LITMIR.BIZ

Without discrediting the expedition's success or Admiral Richard Byrd's leadership, this book makes clear for the first time that the admiral was not the saintly hero he and the press depicted. A provocative reassessment of an American hero, but a scrupulously objective book that makes a major contribution to history.

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A portrait in words and photographs of the interwar Navy, this book examines the twenty-year period that saw the U.S. fleet shrink under the pressure of arms limitation treaties and government economy and then grow again to a world-class force. The authors trace the Navy's evolution from a fleet centered around slow battleships to one that deployed most of the warship types that proved so essential in World War II, including fast aircraft carriers, heavy and light cruisers, sleek destroyers, powerful battleships, and deadly submarines. Both the older battleships and these newer ships are captured in stunning period photographs that have never before been published. An authoritative yet lively text explains how and why the newer ships and aircraft came to be. Thomas Hone and Trent Hone describe how a Navy desperately short funds and men nevertheless pioneered carrier aviation, shipboard electronics, code-breaking, and (with the Marines) amphibious warfare – elements that made America's later victory in the Pacific possible. Based on years of study of official Navy department records, their book presents a comprehensive view of the foundations of a navy that would become the world's largest and most formidable. At the same time, the heart of the book draws on memoirs, novels, and oral histories to reveal the work and the skills of sailors and officers that contributed to successes in World War II. From their service on such battleships as West Virginia to their efforts ashore to develop and procure the most effective aircraft, electronics, and ships, from their adventures on Yangtze River gunboats to carrier landings on the converted battle cruisers Saratoga and Lexington, the men are profiled along with their ships. This combination of popular history with archival history will appeal to a general audience of naval enthusiasts.

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Dino A. Brugioni, author of the best-selling account of the Cuban Missile crisis, Eyeball to Eyeball, draws on his long CIA career as one of the world's premier experts on aerial reconnaissance to provide the inside story of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s efforts to use spy planes and satellites to gather military intelligence. He reveals Eisenhower to be a hands-on president who, contrary to popular belief, took an active role in assuring that the latest technology was used to gather aerial intelligence. This previously untold story of the secret Cold War espionage program makes full use of the author’s own firsthand knowledge and of the information gained from interviews with important participants. As a founder and senior officer of the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center, Brugioni was a key player in keeping Eisenhower informed of all developments, and he sheds new light on the president’s contributions toward building an effective and technologically advanced aerial reconnaissance organization.Eyes in the Sky provides details of the president’s backing of the U-2’s development and its use to dispel the bomber gap, to provide data on Soviet missile and nuclear efforts and to deal with crises in the Suez, Lebanon, Chinese Off Shore Islands, Tibet, Indonesia, East Germany, and elsewhere. Brugioni offers new information about Eisenhower’s order of U-2 flights over Malta, Cyprus, Toulon, and Israel and subsequent warnings to the British, French, and Israelis that the U.S. would not support an invasion of Egypt. He notes that the president also backed the development of the CORONA photographic satellite, which eventually proved the missile gap with the Soviet Union didn't exist, and a variety of other satellite systems that detected and monitored problems around the world.

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The Office of Naval Research, known widely as ONR, was formed in 1946 largely to support the pursuit of basic science to help ensure future U.S. naval dominance—and as such, it set the model for the subsequently created National Science Foundation. But everything changed after the Cold War. The U.S. entered a period of greater fiscal constraints and the concept of warfare shifted from conventional land and sea battles and super-power conflicts to an era of asymmetric warfare, where the country might be engaged in many smaller fights in unconventional arenas.Naval Innovation is a narrative account of ONR’s efforts to respond to this transformation amidst increasing pressure to focus on programs directly relevant to the Navy, but without sacrificing the “seed corn” of fundamental science the organization helped pioneer. Told through the eyes of the admirals leading ONR and the department heads who oversee key programs, the book follows the organization as it responds to the fall of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.These events are inspiring an array of innovations, for land and sea. Consider unmanned undersea vehicles that can patrol strategic coastlines for months on end, novel types of landing craft that can travel up to 2,500 nautical miles without refueling, and precision shipborne “rail guns” whose GPS-guided shells can hit targets from hundreds of miles off. Other efforts include advanced electronics designed to swap out scores of antennas on ships for two solid-state apertures, greatly increasing speed and stealth and speed; virtual training methods that spare the environment by avoid the need to fire tons of live shells, and new ways to protect Marines from improvised explosive devices. All these programs, some pursued in conventional manner and some set up as “skunk works” designed to spur out-of-the-box thinking, are part of an ongoing evolution that seeks to connect scientific investment more directly to the warfighter without forsaking the Navy’s longer-term future.Naval Innovation is a narrative history, and a story of organizational change, centered around the struggles of management and key personnel to adapt to shifting priorities while holding on to their historic core mission of supporting longer-term research. As such, it holds great lessons and insights for how the U.S. government should fund and maintain military R&D in a new era of “small ball” conflicts—and how the country must prepare for the future of warfare.

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China's aircraft carrier program is making major waves well before the first ship has been completed. Undoubtedly, this development heralds a new era in Chinese national security policy. While the present volume presents substantial new insight on that particular question, its focus is decidedly broader in scope. Chinese Aerospace Power offers a comprehensive survey of Chinese aerospace developments, with a focus on areas of potential strategic significance previously unexplored in Western scholarship. The book also links these developments to the vast maritime battlespace of the Asia-Pacific region and highlights the consequent implications for the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Navy.

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For more than two decades at the beginning of the 20th century William S. Sims was at the forefront of naval affairs. From the revolution in naval gunnery that he led as a junior officer, to his advocacy for the Dreadnaught style all-big-gun battleship, to his development of torpedo boat and destroyer operations, he was a central figure in helping to prepare the U.S. Navy for World War I. During the war he served as the senior naval commander in Europe and was instrumental in the establishment of the convoy system that won the Battle of the Atlantic. Following the war his leadership as President of the Naval War College established the foundations of the creative and innovative Navy that would develop the operating concepts for submarines and aircraft carriers which would lead to success in World War II.Despite his dramatic impact on the U.S. Navy in the first half of the 20th century, Sims is a relatively unknown figure today. Overshadowed in our memory by the World War II generation of strategic Admirals, like Chester Nimitz and Raymond Spruance, he receives little attention from historians or professional naval officers. Despite the fact that he won a Pulitzer Prize for history, hardly anyone reads the books or articles he left as his legacy. This collection of six essays written by Sims illustrates why his thinking and leadership are relevant to the challenges faced in the 21st century. From the perils of military conservatism, to the responsibilities of the professional officer, to military downsizing and reform, he helped lay the foundations of the modern Navy. Armstrong’s introductions and analysis of these essays links them directly to the issues of innovation, professional education, and leadership that are as important at the start of this century as they were at the start of the last.

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This book is concerned with both the national security concerns of Asian maritime nations and the security of the Asian maritime commons. These are defined as the Pacific and Indian Oceans and associated seas, bays, and gulfs, with their included sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The most useful geographical designation for maritime Asia is the “Indo-Pacific.” Bernard Cole provides both a survey of the maritime strategies of the primary nations of the Indo-Pacific region and an evaluation of the domestic and international politics that drive those strategies. The United States, Canada, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran, the smaller Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf states are all surveyed and analyzed. The United States, Japan, China, and India not surprisingly draw the most attention, given their large modern navies and distant strategic reach. The author concludes that the United States remains the dominant maritime power in this huge region, stretching from Canada to the Persian Gulf, despite its lack of a traditionally strong merchant marine. U.S. maritime power remains paramount, due primarily to its dominant navy. The Chinese naval modernization program deservedly receives a good deal of public attention, but Cole argues that on a day-to-day basis the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, as its navy is named, is the most powerful maritime force in Far Eastern waters, while the modernizing Indian Navy potentially dominates the Indian Ocean. In fact, a focus of this work is the exemplary description of all the region’s navies, with the author noting the naval arms race that is underway, particularly in the area of submarine acquisition. Cole is careful to couch this phenomenon in the regional concerns about Chinese naval expansion and the desire to ensure a continued, massive U.S. naval presence. The current naval developments in the region evince elements of a naval arms race, but lack the coherent maritime strategies to make naval developments dangerous to regional peace and security. Most telling will be whether United States power and focus remain on the region, while adjusting to continued Chinese maritime power in a way acceptable to both nations. No other current or recent work provides such a complete description of the Indo-Pacific region’s navies and maritime strategies, while analyzing the current and future impact of those forces.

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Hindsight can become foresight if viewed through the right lens. Margin of Victory views the outcomes of five horrific twentieth century battles through the lens of military strategy; force design and modernization, all of which decisively influence the savage fighting on the day of battle. From the house to house fighting in Shanghai, China to the dense forests of Western Russia and the deserts of the Middle East, the recurring theme is powerful: Victorious nation-states accept the pressing need for change and implement the tough reforms in military organization, technology and human capital that are essential to future victory, sometimes decades before a major war begins. Meanwhile, national militaries that are allowed to live in the past, that fail to shed outworn assumptions about warfighting play catch-up when war comes; a situation that leads to an enormous loss of human life and, ultimately, to total defeat.Margin of Victory’s riveting stories of victory and defeat are presented against the backdrop of national policies, culture and history. Each chapter is a reminder that to be successful military action must always be congruent with national culture, geography and scientific-industrial capacity; that strategy and geopolitics inevitably trump ideology. Building effective military power takes time, resources and imagination. Unity of command; unity of effort and the integration of capabilities across service lines only happen when they are ruthlessly imposed from the top down. These are some of the enduring lessons in the five warfighting dramas that unfold in vivid detail on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.Margin of Victory concludes with a discussion of future battle and how the United States can leverage the twentieth century’s lessons to secure its margin of victory in the twenty first century. The final chapter argues that America’s future victories depend on a major reset of U.S. national military strategy and an overhaul of U.S. military command structures and force design. The author’s reset includes the creation of a national defense staff, Joint Force Commands inside the regional unified commands and a plea to cultivate America’s greatest margin of victory, its human capital; the high quality of American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.

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Some cultures are clearly more deceptive than others but only during any given slice of time. No single culture has excelled in deceptiveness throughout its history. While the Chinese did rise to the highest level of military deviousness during the time of Sun Tzu (c.350 BC), they had low levels before Master Sun, and afterwards largely lost it during three long periods, only to regain it each time. The most recent Chinese loss was when they fell to the lowest level from the late 1700s until being conquered in 1948 by the stratagemic Chinese Communists (PLA). Thence the PLA has displayed high if not the highest levels of deceptiveness, although there are indications that, beginning in 2002, they are again on the upswing.The levels of guilefulness at any given time can be quite different across the major disciplines of military, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, and commercial business. Perceived practical considerations of greed and survival do sometimes override religious, moral, or ethical factors to produce deceptive behavior.The levels of guilefulness at any given point in time between any two contemporary armed entities (nations, insurgents, or terrorists) are apt to be asymmetric.Deception sophistication is independent of technological change. Within each culture deception varies widely in its levels of sophistication. High, medium, and low levels were found in every culture at different times and regardless of its level of technology. The reason? Because deception is a mind game, it is played only between or among humans. And this condition will remain as long as machines such as computers lack artificial intelligence.Because deception is a mind game, the variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding the victor in combat.

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This is the true life story of the Scottish gardener’s son, John Paul, who became America’s greatest naval hero, John Paul Jones. British midshipman, African slaver, traveling actor, merchant captain, accused of murder and suspected of freebooting—this was John Paul. Captain in Washington’s Continental Navy, raider of the British coasts and victor in one of history’s most desperate naval battles, lion of the French court and beloved by beautiful women, Russian admiral under Catherine the Great, and dead at 45, neglected by his adopted United States, his very grave lost for a hundred years—that was John Paul Jones.

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