LITMIR.BIZ

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guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, asymmetric warfare, and insurgency.

      Evolution of North Korean Special Purpose Forces. North Korean Special Purpose Forces retain their roots and history from Kim Il Sung’s first military experiences and have evolved as KPA military doctrine has evolved. Figure 5 shows the numerical development of SOF manpower from the 1960s through the present. In 1958, Kim Il Sung began to define the role of the KPA’s emerging SOF when he issued his “Instruction to Reconnaissance Troops.” His instructions included training under every type of weather and seasonal condition to include day and night physical training in the mountains; arming themselves with solid party ideology; being able to fight in the enemy’s rearguard; acquiring the ability to destroy airfields, “atomic guns” (probably a reference to perceived U.S. artillery deployed in the South with a nuclear ordnance capability — it does show North Korea’s awareness and targeting of such systems if they did exist), bridges, tunnels, and locomotives; operating airplanes, automobiles, and trains; operating ocean-going and river ships and boats; and being adept swimmers.

      The early 1960s reflected a time of civil unrest and military vulnerabilities in South Korea. Large student uprisings forced the resignation of the Syngman Rhee government and enabled the ROK military under the leadership of Park Chung Hee to assume power through a coup d’état. The DPRK’s failure to be prepared and capable to exploit these vulnerabilities resulted in reorganization and modernization of the KPA which included intelligence gathering and North Korea-sponsored anti-ROK operations.

      Between 1965 and 1968, the KPA developed the light infantry regiment class of infantry units. This regiment would receive training and equipment for its new warfare missions. It consisted of approximately 1,300-1,800 troops, responsible for conducting guerrilla warfare and special operations within the army group’s area of responsibility.

      Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KPA had only a limited amphibious warfare capability. Most of the KPA maritime lift was conducted by fishing boats, junks, sampans, and a few conventional amphibious warfare craft. The North Koreans had a history of using nontraditional methods to conduct amphibious operations. For example, on June 25, 1950 a ROKN patrol craft sank a 1,000 ton armed North Korean steamer with 600 KPA troops embarked, attempting to land near Pusan. The significance of this operation has been lost, since all the attention has been given to North Korea’s offensive thrust down South Korea’s main road along the east coast. If the 600 troops had landed successfully near Pusan, the outcome of the war could have been drastically altered. This forgotten operation reveals Kim Il Sung’s doctrine of using a rear attack to support his main effort.

      Early in 1968, the DPRK once again revealed its resolve to use its SOF to achieve its missions by using a 31-man assault team to attempt to assassinate the President of South Korea. It was believed that the death of the President would result in civil unrest allowing for the “revolution in the south” to begin with KPA assistance. Dressed in ROK Army uniforms, the North Korean SOF team infiltrated South Korea through the DMZ. On January 21, 1968, the team proceeded to the Presidential residence, the Blue House, to kill the president and any other civilians encountered. However, the team was discovered and engaged by ROK National Police. All of the North Korean commandos were killed, but two of the team reportedly escaped back to North Korea without being captured. Twenty-seven ROK personnel were killed, with 65 ROK wounded. This act was eclipsed quickly in U.S. thinking by the attack and capture of the USS Pueblo two days later by the Korean People’s Navy and Air Force units.

      VIII Special Corps. Because of the failures of this attack and other large commando operations targeting South Korea during the late 1960s, North Korea established the VIII Special Corps. North Korean partisan generals were purged, special warfare and intelligence assets were reorganized, and policy was reformulated. Rather than guerrilla warfare, political subversion, with selected use of military special operations, now became the policy to be pursued against South Korea. This would be complemented by a dramatic increase in support for “international revolution” and the struggle against imperialism (i.e., revolution and terrorism) as an indirect means of striking at both the ROK and the United States. In 1969, Kim Il Sung emphasized the “study of combining regular and irregular warfare, and of mountain warfare.”

      Kim Il Sung stated that there would be a unique strategic approach based upon “light infantry units,” which had the capability of conducting “all forms of combat.” This was a pivotal point in the development of the KPA’s special warfare forces. Prior to this, guerrilla warfare was the primary mission which received the bulk of support and funding. Now these units would be responsible for a broader, more balanced range of unconventional and special warfare operations. Prolonged political subversion and intelligence collection became the primary mission. In 1970, SOF personnel strength was estimated at 15,000. This figure dramatically increased to 41,000 by 1978 and to 80,000 by 1984.

      Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, DPRK continued to conduct infiltration and special operations against the ROK. These missions did not have the same lethality that those in the 1960s had. KPA SOF utilized overland but preferred seaborne insertion methods such as using high-speed infiltration craft; however, all attempted to exfiltrate via land through the DMZ.

      By the late 1970s, the term “special purpose forces” was coined to describe those KPA units that possessed ranger/commando- and special forces-type capabilities, as well as capabilities for unconventional warfare and special operations.

      From 1970 to 1980, at least six infiltration teams were engaged and killed or destroyed. However, in 1974, Kim Il Sung still sent assassination teams to kill ROK President Park Chung Hee, all failing in their attempts (although they did kill Park’s wife).

      In 1982-83, North Korea implemented a series of organizational changes which reorganized the intelligence and internal security services and separated MPAF from the State Administration Council and placed it under the CMC (which later evolved into the NDC). During this organization, programs to mechanize and modernize the KPA as well as cultivate the KPA’s special warfare assets, and the capabilities of the Reconnaissance Bureau and VIII Special Corps were developed and implemented.

      In 1984-85, the KPAF acquired 87 Hughes MD500 Defender helicopters which were repainted with ROKAF paint schemes. Thus reconfigured, these helicopters would prove significantly useful in any operations against the ROK.

      In the 1980s, the KPA began to improve and increase its airborne and seaborne lift capabilities. In 1987, KPA amphibious warfare (which included new amphibious doctrine and industrial production) began constructing high-speed air-cushion landing craft (speeds up to 52 knots and carrying 40-50 troops) which significantly improved the KPA’s amphibious assault capability, especially into the ROK rear areas which have large mud flats.

      During the early 1990s, the VIII Special Corps was renamed the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau. The special purpose forces continued to expand during this period from 85,000 troops organized into 22 brigades in 1990 to approximately 100,000 troops organized into 25 brigades in 1996.

      Foreign Military Assistance Using SOF Assets. From 1969-89, the DPRK expanded its foreign military assistance to a number of developing countries and to its support for terrorist and revolutionary groups. Personnel from the VIII Special Corps and Reconnaissance Bureau provided the majority of the advisors sent overseas on military assistance missions and would serve as instructors and trainers to terrorist and revolutionary groups both overseas and within the DPRK. As late as 1995, the DPRK invited members of the terrorist organization Abu Nidal to North Korea and continued to support rebel groups in the Philippines.

      Beginning in 1990, several organizational changes occurred within the DPRK that enhanced Kim Jong Il’s control over the KPA and affected both the VIII Special Corps and the intelligence services. The first was the establishment of the NDC and the transferring of MPAF to the NDC. On December 24, 1991, Kim Jong Il was appointed supreme commander of the KPA, and 1 year later, he was appointed chairman of the NDC. Because of Kim Jong Il’s moves, the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 had minimal observable effect on the special forces or even the KPA in general.

      SOF Missions. Today, KPA Special Purpose Forces have evolved the following missions:

       Seizure

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