Fundamental Philosophy (Vol. 1&2) - Jaime Luciano Balmes

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When treating of the necessary relations of things, the general principles, the middle terms, and all the auxiliaries to reasoning furnished by logic, are only inventions of art to make us reflect upon the conception of the thing, and see in it what otherwise we should not see. Hence our judgments on necessary objects are in some sense analytical; and Kant equivocates, when he says there are synthetic judgments not dependent on experience. Without experience we have only the conception of the thing. We do not pretend that all propositions express such a relation between the subject and the predicate, that the conception of the former will always give that of the latter; but we do hold, that the reason of this insufficiency is the incompleteness of the conception, either in itself, or in relation to our comprehension. But if we suppose the conception complete in itself, and a due capacity in our intellect to understand whatever it contains, we shall find in the conception all that can be the object of science.

      276. An example from mathematics will make this clearer. Large works on geometry are filled with explanations, demonstrations, and applications of the properties of the triangle. The conceptions of right lines, and the angles formed by them, enter into the conception of the triangle. We ask, can all the explanations and demonstrations of the properties of triangles in general ever go beyond the ideas of right lines and angles? No. For the new elements introduced would be foreign to the triangle, and would consequently change its nature. Necessary relations neither admit of more nor of less, neither additions nor subtractions of any sort; what is, is, and nothing more. In passing from the triangle in general to its different species, such as equilateral, isosceles, right angled, scalene, it is to be observed that the demonstration must rigorously attend to what is contained in the general conception, modified by the determining properties of the species, that is, the equality of the three sides, of two, the inequality of all, the supposition of a right angle, and others.

      277. What we are now explaining is clearly seen in the application of algebra to geometry. A curve is expressed by a formula containing the conception of the curve, or its essence. The geometrician, to demonstrate the properties of the curve, does not need to go out of this formula; it is a touch-stone in his hand, and he finds in it all that he wants. He inscribes triangles, or other figures in the curve, draws right lines from it to points without, but never goes out of the conception expressed in the formula; he decomposes it, and finds in it what before he had not discovered.

      In this equation z2 = (e2/E2)(2Ex-x2), we find the expression of the relations which constitute the ellipse; E expresses the greater semi-axis, e the lesser, z the ordinates, and x the abscissas. With this equation variously developed and transformed, the properties of the curve are determined; it shows, with the help of constructions, that the new property is contained in the conception, and to find it, we have only to analyze it.

      If we suppose an intelligence capable of conceiving the essence of the curve, by an immediate intuition of the law governing the inflection of points, without the necessity of referring it to any line, whether one axis instead of two suffices, or in any other manner not even imaginable by us; this intelligence will not need to follow all the evolutions which we have made in demonstrating the properties of the curve; for it will perceive them to be clearly contained in the very conception of the curve. This supposition is not arbitrary; we see it realized every day, though on a smaller scale. An ordinary geometrician conceives a curve as also does Pascal; but while Pascal at a glance sees the most recondite properties of the curve in this conception, an ordinary geometrician sees only after long study its most common properties. Kant made no account of this doctrine, and therefore could not solve the problem of pure synthetic judgments: had he examined the subject more profoundly he would have seen that, strictly speaking, there are no such judgments; and instead of wearing out his genius in attempting to solve an insolvable problem, he would have abstained from raising it.(26)

      CHAPTER XXIX.

      ARE THERE TRUE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN THE SENSE OF KANT?

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      278. The great importance attributed by the German philosopher to his imaginary discovery, requires us to examine it at length. This importance may be estimated from what he himself says: "If any of the ancients had only had the idea of proposing the present question, it would have been a mighty barrier against all the systems of pure reason down to our days, and would have saved many vain attempts which were blindly made without knowing what was treated of."[23] This passage is quite modest and naturally excites our curiosity to know what is the problem which needed only to be proposed in order to avoid all the aberrations of pure reason.

      Here are his words: "All empirical judgments, as such, are synthetic. For it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience, since I am not obliged to go out of the conception itself in order to form the judgment, and therefore can have no need of the testimony of experience. That a body is extended, is a proposition which stands firm a priori. It is no empirical judgment; for, prior to experience, I have all the conditions of forming it in the conception of body, from which I deduce the predicate, extension, according to the principle of contradiction, by which I at once become conscious of its necessity, which I could not learn from experience. But, on the other hand, I do not include, in the primitive conception of body in general, the predicate, heaviness; yet this conception of body in general indicates, through experience of a part of it, an object of experience, to which I may add from experience other parts also belonging to it. I can attain to the conception of body beforehand, analytically, through its characteristics extension, impenetrability, form, etc., all of which are included in the primary conception of body. But I now extend my cognition, and, as I recur to experience, from which I have obtained the conception of body in general, I find along with these characteristics the conception of heaviness. I therefore add this, as a predicate, to the conception of body. The possibility of this synthesis therefore rests on experience; for both conceptions, although one does not contain the other, yet belong as parts to a whole, that is to say, to experience, which is itself a union of synthetic, though contingent intuitions. But in the case of synthetic judgments a priori we have not this assistance. Here we have not the advantage of returning and supporting ourselves on experience. If I must go out of the conception A in order to find another conception B, which is to be joined to it, on what am I to rely? and by what means does the synthesis become possible?"[24]

      279. The reason of this synthesis is found in the faculty of our mind of forming total conceptions, in which the relation of the partial conceptions composing it is discovered; and the legitimacy of the same synthesis is founded on the principles on which the criterion of evidence is based.

      The synthesis of the schoolmen consists in the union of conceptions, and does not refuse to admit as analytical the total conceptions, from the decomposition of which results the knowledge of the relations of the partial conceptions.

      If Kant had stopped with the judgments of experience, there would be no objection to his doctrine. But extended to the purely intellectual order, it is either inadmissible, or at least expressed without much exactness.

      260. Kant says all mathematical judgments are analytic, and that this truth which in his opinion "is certainly incontestible and important on account of its consequences, seems to have hitherto escaped the sagacity of the analysts of human reason, causing very contrary opinions." We think it is the sagacity of his Aristarchus, and not that of the analysts, that is at fault.

      "One would certainly think at first sight that the proposition, 7 + 5 = 12, is a purely analytic proposition, which follows from the conception of a sum of seven and five, according to the principle of contradiction. But if we examine it more closely, we find that the conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing farther than the union of both numbers in one, from which it cannot by any means be inferred what this other number is which contains them both."[25]

      Were we to say that whoever hears seven plus five, does not always think of twelve, because he does not see clearly enough that one conception is the same as the other, although it is under a different form, it would be true. But from this it does not follow that the

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