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was a sense in the Truman administration that rather than divide the resource pie, one could expand it to justify larger defense spending, Indian policymakers, including Nehru, did not believe that was feasible for them given their limited resources.²¹⁸

      Henderson hoped that differences over tactics would not overpower a common interest in peace and security.²¹⁹ But for Acheson, “it was not [Nehru’s] objectives so much as [the] way in which he said and did things which had caused us lots of trouble.”²²⁰ Nehru, too, subsequently acknowledged that the main difference between the US and India was “in the method of approach.”²²¹ For US policymakers “frustrating the Kremlin design” had become a goal in itself.²²² For Nehru, this blurring of means and ends—and the American emphasis on military instruments—made it harder to achieve the objective of peace.

      The consequence of these differences, especially as the situation in Korea deteriorated after the Chinese intervention, was strain in the US-India relationship. Pandit expressed concern to Bajpai about the “considerable hostility” toward India in US government circles as a result of various China-related disagreements. Lamenting “the universality of the change in tone,” Bajpai felt as a consequence, “for the time being, at any rate, we are isolated, and that over Kashmir and other issues, Pakistan and our enemies will exploit our isolation to the full.”²²³

      Beyond disillusionment, a more visible impact of the China-related friction was the reaction to India’s first major request for bilateral assistance from the US in December 1950. Delhi had asked for food aid. There was debate within the Truman administration—not so much on the desirability of aiding India economically, but on the feasibility given the cost and congressional attitude. While there were a number of US-India disagreements, Acheson told the Indian ambassador frankly that Congress would basically watch India’s approach on two matters: (1) Kashmir and (2) Korea, especially India’s response to greater Chinese involvement.²²⁴

      India’s attitude toward the Korean War, where the US was directly involved, evoked a greater reaction in Congress than the subject of Kashmir. When Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee reached out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Tom Connally (D-TX) to facilitate passage of an aid bill in January 1951, the senator bluntly noted that sentiments toward India, greatly affected by its China policy, would make the task difficult.²²⁵ He refused to move quickly on Indian food assistance, referring the question to a subcommittee.²²⁶ There, McGhee tried to argue that the grant would have a “strong conditioning effect” on Nehru’s policies and Indians’ sentiments. If, however, the US did nothing despite its resources and large numbers of people died, the Indian people “will know at that time that Mr. Nehru and we were on the outs over the question of Communist China, and an inference will be very strong to them that we denied this request because we did not like the political attitude Mr. Nehru expressed.”

      But Connally retorted, “Nehru is out giving us hell at the time, working against us and voting against us” and was unlikely to change his approach. Senator Guy Gillette (D-IA) said he did not want to do anything to stabilize Nehru’s position. And Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AK) said that India should pay for the food. He added that he did not like what appeared to be blackmail, with India arguing, “Give it to us or we will go Communist.” McGhee argued that the US had already lost China and could not afford to lose India too, but when Fulbright asked if India, especially given its attitude, was “more important than the Ruhr and Japan,” the assistant secretary had to admit “strategically, no.”²²⁷

      US officials told their Indian counterparts that their statements and actions, which were seen as defending the Chinese attack against UN forces, made the aid request harder to get through Congress.²²⁸ The New York Times predicted further delays, “probably … due to irritation caused by Mr. Nehru’s refusal to go along with the United States and its policy toward Communist China.”²²⁹ A former chairman of the Republican National Committee asserted that India’s “cooperation with aggressors” weakened the case for aid.²³⁰

      With support from a bipartisan coalition, however, Truman went ahead with a request to Congress that February. His message made anticommunist, humanitarian, and democracy promotion cases for aiding India. Many members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed that it was important to aid India.²³¹ In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to spur action, Acheson and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) noted Chinese and Soviet offers of grain to India on a barter or sale basis.²³² The bill, however, stalled in Congress for months as members debated whether to give India aid and whether to demand raw materials in return since Delhi was not going to support US foreign policy.²³³ The debate also gave members a forum to criticize India’s China policy repeatedly and vociferously.

      The India bashing in Congress and the media resulting from Delhi’s China policy, and the linkage between Indian foreign policy and American food assistance, adversely affected Indian views of the US.²³⁴ As Nehru had noted, “We are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down.… Our general reaction, whenever any pressure is sought to be applied upon us by any country, is to resent it and may be to go against it.”²³⁵ Anti-India rhetoric in the US generated louder self-sufficiency rhetoric in India. Nehru insisted publicly that conditional aid would not be welcome. His reproach, in turn, sparked further criticism on Capitol Hill, finally leading the prime minister to state that India would prefer a loan rather than a grant.²³⁶ In June, months after India had requested aid, Truman signed a food assistance bill. Thus the US eventually helped fill Indian stomachs, but in the process did little to win the battle for Indian hearts and minds.²³⁷

      India as a Channel to China: Only Hurting Itself? (1951–1952)

      Feeling burned by the American attitude and recognizing the adverse impact on the aid debate in Congress, Delhi had limited its intermediary role in the Korean War in spring 1951. Bajpai told Pandit, “Both China and the USA are determined to fight it out, and any third party that tries to come between the two is likely only to hurt itself.” There was criticism in parliament of such a role as well. Jivatram Bhagwandas (J. B.) Kripalani, whom Nehru had backed to be president of the Indian National Congress, said that thanks to India’s positions, “[India had] no friend left in the world.”²³⁸ Furthermore, the experience was frustrating. China and the US mistrusted each other’s intentions. Each side told Indian officials they doubted the other’s peaceful intentions and, therefore, insisted that the other provide reassurance first.²³⁹

      Nonetheless, in summer 1951, Indian officials did become involved in efforts in Beijing and Delhi—quietly coordinating with British and Swiss representatives—to secure the release of American prisoners being held in China.²⁴⁰ India was reprising a role it had played in 1949 when it had tried to secure the release of American consul Angus Ward.²⁴¹ Differing US and Indian perceptions of China were again evident. In the early stages of talks on the prisoners, Panikkar felt Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s responses were positive. Washington, however, took more seriously the views of British officials, who did not share the Indian ambassador’s optimism.²⁴² There were also differences on tactics. American officials thought that Indian public representations on behalf of the US would convey to Beijing the widespread disapproval of its attitude toward foreign nationals. Indian officials, on the other hand, believed that explicit association with the US or others would reduce Indian influence in Beijing.²⁴³

      Frustration with Washington deepened when India became involved as an intermediary on the Korean issue again, even as China and the US undertook armistice talks after summer 1951 in Kaesong and then Panmunjom. After China backtracked in July 1952 on its in-principle acceptance of an India-UK prisoner repatriation formula that could have led to a settlement, an exasperated Nehru said that both sides “express their desire for settlement, but neither is prepared to give in … and wants the other to do so.” He was unhappy that Beijing had not been “straight” with India. But he found the American military approach—and continued bombing in the midst of peace efforts that only made Beijing more intransigent—to be “outrageous.” On balance, he blamed American policy in the Far East,

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