SUMMA THEOLOGICA - Thomas Aquinas

Скачать книгу

bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good ( Question [5], Article [3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject ( Question [48], Article [3]).

      Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above ( Question [6], Article [2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above ( Question [48], Article [4]), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.

      Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above ( Article [1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

      Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above ( Question [47], Article [2], ad 1).

      Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above ( Question [2], Article [3]).

      Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.

      Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above ( Question [48], Article [3]). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above ( Question [48], Articles [1], 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.

      Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

      Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.

      Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above ( Article [1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

      Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.

      TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (Questions [50]-64)

      OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)

       Table of Contents

      Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

      Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

      Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.

      Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry:

       (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?

       (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?

       (3) We ask concerning their number.

       (4) Of their difference from each other.

       (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.

      Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."

      Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.

      Objection

Скачать книгу