LITMIR.BIZ

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conceived it eminently fitting and practicable that that same Union element should have its loyalty put to good uses and be itself induced to take up arms in behalf of the cause it affected so ardently to endorse. To an ex-teacher among the Seminoles, E.H. Carruth, was entrusted the task of recruiting.

      The situation in Indian Territory was more than

      Footnote 130: (return)

      (cont.) Robinson was opposed to the idea [ibid., November 2, 6, 1861].

Footnote 131: (return)

      Official Records, vol. iii, 530.

Footnote 132: (return)

      Martin, First Two Years of Kansas, 24; Biographical Congressional Directory, 1771–1903.

Footnote 133: (return)

      Daily Conservative, November 1, 1861, gives Robinson the credit of inciting Stanton to contest the seat.

Footnote 134: (return)

      Daily Conservative, October 30, 1861.

      

delicate. It was precarious and had been so almost from the beginning. The withdrawal of troops from the frontier posts had left the Territory absolutely destitute of the protection solemnly guaranteed its inhabitants by treaty with the United States government. Appeal¹³⁵ to the War Department for a restoration of what was a sacred obligation had been without effect all the summer. Southern emissaries had had, therefore, an entirely free hand to accomplish whatever purpose they might have in mind with the tribes. In September,¹³⁶ the Indian Office through Charles E. Mix, acting commissioner of Indian affairs in the absence of William P. Dole, who was then away on a mission to the Kansas tribes, again begged the War Department¹³⁷ to look into matters so extremely urgent. National honor would of itself have dictated a policy of intervention before

Footnote 135: (return)

      Secretary Cameron's reply to Secretary Smith's first request was uncompromising in the extreme and prophetic of his persistent refusal to recognize the obligation resting upon the United States to protect its defenceless "wards." This is Cameron's letter of May 10, 1861:

      "In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state that on the 17th April instructions were issued by this Department to remove the troops stationed at Forts Cobb, Arbuckle, Washita, and Smith, to Fort Leavenworth, leaving it to the discretion of the Commanding Officer to replace them, or not, by Arkansas Volunteers.

      "The exigencies of the service will not admit any change in these orders." [Interior Department Files, Bundle no. 1 (1849–1864) War.]

      Secretary Smith wrote to Cameron again on the thirtieth [Interior Department Letter Press Book, vol. iii, 125], enclosing Dole's letter of the same date [Interior Department, File Box, January 1 to December 1, 1861; Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 176], but to no purpose.

Footnote 136: (return)

      Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 218–219.

Footnote 137: (return)

      Although his refusal to keep faith with the Indians is not usually cited among the things making for Cameron's unfitness for the office of Secretary of War, it might well and justifiably be. No student of history questions to-day that the appointment of Simon Cameron to the portfolio of war, to which Thaddeus Stevens had aspirations [Woodburn, Life of Thaddeus Stevens, 239], was one of the worst administrative mistakes Lincoln ever made. It was certainly one of the four cabinet appointment errors noted by Weed [Autobiography, 607].

      

the poor neglected Indians had been driven to the last desperate straits. The next month, October, nothing at all having been done in the interval, Dole submitted¹³⁸ to Secretary Smith new evidence of a most alarmingly serious state of affairs and asked that the president's attention be at once elicited. The apparent result was that about the middle of November, Dole was able to write with confidence—and he was writing at the request of the president—that the United States was prepared to maintain itself in its authority over the Indians at all hazards.¹³⁹

      Boastful words those were and not to be made good until many precious months had elapsed and many sad regrettable scenes enacted. In early November occurred the reorganization of the Department of the West which meant the formation of a Department of Kansas separate and distinct from a Department of Missouri, an arrangement that afforded ample opportunity for a closer attention to local exigencies in both states than had heretofore been possible or than, upon trial, was subsequently to be deemed altogether desirable. It necessarily increased the chances for local patronage and exposed military matters to the grave danger of becoming hopelessly entangled with political.

The need for change of some sort was, however, very evident and the demand for it, insistent. If the southern Indians were not soon secured, they were bound to menace, not only Kansas, but Colorado¹⁴⁰ and to help materially in blocking the way to Texas, New Mexico,

Footnote 138: (return)

      Indian Office Report Book no. 12, 225.

Footnote 139: (return)

      Dole to Hunter, November 16, 1861, ibid., Letter Book, no. 67, pp. 80–82.

Footnote 140: (return)

      On conditions in Colorado Territory, the following are enlightening: ibid., Consolidated Files, C 195 of 1861; C 1213 of 1861; C 1270 of 1861; C 1369 of 1861; V 43 of 1861; Official Records, vol. iv, 73.

      

and Arizona. Their own domestic affairs had now reached a supremely critical stage.¹⁴¹ It was high time

Footnote 141: (return)

      In addition to what may be obtained on the subject from the first volume of this work, two letters of slightly later date furnish particulars, as do also the records of a council held by Agent Cuther with certain chiefs at Leroy.

      (a). LAWRENCE, KANSAS, Dec. 14th, 1861.

      HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Ind. Affairs

      Dear Sir, It is with reluctance that I again intrude on your valuable time. But I am induced to do so by the conviction that the subject of our Indian relations is

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