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economies of scale – that is, the efficiencies derived from an increase in output. Likewise, by leveraging economies of scope – the efficiencies derived from product variety – corporate giants can capitalize on their access to finance capital by acquiring competitors or promising new start-ups. Indeed, the cultural industries have seen a rapid uptick in mergers and acquisitions – a fact that owes much to antitrust regulators stepping aside and trade agreements opening up domestic markets to foreign entrants. Together, these broader economic principles also help explain the current impact ascribed to platform companies. As we show in the next section, platform companies take economies of scope and scale to an unprecedented level. We should note that the financial prowess of platforms does have a historical precedent (Srnicek, 2017). Monopoly power or oligopoly competition – highly concentrated markets dominated by one or few firms – have existed since the dawn of the industrial age.

      Next to corporate clustering, cultural producers are faced with socioeconomic drivers of concentration that are more specific to the cultural industries. One such driver concerns attention. Who among the millions of cultural producers are the “winners” and who are the “losers” of the rapidly evolving media economy? We can be brief about the winners: a lucky few. A very small percentage of cultural products tends to generate the vast majority of revenue and profit. The consumption of games, music, and movies has always been blockbuster-driven; hits are as much a sociocultural phenomenon as an economic one (Elberse, 2013). Not for nothing are the cultural industries described as a “risky business,” in which nobody can predict long-term trends and tastes (Hesmondhalgh, 2019: 32). The need to withstand losses, or vice versa, to secure access to finance capital to fund big-budget blockbusters, therefore, plays straight into the strengths of transnational media conglomerates (Fitzgerald, 2012; Mirrlees, 2013). At the same time, the value of existing brands, stars, franchises, and fan favorites puts small and medium-sized enterprises and new entrants in a disadvantaged position.

      The cultural and economic power that record labels and news organizations accrued and held for decades was suddenly challenged by individuals who had the ability to easily distribute MP3 files or set up a blog to become citizen journalists. Then again, while such instances of “non-market” production had the potential to radically transform the information economy, and, in so doing, initiate a “substantial redistribution of power and money” (Benkler, 2006: 23), such a future has yet to be realized. As political economist Enrique Bustamante had already predicted: “digital change does not engender a revolution, an abrupt rupture with past history, because the new technologies cannot erase the core nature of the media within modern capitalist society” (2004: 805). While, in the abstract, the costs to create and distribute digital information have fallen drastically, this has not eradicated existing inequalities, such as access to capital, education, and access to internet connectivity (Hargittai & Walejko, 2008; Mansell, 2017). Nor has increased access to the means of production put a dent in the balance sheets of telecoms, consumer electronics, or media conglomerates (Winseck, 2017, 2020).

      That being said, what did change is that digitalization and internet connectivity have made the “boundaries of the firm” – to use a turn of phrase popular among business scholars – more porous. Instead of engaging in costly legal battles, structurally acquiring suppliers, or merging with competitors, businesses in a wide variety of sectors decided to provide consumers, suppliers, and competitors with “toolkits for innovation” (von Hippel, 2005). This concept, popularized in the early 2000s by MIT business scholars, is a prescient description of how, a decade later, platform companies provided consumers and third-party companies with the means of cultural creation, distribution, marketing, and monetization. In the next two chapters we discuss how platforms have used these toolkits both to vastly expand their infrastructural boundaries and as a means to govern cultural producers. But first, we examine the main tenets of platform economics.

      Platformization simultaneously entails a continuation of and a break with long-established economic models and strategies. On the one hand, platform companies such as Google and Tencent behave as globally operating tech conglomerates that aim to leverage economies of scope and scale, attract and retain high-quality personnel, and create “sticky” products and services, as well as valuable brands (Barwise & Watkins, 2018). On the other hand, platform companies operate unique business models and have devised novel business strategies (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016; Parker et al., 2016). By doing so, platforms have ushered in a fundamental reorganization of institutional relationships and a subsequent shift in power, which has been theorized along different disciplinary lines.

      Taking these disparate, yet overlapping views into consideration, in the context of this chapter we understand platforms as multisided markets, which we define as aggregators of institutional connections, including economic transactions, that mediate between end-users and content and service providers. Let us unpack this definition by pointing to how platforms give way to, control, and structure markets, and how they generate revenue.

      First, platform companies engender so-called “multisided markets” because they make and operate marketplaces that mediate between two or more user groups (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). A platform’s role is to be a “matchmaker” that connects consumers or “end-users,” businesses, governments, nonprofits, and other groups, each representing a separate side in a platform market (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016). A popular case study among economists is the game industry, particularly the dedicated game console: companies such as Nintendo and Sega operate prototypical two-sided markets as they mediate between players and game publishers (Shankar & Bayus, 2003). In this instance, players

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