      – So it's already been signaled to attack from us, but without us? – he asked worriedly.

      – Maybe," Zhidkov replied, giving him a leering look.

      – Can't you ask the supreme commander-in-chief? – he continued.

      – That's the interesting part. Who is the supreme commander in chief? Where does the initial order to open the bags of pre-posted orders come from?

      Ruthra realized that the chief was asking questions to which he knew the answers. "Do the others know this manner of Zhidkov's dialog?" – he thought.

      – What about the signal to stop the combat algorithm? – The "F" department officer did not stop.

      – Let's say it hasn't been received yet.

      – What's stopping you from giving it away?

      – How?

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