Аннотация

A specific form of understanding of evil, in the problem of evil debate, gets assumed among a variety of materialistic naturalists. Owing to their physicalist and, in some cases, behaviorist philosophies, this understanding assumes a hedonistic view of pain that reduces valuation to pleasure and pain. Herein, all forms of good and evil get reduced to pleasure and pain. This work reorients the debate toward a more biblical understanding of evil based on an essentialist reading of ethics. The book argues that the hedonistic understanding of value characterizing prominent naturalistic materialists, such as those alluded to by J. L. Mackie, semantically seems to entail either a synonymous or a near synonymous relationship between evil and pain. The book further argues that this understanding, given the essentialist reading of ethics, seems wrongheaded. By reorienting the contours of the debate, it suggests that the problem of pain might, in effect, be quite different from the problem of evil and that neither problem necessarily entails the other. Seen in this way, neither problem casts doubt on belief in God's existence.

Аннотация

Methodological naturalism is the thesis that only natural features can be factored into any legitimate explanation. Moreover, the thesis contends, any attempt to explain natural phenomena by appealing to supernatural features is unscientific and, therefore, illegitimate. This book argues that nothing inherently problematic afflicts possible appeals to supernatural agency in the attempt to explain select phenomena in nature. Reputable philosophers of the ancient and medieval periods, as well as prominent scientists of the early modern era, invoked supernatural agency in their attempts to understand nature. For them, miraculous interventions in nature by a supernatural agent were not unreasonable. However, the super-naturalistic worldview has been replaced by methodological naturalism. The assumptions of two pivotal figures–David Hume and Charles Darwin–brought about this change. This book shows that this change was motivated by unscientific means. Hence, the change itself remains inconsistent with the assumptions of methodological naturalism.