Аннотация

Is knowledge discovered, or just invented? Can we ever get outside ourselves to know how reality is in itself, independent of us? Philosophical realism raises the question whether in our knowing we connect with an independent reality–or only connect with our own mental constructs. Far from being a silly parlor game, the question impacts our lives concretely and deeply. Modern Western culture has been infected with antirealism and the doubt, skepticism, subjectivism, relativism, and atheism that attends it–not to mention distrust and arbitrary (mis)use of reality. Premier scientist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi stepped aside from research to offer an innovative account of knowing that takes its cue from how discovery actually happens. Polanyi defied the antirealism of the twentieth century, sounding a ringing note of hope in his repeated claim that in discovery, we know we have made contact with reality because «we have a sense of the possibility of indeterminate future manifestations.» And that sense marks contact with reality, because it is the way reality is: abundant, generous, and fraught with as-yet-unnameable possibilities. This book examines that distinctive claim, contrasting it to the wider philosophical discussions regarding realism and antirealism in the recent decades. It shows why Polanyi's outlook is superior, and why that matters, not just to scientific discoverers, but to us all.

Аннотация

Writing in the late 1990s about the tendency of encyclopedists to designate existentialism a finished project, Thomas W. Busch cautions that such hasty periodization risks distorting our understanding of the contemporary philosophical scene and of depriving ourselves of vital resources for critiquing contemporary forms of oppression, what Garbriel Marcel referred to as processes of dehumanization. We should recall that «existentialism made possible present forms of Continental philosophy, all of which assume the existentialist critique of dualism, essentialism, and totality in modern philosophy,» and we should acknowledge that «existentialism remains capable of haunting today's scene as an important and relevant critic.» Offered in honor of Thomas W. Busch after his more than fifty years of work in philosophy, the essays in this volume attest to existentialism as a living project. The essays are written by scholars who championed existentialism in America and by scholars who now seek to extend existentialist insights into new territory, including into research in cognitive science. The essays range from studies of key figures and texts to explorations of urgent topics such as the nature of freedom and the possibility of what Busch calls «incorporation,» a sense of communicative solidarity that respects difference and disagreement.

Аннотация

Is following Jesus natural? Many would say no, but this book argues yes. Saying no suggests that grace and human nature are alternate moral categories. Saying yes implies that our humanity is gracious in origin, capacity, and intent. Much of this discussion hangs on what is meant by «nature» and «natural,» and this book explores these ideas creationly and christologically. Part One considers natural law as commonly found in the classical Christian tradition. Part Two explores the radical christological tradition of Anabaptism. Part Three then proposes the two-nature christology of the Chalcedonian definition as a theological resource enabling their reconciliation. The Chalcedonianism of the modern Barth and the ancient Maximus the Confessor are appropriated, along with scientific theology of T. F. Torrance and Nancey Murphy. If Chalcedon correctly affirms Jesus's humanity as being homoousios (one nature) with our humanity, created like Adam's through the eternal Spirit, then Jesus's life was natural–proper to its created intent. And as his divine nature was homoousios with the Father's nature, he is the human expression of the divine Word which gives creation its contingent moral rationality. As such, the life of Jesus (Anabaptists' concern) is morally normative for all humanity (natural law's concern).

Аннотация

Is God above logic? If so, is he irrational? Is God subservient to logic? If so, is he really omnipotent? These questions are similar to Socrates' infamous challenge to explaining God's relation to morality, the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. In this book McGlothlin argues that the Euthyphro challenge can be extended to help explain the relationship between God and logic, what he call the Logiphro dilemma. Logic, on this account, depends on aspects of God's mind other than God's will. This is a nonstandard form of theistic logical dependence. It contrasts both with the standard form of theistic logical dependence, according to which logic depends on God's will, and with theistic logical independence, according to which logic is independent of God. These rival views can be seen as the horns of the Logiphro dilemma: either logic depends on God's will, in which case special revelation would no longer be communicable; or logic is independent of God, in which case core claims of classical theism–for example, that God is the only independent being–would be violated. The best way to escape both of these horns, according to McGlothlin, is to adopt the nonstandard form of theistic logical dependence.

Аннотация

Biblical contributors express an oral stage engaging Christianity within a properly basic communal worldview similar to Alvin Plantinga advocates. This approach includes a communal Christian application of common sense realism within a worldview and rhetoric similar to Hillite Pharisaism. Each biblical contributor provided vivid testimony using rabbinic language and thought forms. For example, Jewish-Christian midrash re-appropriates Old Testament quotes and narrative in a new performative pesher manner to present Jesus as the Christ. Moving beyond the word studies of biblical epistemologists, Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism use of biblical revelation, mystical vision, dream, or audible divine voice frame mystical empiricism similar to William Alston. Non-foundational realism facilitates a communal resilient oral tradition similar to the rabbinics. Additionally, Luke-Acts extensively engages Hellenistic historiographic method and the concept of «witness.» When multiple interpretations occur concerning miracles, epistemic dualistic non-foundational Lockean epistemology emerges to contribute to the authority of communal kingdom testimony. Occasionally, this Lockean approach adds an internal transformation much as Jonathan Edwards modified Locke to set forth his religious affections as a divine virtue epistemology confirming the authentic narrow way through Peircean pragmatism. This internal knowledge provides self-referential confirmation for a personal relationship and filial knowledge. Each of these expressions of knowledge fosters an ultimate Kierkegaardian commitment to the Trinitarian Christian God.

Аннотация

Post-secularism is the fundamental evidence of the end of modernity. Modernity, as sleeping reason in Francisco Goya's painting, realizes that, although it thought that it was awake, it was producing monsters. We try to analyze post-secular philosophy from the point of view of Russian religious thought. We believe that such philosophers as Vladimir Soloviev, Pavel Florensky, Sergey Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Georges Florovsky, and Semen Frank may be helpful for understanding and overcoming post-secular order. Their unique views on the relations between religion and philosophy, science, and social life are apparently missing in the current Western debates. It seems to us that Russian religious philosophy becomes surprisingly up-to-date and attractive in the contemporary world. We hope that the present volume will be a significant step forward in the inclusion of the heritage of Russian religious philosophy in contemporary debates.

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Methodological naturalism is the thesis that only natural features can be factored into any legitimate explanation. Moreover, the thesis contends, any attempt to explain natural phenomena by appealing to supernatural features is unscientific and, therefore, illegitimate. This book argues that nothing inherently problematic afflicts possible appeals to supernatural agency in the attempt to explain select phenomena in nature. Reputable philosophers of the ancient and medieval periods, as well as prominent scientists of the early modern era, invoked supernatural agency in their attempts to understand nature. For them, miraculous interventions in nature by a supernatural agent were not unreasonable. However, the super-naturalistic worldview has been replaced by methodological naturalism. The assumptions of two pivotal figures–David Hume and Charles Darwin–brought about this change. This book shows that this change was motivated by unscientific means. Hence, the change itself remains inconsistent with the assumptions of methodological naturalism.

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Each of the five volumes in the Stone Art Theory Institutes series brings together a range of scholars who are not always directly familiar with one another’s work. The outcome of each of these convergences is an extensive and “unpredictable conversation” on knotty and provocative issues about art. This fifth and final volume in the series focuses on the identity, nature, and future of visual studies, discussing critical questions about its history, objects, and methods. The contributors question the canon of literature of visual studies and the place of visual studies with relation to theories of vision, visuality, epistemology, politics, and art history, giving voice to a variety of inter- and transdisciplinary perspectives. Rather than dismissing visual studies, as its provocative title might suggest, this volume aims to engage a critical discussion of the state of visual studies today, how it might move forward, and what it might leave behind to evolve in productive ways. The contributors are Emmanuel Alloa, Nell Andrew, Linda Báez Rubí, Martin A. Berger, Hans Dam Christensen, Isabelle Decobecq, Bernhard J. Dotzler, Johanna Drucker, James Elkins, Michele Emmer, Yolaine Escande, Gustav Frank, Theodore Gracyk, Asbjørn Grønstad, Stephan Günzel, Charles W. Haxthausen, Miguel Á. Hernández-Navarro, Tom Holert, Kıvanç Kılınç, Charlotte Klonk, Tirza True Latimer, Mark Linder, Sunil Manghani, Anna Notaro, Julia Orell, Mark Reinhardt, Vanessa R. Schwartz, Bernd Stiegler, Øyvind Vågnes, Sjoukje van der Meulen, Terri Weissman, Lisa Zaher, and Marta Zarzycka.

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The political writings of the French poststructuralists have eluded articulation in the broader framework of general political philosophy primarily because of the pervasive tendency to define politics along a single parameter: the balance between state power and individual rights in liberalism and the focus on economic justice as a goal in Marxism. What poststructuralists like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-François Lyotard offer instead is a political philosophy that can be called tactical: it emphasizes that power emerges from many different sources and operates along many different registers. This approach has roots in traditional anarchist thought, which sees the social and political field as a network of intertwined practices with overlapping political effects. The poststructuralist approach, however, eschews two questionable assumptions of anarchism, that human beings have an (essentially benign) essence and that power is always repressive, never productive. After positioning poststructuralist political thought against the background of Marxism and the traditional anarchism of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Proudhon, Todd May shows what a tactical political philosophy like anarchism looks like shorn of its humanist commitments—namely, a poststructuralist anarchism. The book concludes with a defense, contra Habermas and Critical Theory, of poststructuralist political thought as having a metaethical structure allowing for positive ethical commitments.

Аннотация

Each of the five volumes in the Stone Art Theory Institutes series, and the seminars on which they are based, brings together a range of scholars who are not always directly familiar with one another’s work. The outcome of each of these convergences is an extensive and “unpredictable conversation” on knotty and provocative issues about art. This fourth volume in the series, Beyond the Aesthetic and the Anti-Aesthetic , focuses on questions revolving around the concepts of the aesthetic, the anti-aesthetic, and the political. The book is about the fact that now, almost thirty years after Hal Foster defined the anti-aesthetic, there is still no viable alternative to the dichotomy between aesthetics and anti- or nonaesthetic art. The impasse is made more difficult by the proliferation of identity politics, and it is made less negotiable by the hegemony of anti-aesthetics in academic discourse on art. The central question of this book is whether artists and academicians are free of this choice in practice, in pedagogy, and in theory. The contributors are Stéphanie Benzaquen, J. M. Bernstein, Karen Busk-Jepsen, Luis Camnitzer, Diarmuid Costello, Joana Cunha Leal, Angela Dimitrakaki, Alexander Dumbadze, T. Brandon Evans, Geng Youzhuang, Boris Groys, Beáta Hock, Gordon Hughes, Michael Kelly, Grant Kester, Meredith Kooi, Cary Levine, Sunil Manghani, William Mazzarella, Justin McKeown, Andrew McNamara, Eve Meltzer, Nadja Millner-Larsen, Maria Filomena Molder, Carrie Noland, Gary Peters, Aaron Richmond, Lauren Ross, Toni Ross, Eva Schürmann, Gregory Sholette, Noah Simblist, Jon Simons, Robert Storr, Martin Sundberg, Timotheus Vermeulen, and Rebecca Zorach.