LITMIR.BIZ

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and abortive shocks, of which a list has just been detailed, could lead neither commander to hope for any final result. Boufflers ordered a retreat, screened by his yet unbroken lines of horse. The infantry were withdrawn from the wood of Lanière, which they still held, and from their positions behind the forest of Sars. They were directed in two columns towards Bavai in their rear, and as that orderly and unhurried retreat was accomplished, the cavalry filed in to follow the line, and the French host, leaving the field in the possession of the victors, marched back westward by the two Roman roads in as regular a formation as though they had been advancing to action rather than retreating from an abandoned position.

      It was not quite three o’clock in the afternoon.

      There was no pursuit, and there could be none. The allied army slept upon the ground it had gained; rested, evacuated its wounded, and restored its broken ranks through the whole of the morrow, Thursday. It was not until the Friday that it was able to march back again from the field in which it had triumphed at so terrible an expense of numbers, guns, and colours, and with so null a strategic result, and to take up once more the siege of Mons. Upon the 9th of October Mons capitulated, furnishing the sole fruit of this most arduous of all the great series of Marlborough’s campaigns.

      No battle has been contested with more valour or tenacity than the battle of Malplaquet. The nature of the woodland fighting contributed to the enormous losses sustained upon either side. The delay during which the French had been permitted to entrench themselves so thoroughly naturally threw the great balance of the loss upon the assailants. In no battle, free, as Malplaquet was free, from all pursuit or a rout, or even the breaking of any considerable body of troops (save the Dutch troops and Highlanders on the left in the earlier part of the battle, and the Bavarians and Cologne men in the redans at the close of it), has the proportion of the killed and wounded been anything like so high. In none, perhaps, were casualties so heavy accompanied by so small a proportion of prisoners.

      The action will remain throughout history a standing example of the pitch of excellence to which those highly trained professional armies of the eighteenth century, with their savage discipline, their aristocratic command, their close formations, and their extraordinary reliance upon human daring, could arrive.

      Footnotes:

1. From which little place the lines as a whole take the name in history of “Lines of La Bassée.”

2. As is common in the history of military affairs, the advocates of either party present these confused movements before the lines of La Bassée upon the eve of the siege of Tournai in very different and indeed contradictory lights.

      The classical work of Mr. Fortescue, to which I must, here as elsewhere, render homage, will have the whole movement, from its inception, to be deliberately designed; no battle intended, the siege of Tournai to be the only real object of the allies.

      The French apologists talk of quarrels between Eugene and Marlborough, take for granted a plan of assault against Villars, and represent the turning off of the army to the siege of Tournai as an afterthought. The truth, of course, is contained in both versions, and lies between the two. Eugene and Marlborough did intend a destructive assault upon Villars and his line, but they were early persuaded—especially by the reconnoitring of Cadogan—that the defensive skill of the French commander had proved formidable, and we may take it that the determination to besiege Tournai and to abandon an assault upon the main of the French forces had been reached at least as early as the 26th. There is no positive evidence, however, one way or the other, to decide these questions of motive. I rely upon no more than the probable intention of the men, to be deduced from their actions, and I do not believe that the Dutch would have had orders to move as early as they did unless Marlborough had decided—not later than the moment I have mentioned—to make Tournai the first objective of the campaign.

3. Mr. Fortescue in his work makes it the 23rd. I cannot conceive the basis for such an error. The whole story of the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th is in the French archives, together with full details of the capitulation on the 29th and 30th.

4. As usual, there is a contradiction in the records. The French record definitely ascribes the proposal to Marlborough. Marlborough, in a letter to his wife of 5th August, as definitely ascribes it to Surville; and there is no positive evidence one way or the other, though Louis’ rejection of the terms and the ability of calculation and the character of the two men certainly make it more probable that Marlborough and not Surville was the author of the proposition.

5. The dispute as to who was the author of the suggestion for an armistice is further illumined by this refusal on the part of the allies. The proposal to contain Tournai and yet to have free their vast forces in operation elsewhere, if a trifle crude, was certainly to their advantage, and as certainly to the disadvantage of the French.

6. This excellent phrase is Mr. Fortescue’s.

7. Technically the line of defence was forced, for the line of Trouille was but a continuation of the lines of La Bassée—Douai—Valenciennes. So far as strategical results were concerned, the withdrawal of Villars behind the forest barrier was equivalent to the reconstruction of new lines, and in the event the action of Malplaquet proved that new defensive position to be strong enough to prevent the invasion of France. On the other hand, there is little doubt that if Villars had been in a little more strength he would have elected to fight on the old lines and not behind the woods.

      It must further be remarked that if the operations had not been prolonged as they were by the existence of the posts on the lines, notably at St. Ghislain, the defensive position of the French would probably have been forced and their whole line broken as early as September 4th.

8. It is remarkable that these two roads, which are the chief feature both of the landscape and the local military topography, and which are of course as straight as taut strings, are represented upon Mr. Fortescue’s map (vol. i. p. 424) as winding lanes, or, to speak more accurately, are not represented at all. In this perhaps the learned historian of the British army was misled by Coxe’s atlas to Marlborough’s campaign, a picturesque but grossly inaccurate compilation. The student who desires to study this action in detail will do well to consult the Belgian Ordnance Map on the scale of ¹⁄40,000 contours at 5 metres, section Roisin, and the French General Staff Map, ¹⁄80,000, section Maubeuge, south-western quarter; the action being fought exactly on the frontier between Belgium and France, both maps are necessary. For the general strategic position the French ¹⁄200,000 in colours, sheet Maubeuge, and the adjoining sheet, Lille, are sufficient.

9. The reader who may compare this account of Malplaquet with others will be the less confused if he remembers that the forest of Sars is called on that extremity nearest to the gap the wood of Blaregnies, and that this name is often extended, especially in English accounts, to the whole forest.

10. These 9000 found at St. Ghislain a belated post of 200 French, who surrendered. Someone had forgotten them.

11. For the discussion of this see later on p. 75.

12. They were commanded by Hamilton and Tullibardine. It is to be remarked that the

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