LITMIR.BIZ

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has been defined in many ways. Some definitions, as Richard Betts pointed out in his book, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, are fairly broad and synonymous with overall military capabilities — for example, the “balancing of manpower, investment, and operations and maintenance expenditures that produce the force structure capability of rapid, sustained, and ultimate full response.” However, most definitions are narrower, focusing on the ability to respond quickly. For this monograph, the following will be used:

       The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they are designed and to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays.

       The capacity to perform missions when directed to do so.

       A force’s ability to fight with little or no warning.

       The fraction of a force committed to a fight without unacceptable delays and that acquits itself well.

       The ability of the currently configured force structure to perform its assigned missions promptly.

      Deliver and Deploy Without Unacceptable Delays. During the Korean War, lack of adequate logistics hampered North Korea’s military forces and kept North Korea from completely controlling the peninsula. Thus, sustainability of the North Korean military forces became a primary requirement, and the country continues to maintain war reserves for all classes of supply for 6 months of sustainability for regular forces and 3 months for reserve units and paramilitary forces. A major increase in the number of active forces and the deployment of many new types of weapons systems in the past 20 years complicate this doctrine; however, North Korea’s massive war reserve stockpiles continue to expand despite the tremendous cost to its economic structure and hardship to its people.

      On the negative side of the military-first rule, due to the over-expansion of military roles, the overpoliticization of the KPA, and the “military sprawl” in the North Korean society, the KPA’s primary role, i.e., the military defense of North Korea, probably would be downgraded and downplayed. Despite the KPA’s continuous claim on almost half of the DPRK’s government budget, its resources are still limited and unduly stretched out. As a result, the KPA’s military readiness suffers, and actual military capabilities continue to deteriorate despite the military-first policy.

      North Korea expanded its ammunition and equipment storage capacities by building hardened and underground facilities and enlarging existing facilities as well as major national-level storage installations and unit-level storage depots, especially near the DMZ. Current ammunition stockpiles are estimated at over one million tons as well as major military POL war reserves, despite the severe shortage of fuel supplies for the civil economy.

      The Nautilus Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology estimates that North Korean fuel consumption for 30 days of full-time combat would be up to 200,000 tons, and it would take 4 months to restock military fuel, given North Korea’s current supply rate, either by bringing in fuel stored in rear areas or from refining new fuel and then moving it into combat zones. However, one of North Korea’s military objectives is to take the entire Korean peninsula within 30 days and it could probably replenish its fuel stocks with the numerous ROK civilian POL gas stations and supply points.

      Substantial food and combat ration war reserves are stockpiled, despite widespread starvation and malnourishment in recent years. Information from interviews with North Korean defectors and World Food Program officials suggests that the North Korean food rationing system operates on a priority basis, feeding KWP members and military and police officers while leaving many ordinary people in hunger. Despite its improved harvest in recent years, North Korea still suffers from a chronic food shortage, with the country needing approximately 6 million tons of grain a year to provide basic nutrition for its 22 million people.

      Capacity to Perform Missions when Directed. North Korea’s ability and capacity to perform its missions when directed has not changed since the Korean War. A survivor of Pork Chop Hill and Silver Star recipient, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Earle Denton describes the opponent he faced on the Korean peninsula: “The North Korean soldier was a formidable warrior and enemy. He was resourceful and tenacious on the battlefield. He followed orders without deviation and was willing to give his life for mission accomplishment without question. He did not surrender.”

      Since the Korean War, the KPA soldier has had no reason to change his ethic on performing his mission. In fact, over 53 years of reinforcement by his chain-of-command concerning the “dark forces in the South” probably has only strengthened the resolve of the KPA.

      The KPA currently is judged to be capable of defending the DPRK, conducting special operations against the ROK and Japan, and maintaining internal security. It currently maintains the capability to initiate a war of reunification against the ROK with little warning; however, it has a declining capability to prosecute such a war for an extended period of time.

      North Korea has over 200,000 vehicles, 1,000 locomotives, and over 20,000 railcars that are mostly nonmilitary but would be mobilized to support a conflict. Much of this transportation is tied to reserve force units that would provide a substantial part of the logistic support required by military forces and would move personnel, ammunition, and supplies into the ROK during a conflict. Truck transportation units would provide a full range of support. However, shortages in truck transportation could be supplied by North Korean SOF and agent-commandeered ROK civilian trucks which would be plentiful throughout South Korea.

      Rail assets would provide heavy-lift capacity to move armor, self-propelled artillery, and resupply from national depots. Merchant and fishery vessels would support naval forces and ground troops along the peninsula’s coastal waters. The civil air transport fleet would be mobilized to carry troops and high-value cargo and possibly to deliver chemical and biological warfare agents.

      However, the KPA would still be hard-pressed to provide logistic sustainment to KPA troops operating well south of the DMZ. The KPA probably plans on using South Korean fuel, food, and other logistics. Information concerning the KPA’s plan to feed, provide ammo resupply, and fuel its attacking forces is unknown. This could be one of the primary factors limiting DPRK from initiating an offensive attack. However, South Korea has a plentiful supply of civilian fuel stations for gas, diesel, and other POL products.

      Some analysts have determined that urbanization has taken maneuver ground away from advancing North Korean ground forces. Additionally, during any offensive, South Koreans fleeing Seoul and other northern areas would clog the road systems and further reduce North Korea’s ability to travel quickly. However, as South Korea continues to build new modern highways, North Korean forces would have no compunction about destroying or bulldozing cars off the roads in advance of their mechanized forces.

      Ability to Fight with Little or No Warning. North Korea deploys approximately 65 percent of its military units and up to 80 percent of its estimated aggregate firepower within 100 km of the DMZ. Figure 6 depicts the southerly forward movement of KPA forces over the decades. North Korea theoretically could invade the south without recourse to further deployments and with relatively little warning time. However, this forward deployment also is positioned to deter any attack coming from the south. It is estimated that if North Korea decided to initiate hostilities, the Republic North Korea decided to initiate hostilities, the Republic 36 hours warning under ideal conditions, or as little as 12 hours if the KPA already was at an alerted status.

       Figure 6. North Korea historical Force Deployment toward the DMZ.

      Force multipliers for ensuring success for any NK offensive operations include surprise, the United States being preoccupied in another major area of operations (i.e., Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), or the location of U.S. forces in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area (i.e., 7th Fleet participating in an exercise in Australia or conducting tsunami relief operations in Indonesia).

      Fight with Unacceptable Delays. In 2000, North Korea continued to improve its military, working hard to arrest a decline in readiness and to upgrade its capability. Highlighting these enhancements was an ambitious program to improve ground forces capabilities

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