SUMMA THEOLOGICA - Thomas Aquinas

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and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

      Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."

      Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is "one."

      Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any other being is "one."

      On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."

      I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above ( Question [3], Article [7]). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.

      Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one."

      Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

      Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple.

       Table of Contents

      As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:

       (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?

       (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?

       (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?

       (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?

       (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?

       (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?

       (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?

       (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?

       (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?

       (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?

       (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?

       (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?

       (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

      Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."

      Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( Question [7], Article [1]). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

      Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

      Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

      On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 2:2).

      I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.

      Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being;

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