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Chinese invasion might not have caused a Sino-Indian split, but it did have an impact within India. A diplomat later noted the “deep anger” it generated.¹⁶⁷ In parliament, there was also anxiety about Chinese intentions and Indian preparedness on both the opposition and treasury benches.¹⁶⁸ Even some socialist politicians became disillusioned with China.¹⁶⁹ Within the government, officials like Bajpai altered their assessments—the invasion of Tibet showed that China did not really care about India’s sensitivities. With Nehru’s approval, Bajpai instructed Panikkar to tell Beijing that its use of force was harmful for Sino-Indian relations, as well as China’s international position. Suggesting that China had misled it, India also sent an official note calling the Chinese action “deplorable.”¹⁷⁰ After India received an accusatory response from China, Delhi responded defensively, denying that it had any ambitions in Tibet, but asserting that it had certain rights there.¹⁷¹

      The invasion further fueled the Indian government’s internal debate about China. The different perceptions of and proposed strategies toward that country were evident in a letter from Patel to Nehru and in the latter’s subsequent note on Tibet. In Patel’s view, which was closer to the dominant assessment in the US, the invasion showed that China represented both an internal and external threat to India. He asserted that Beijing was hoodwinking Delhi. Furthermore, China did not see India as a friend despite Delhi’s recognition of the communist regime and its efforts to facilitate Beijing’s seating at the UN. Patel argued that nothing India did to convince China of its good intentions would change the Chinese leadership’s hostility toward India. Finally, he viewed China’s behavior as that of a “potential enemy,” one that was no longer separated by a Tibetan buffer and that in fact had territorial ambitions that included parts of India’s northeast and Burma.

      Patel was critical of the government’s response to the invasion, seeing it as too placatory and weak. The deputy prime minister thought that Beijing would see accommodation as a sign of weakness, and that complacency and vacillation would increase the threat from China. Instead, Patel advocated “enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.” He called for a threat assessment; analysis of India’s existing and required defense capabilities; reconsideration of Delhi’s support for Beijing at the UN; strengthening of India’s northeast and of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim; internal security measures in India’s border states; improvement of transport and communication lines to the border; manning of key border posts; reassessment of India’s Tibet presence and its position on the McMahon Line; and, finally, re-examination of India’s external relations—including with the US.¹⁷²

      Despite Patel’s stature, Nehru was the ultimate decisionmaker on foreign policy. Initially after the invasion, a disappointed Nehru questioned broader Chinese intentions.¹⁷³ But, as Henderson had predicted,¹⁷⁴ the prime minister decided to stay the course after receiving what he interpreted as a less antagonistic note from China in mid-November. The missive, coupled with a Chinese military pause at the Xinjiang-Tibet border, seemed to leave the door open for Sino-Tibetan negotiations.¹⁷⁵

      Nehru stressed the long-term perspective: India needed a working relationship with a Chinese communist regime that was here to stay. He believed that Beijing desired India’s friendship and that Delhi should respond. This view was probably encouraged by Panikkar’s report earlier that year that Mao had told him, “India and China cannot afford to have war.” And the chairman’s outline of the two Asian nations’ similar problems would have done nothing to discourage the prime minister’s mirror imaging.¹⁷⁶

      In a November note, Nehru also interpreted the lack of a Chinese demand for complete withdrawal of Indian interests in Tibet as significant. He reiterated that India lacked the military capacity to prevent the takeover of Tibet. Any attempt at stopping the Chinese advance would likely fail and would lead to Chinese hostility toward India and constant insecurity at India’s borders. Nehru instead sought Tibetan autonomy, arguing that the limited but more feasible goal would be harder to attain if Sino-Indian relations were bad.

      Nehru did not think there would be any real Chinese military invasion of India in the “foreseeable future.” For one, this would likely spark a world war. Also, Beijing needed to defend its other borders and would hardly be able to divert the troops required for a major attack on India. However, “gradual infiltration” across the border and Chinese occupation of disputed territory was possible—and indeed a risk. This required improving connectivity to India’s tribal areas in the northeast, which were not well integrated with the country, and preparation to prevent any Chinese infiltration. Furthermore, India needed to tackle the other real threat from China—the “infiltration of … ideas”—with ideas of its own.

      The Indian prime minister believed that visible military strengthening on the scale that Patel envisioned was neither desirable nor feasible. Any attempt to build up India’s military on the Sino-Indian border would likely reinforce Chinese insecurity and be counterproductive—such preparation would serve as a provocation rather than a deterrent. Furthermore, Nehru asserted that India did not have the financial and military resources to prepare for an unlikely attack. Diverting significant resources to the Sino-Indian border would also undermine Indian defence vis-à-vis Pakistan, which he saw as the major potential threat. He believed, additionally, that Pakistan would take political or military advantage of Sino-Indian tensions. Even if India enhanced its defense capabilities or looked abroad for military supplies, it would then be left in a strategically “unsound” position with two major enemies.

      Nehru did not rule out the possibility that the Chinese communists would be expansionist, but he did not believe this was inevitable. It depended on a number of factors, including the development of both countries and the extent to which China adopted communist characteristics. Sino-Indian conflict would be mutually destructive and would allow external actors to take advantage. Given this assessment and the level of India’s capabilities, while Delhi should prepare for contingencies, Nehru continued to believe that the best approach was reaching “some kind of understanding” with China, as long as Beijing desired the same.¹⁷⁷ This belief underlay India’s subsequent Tibet and China policy.

      Postinvasion, Acheson had hoped that, at the very least, India would participate in proposed UN action on Tibet—seen as having a propaganda purpose. The exercise might lead Delhi to realize how difficult it was to deal with Beijing and Moscow. This could make India “less neutral and more realistic about Communism,” facilitating better US-India relations.¹⁷⁸ But, despite indicating that it would participate,¹⁷⁹ India demurred after receiving the more conciliatory note from Beijing and interpreting other Chinese steps as friendlier (e.g., release of some American prisoners of war in North Korea).¹⁸⁰ Bajpai was “suspicious and cynical” about the note, but he agreed that a UN debate would not be helpful at that time.¹⁸¹ It would jeopardize simultaneous Indian efforts for a ceasefire in Korea.¹⁸² Patel’s death in December 1950 only made Nehru’s voice more dominant on Tibet. By January 1951, Bajpai was telling Henderson that with Tibet likely beyond saving and other issues intervening, India was “giving little thought to Tibet.”¹⁸³

      Henderson, who had previously detected little Indian interest in the State Department idea of joint US-UK-India action to stall China in Tibet,¹⁸⁴ urged UN action that could highlight China’s “aggressive attitude.” But he found Indian assessments to be “wishfully warped” to fit their “inclination to do nothing which might offend China.”¹⁸⁵ While some US officials argued that such joint support would buoy Tibetan spirits, Indian officials made clear their belief that the Tibetans were merely trying to postpone—rather than resist—a Chinese takeover.

      Indian officials were not disinterested, but they had different moves in mind. They were, in fact, chagrined about the idea of China taking over Tibetan border defense.¹⁸⁶ Bajpai acknowledged that the Sino-Tibetan agreement signed in May 1951 would affect India’s position vis-à-vis Bhutan, Burma, Nepal, and even Korea. Delhi had already taken some steps to protect its interests. It had devised its own version of what came to be called pactomania in the Eisenhower administration in the US. It signed treaties with neighbors Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), and Sikkim (1950, making it a protectorate) that gave Delhi a crucial say in their

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