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Since the end of World War II, America lost every war it started and failed in military interventions when it did not use sound strategic thinking or have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstances in deciding to use force. The public and politicians need to understand why we have often failed in using military force and the causes. From that understanding, hopefully future administrations will be better prepared when considering the most vexing decision to employ force and send Americans into battle.
The twin causes have been the failure to think strategically and to have sufficient knowledge and understanding when deciding on the use of force. Interestingly, this failure applies to republicans and democrats alike and seems inherent in our national DNA as we continue ignore past mistakes. By examining the records of presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama in using force or starting wars, it becomes self-evident why we fail. And the argument is reinforced by autobiographical vignettes that provide a human dimension and insight into the reasons for failure, in some cases making public previously unknown history.
The recommendations and solutions offered in Anatomy of Failure begin with a framework for a brains based approach to strategic thinking and then address specific bureaucratic, political, organizational and cultural deficiencies have reinforced this propensity for failure. The clarion call of the book is that both a sound strategic framework and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstance that may lead to using force are vital. Without them, failure is virtually guaranteed.

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In 1914, as Germany mobilized for war, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg remarked to the country’s legislators, “If the iron dice must roll, then God help us.” War has often been compared to a game of dice or a lottery. But just as frequently, war has been compared to a game of pure strategy like chess. Napoleon’s shocking successes during the early years of the Napoleonic Wars, for instance, are often attributed to strategic superiority and his ability to see the conflict in the same way a player sees the pieces on a chess board.
In reality, the business of negotiating with adversaries, fighting wars, and ending wars is far more complicated than a game of chess where each player can see all the pieces on the board and knows the possible paths that they can take. Even a casual observer of history can see that war is far more chaotic and unpredictable. And yet, international bargaining and international conflict is not a simple dice game either, where human beings have no control over the outcome. A comprehensive analysis of why wars occur and how they are fought must take into account a variety of factors including strategy, human error and dumb luck.
And perhaps no game in human history better captures these elements than the game of poker. Indeed, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz remarked that “war most closely resembles a game of cards.” To succeed in poker, it is not enough to simply anticipate the actions of other players and try to outsmart them. A successful player must also have an understanding of, and a healthy appreciation for, the role of randomness. Additionally, players must confront the reality that all human beings are prone to errors in judgment, which causes them to make suboptimal choices under many circumstances. Taken together, all of these challenges make poker a fascinating and highly unpredictable game, explaining its enduring popularity.
This book focuses on applying lessons learned from poker, blackjack, roulette and other games of chance to study of international conflict. The book demonstrates how the combined factors of strategy, psychology and probability influence the outbreak of wars, how they are fought, and why they end. Drawing on scholarly insights from a variety of fields, including probability, statistics, political science, psychology and economics, the book offers thoughts on how we can better manage and prevent international conflict, the costliest game of all.

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Neglected Skies is a reconsideration of one of the Second World War’s most forgotten naval engagements – the abortive clash between the British Eastern Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s First Air Fleet (Kido Butai) to the south of Ceylon, over a period of ten days in late March/early April 1942. The focus upon this battle is for the purpose of exploring the surrender of British naval supremacy from the operational perspective, most particularly the inability of the British Admiralty over two decades to develop a first-line, carrier-borne air arm. By primarily analysing the evolution of British naval aviation during the interwar period, as well as the challenges which the peacetime Royal Navy was forced to confront, most especially in the fields of international arms-limitation and domestic fiscal restraint, a picture emerges of a battlefleet which entered war in September 1939 at considerably less that a primary state of combat readiness. Likewise, the publication examines the rise of the instrument which was primarily responsible for toppling the Royal Navy from its paramount position on the battlefield – namely the development of Japan’s lethal first strike instrument known as the Kido Butai. The concentration of the IJN’s six largest aircraft-carriers into a single striking force, equipped with state-of-the-art aircraft manned by elite aviators, represented an enormous quantum leap forward in warfighting at sea, and the evolution of both the concept, and its material components in a domestic atmosphere permeated by aggressive militarism, is a central component in the book. Two essential conclusions are reach by the author. The first is that the demise of British naval supremacy was first and foremost a process that spanned two decades, prior to coming to fruition in the Indian Ocean in April 1942. The second is that the story of British naval and imperial decline did not end with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, but rather reached its climax in the subsequent conduct of Japan’s Operation C, where for the first time in history, a British fleet was compelled to retire from the battlefield in the face of opposition from a force which, though similar in size, possessed a measure of modern aerial firepower which was quite beyond the capability of the British to effectively counter in any form then available to the British Admiralty.

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Strategic bombing is likely the most studied element in Aviation History. The shelves of libraries are filled with books on the topic, yet relatively little is known about where the concept originated or how it evolved. Most of the books on strategic bombing fall into three categories: descriptions of bombing campaigns, critiquing whether they succeeded, or describing why different nations pursued individual visions of airpower. While these are important analyses, there is no one complete study of the idea behind America’s vision of strategy bombing that answers: how it originated, why it changed over time, the factors that shaped change, and how technology molded military doctrine? This book provides just such a full spectrum intellectual history of the American concept of strategic bombing.
In the minds of forward thinking aerial theorists the new technology of the airplane removed the limitations of geography, defenses, and operational reach that had restricted ground and naval forces since the dawn of human conflict. With aviation, a nation could avoid costly traditional military campaigns and attack the industrial heart of an enemy using long-range bombers. Yet, the acceptance of strategic bombing doctrine proved a hard-fought process. The story of strategic bombing is not that of any one person or any one causal factor. Instead, it is a twisting tale of individual efforts, organizational infighting, political priorities, and most important technological integration. At no point was strategic bombing preordained or destined to succeed. In every era, the theory had to survive critical challenges. By tracing the complex interrelationships of these four causal factors, this book provides a greater understanding of the origins and rise to dominance of American strategic bombing theory.
The Origins of American Strategic Bombing meets this need in two ways. First, it explains the intellectual process of going from Wright Flyers to B-17 formations over Germany. Next, it identifies the factors that shaped that intellectual development. In doing so, it challenges the Air Force’s self-identity with a much more complex explanation. It is no longer the story of Billy Mitchell or The Bomber Mafia, but one of a complicated interweaving of events, people, organizational cultures, technology, and politics. The book is unique as it integrates military, political, cultural, and technological history to explain the rise of strategic bombing as the dominant American vision of airpower as it entered World War II.

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The wives and female guests of commissioned officers often went to sea in the sailing ships of the British Royal Navy in the 18th and 19th centuries, but there were other women on board as well, rarely mentioned in print. Suzanne Stark has written the story of the women who lived on the lower decks. She thoroughly investigates the custom of allowing prostitutes to live with the crews of warships in port. She provides some judicious answers to questions about what led so many women to such an appalling fate and why the Royal Navy unofficially condoned the practice. She also offers some revealing firsthand accounts of the wives of warrant officers and semen who spent years at sea living—and fighting—beside their men without pay or even food rations, and of the women in male disguise who actually served as seamen or marines.
These women’s stories have long intrigued the public as the popularity of the often richly embellished accounts of their exploits has proved. Stark disentangles fact from myth and offers some well-founded explanations for such perplexing phenomena as the willingness of women to join the navy when most of the men had to be forced on board by press gangs.
Now available in paperback, this lively history draws on primary sources and so gives an authentic view of life on board the ships of Britain’s old sailing navy and the social context of the period that served to limit roles open to lower-class women. The final chapter is devoted to the autobiography of one redoubtable seagoing woman: Mary Lacy, who served as a seaman in shipwright in the Royal Navy for twelve years.

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Roots of Tradition: Amphibious Warfare in Early America will fill the gap in the historiography of naval and military warfare. As the title implies, this book describes and analyzes early landing operations (from the Revolution through the Civil War) of American history, showing how they contributed to its rich amphibious tradition. No such study currently exists. This study does not attempt to describe every amphibious operation in early America, but focuses on seven major battles or campaigns providing a strong appreciation for the roots of American amphibious traditions. It will address in abbreviated form other amphibious operations and various land and naval battles as necessary to place these major actions in proper historical context.
It is important to remember that amphibious operations include both offensive and defensive actions; and both when viewed from the water’s edge can be instructive. Of the seven major amphibious campaigns examined in this book, five are offensive and two are defensive from the American perspective. (The New York and Baltimore campaigns are defensive and the Yorktown, Derna (Tripoli), California, Veracruz, and Fort Fisher are offensive.)
For many Americans, the concept of amphibious warfare derives from the World War II model where landing forces assaulted foreign shores against determined resistance. These actions resulted in very high casualties, yet proved uniformly success for American operations. The circumstances of geography coupled with the weapons and equipment available at that time dictated this type of warfare. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, no such equipment or weapons existed for assaulting defended beaches. Commanders attempted to land their forces in areas where the resistance would be light or nonexistent. The initiative and maneuverability inherent in naval forces permitted the establishment of combat power ashore before having to engage the enemy. The naval echelon could deliver forces to the point of attack faster that the land-based defenders could react.
The focus of this book is to analyze and explain how amphibious traditions began in this earlier era and, in the epilogue, show how they compare and contrast with modern amphibious forces, particularly the modern U.S. Marine Corps. One of the interesting conclusions it that weapons and equipment (modern amphibious ships, landing craft air cushioned, VSTOL fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and theV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft), coupled with new doctrine (operational maneuver from the sea, ship to shore maneuver) actually allow modern forces to return to the amphibious tactics and operations of the earlier period. Is short, the U.S. Marine corps of the twenty-first century is a true inheritor of these Roots of Tradition established in early America.

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Set amid the backdrop of political infighting, interservice jealousy, and diplomatic intrigue, To the Walls of Derne is the story of William Eaton’s effort to topple Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli, the ruler of Tripoli, and replace him with his brother, Hamet, who was sympathetic to America. Coming in the fourth year of the war with Tripoli, Eaton’s coup attempt marked the first time the United States attempted “regime change” in another country. Although it had the backing of President Thomas Jefferson, problems – political, military and logistical – beset Eaton’s campaign. At the same time, the US Navy continued its campaign against Tripoli, ranging from blockade to planning for an all-out assault on the city. Neither Commodore Samuel Barron nor John Rodgers, the commanders of the American squadron, support Eaton’s mission and also did not want the former Army captain to grab the glory of the ending the war. Meanwhile, Jefferson sent diplomat Tobias Lear to North Africa with specific orders to negotiate an end to the war.
Despite the roadblocks, Eaton’s indomitable will carried him through. He landed in Egypt, searched for and found Hamet Karamanli, assembled an army that included First Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon and seven U.S. Marines. Eaton led his army across the Egyptian and Libyan deserts to attack Bengahzi and had to contend with mutinies, cantankerous allies, hunger, thirst, and lukewarm support from Navy. Almost to spite his detractors, Eaton accomplished his mission, with O’Bannon and his Marines leading the charge that took Benghazi and becoming the first U.S. troops to raise the Stars and Stripes over a foreign city. Just as he seemed on the verge of victory and ousting Yusuf, however, Lear negotiated an end to the war, forcing Eaton to abandon Hamet, his army, and his dreams of glory.
To the Walls of Derne looks not only at the military aspect of the campaigns but at the character of those involved. It uses Libyan sources to provide insight into the persona of Yusuf Karmaanli, who was far from the mindless brute many as Western historians portray him. Karamanli was a fascinating character and arguably among the first Arab nationalists. This book also breathes new life into Hamet Karamanli, who, despite his shortcomings, was a brave combat leader and devoted family. It also examines the role of the US Marine Corps in the campaign in detail – a role that literally saved the Corps from extinction. It delves into the tangled web of political, military and diplomatic efforts and competing interests that plagued the final year of the Tripoli War and gives new insight into the larger-than-life character that was William Eaton.

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The United States Coast Guard might be the smallest branch of the U.S. military but it plays a vital role in our national security as detailed in the selections appearing in this wheel book. From protecting the homeland to providing coast guard forces to combatant commanders and every mission in between, all 11 of the U.S. Coast Guard’s statutory missions are highlighted.
Subjects include Coast Guard history, roles and missions, Team Coast Guard (active, reserve, civilian and auxiliarists), the coast guard’s $25 billion modernization program, research and development, port security in New York City, counter-narcotics, coast guard intelligence, maritime law enforcement, freeing the whales, the Arctic, and the National Fleet concept, to name a few. Every author of each selection is a subject matter expert on the topic and it will be a real treat for readers of the U.S. Coast Guard to have so much wisdom from some of the Coast Guard’s best thinkers and senior leadership in one volume.
Readers will be surprised to learn that the coast guard deploys highly trained dogs on the high seas. They will also be pleasantly surprised that the Coast Guard is a unique tool for theater security cooperation for combatant commanders around the globe since many of the world’s navies are more like the U.S. Coast Guard focused on maritime law enforcement issues instead of projecting power like the U.S. Navy.
The U.S. Coast Guard is a bargain for the American taxpayer. From the selections compiled for this wheel book, the readers will be amazed to learn that the U.S. Coast Guard is able to accomplish the wide range of missions with minimal taxpayer funds, aging platforms, and an active duty force slightly larger than the New York Police Department (NYPD).

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Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov led the Soviet Navy for almost three decades during the height of the Cold War. He was the architect of the Red Fleet, turning it from little more than a coastal defense force into the most powerful navy that Russia ever possessed. It was a remarkable achievement and gave his country unprecedented influence far beyond its shores. Ahead of his time, he was a strategist who advocated a much broader view of sea power than just the naval element, drawing together the exploitation of natural resources, the conduct of mercantile business, the enabling of legal frameworks, societal needs, environmental protection, politics and maritime security into his unified vision. But, most importantly for today’s scholars, he was also a writer, capturing his thoughts in books and articles written throughout his period at the helm. Now, a century after the Russian Revolution and almost three decades after the collapse of the USSR, there is renewed interest in the history of the Cold War. The time is right for new, objective assessments of the confrontation that shaped so much of the last century, for in it there are lessons for our own. Western, predominantly Anglo-American concepts of sea power have so dominated theory and practise that they have become accepted in the West almost without question. Sergei Gorshkov showed that there is always an alternative perspective. 21st Century Gorshkov is a collection of writing by one of the twentieth century’s most revered naval figures. Articles, many of which have not previously been published in English, sit alongside notable passages from his more famous books, each with a short introduction linking the work to the challenges facing navies everywhere today. Planners from Washington, DC to Beijing, London to New Delhi have much to learn from the man behind the most rapid naval expansion program in peacetime history. Gorshkov’s ideas on teamwork, ethos, naval ‘art’ and ‘science’, power and prosperity remain as relevant today as the day they were written.