LITMIR.BIZ

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state is understood to have been formed between nations; those things must be reconsidered which we have mentioned elsewhere. Furthermore, in establishing this quasi-agreement we have assumed nothing which is at variance with reason, or which may not be allowed in other quasi-agreements. For that nations are carried into that association by a certain natural impulse is apparent from their acts, as when they enter into treaties for the purpose of commerce or war, or even of friendship, concerning which we shall speak below in their proper place. There is no need to persuade yourself that there

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      is no nation that is not known to unite to form the state, into which nature herself commands all to combine. Just as in tutelage it is rightly presumed that the pupil agrees, in so far as he ought to agree, nay, more, as he would be likely to agree, if he knew his own interest; so in the same way nations which through lack of insight fail to see how great an advantage it is to be a member of that supreme state, are presumed to agree to this association. And since it is understood in a civil state that the tutor is compelled to act, if he should be unwilling to consent of his own accord, but that even when the agreement is extorted by a superior by force that does not prevent the tutelage from resting upon a quasi-agreement; why, then, is it not allowable to attribute the same force to the natural obligation by which nations are compelled to enter into an alliance as is attributed to the civil obligation, that it is understood to force consent even as from one unwilling? But if these arguments seem more ingenious than true, and altogether too complicated; putting them aside, it is enough to recognize that nature herself has combined nations into a state, therefore whatever flows from the concept of a state, must be assumed as established by nature herself. We have aimed at nothing else.

      § 10. What indeed may be called the supreme state

      The state, into which nations are understood to have combined, and of which they are members or citizens, is called the supreme state.

      §§ 17, 23, Proleg.

      The size of a state is determined by the number of its citizens. Therefore a greater state cannot be conceived of than one whose members are all nations in general, inasmuch as they together include the whole human race. This concept of a supreme state was not unknown to Grotius, nor was he ignorant of the fact that the law of nations was based on it, but nevertheless he did not derive from it the law of nations which is called voluntary, as he could and ought to have done.

      § 11. Of the laws of the supreme state

      § 10.

      § 4, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 46, part 7, Jus Nat.

      § 965, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 969, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Since the supreme state is a certain sort of state, and consequently a society, moreover since every society ought to have its own laws and the right exists in it of promulgating laws with respect to those things which

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      concern it, the supreme state also ought to have its own laws and the right exists in it of promulgating laws with respect to those things which concern it; and because civil laws, that is, those declared in a state, prescribe the means by which the good of a state is maintained, the laws of the supreme state likewise ought to prescribe the means by which its good is maintained.

      § 965, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Note, § 965, part 8, Jus Nat.

      It occasions very little difficulty that laws may be promulgated in the state by a superior such as nations do not have, and certainly do not recognize. For since the law of nature governs the will of the ruler in making laws, and since laws ought to prescribe the means by which the good of the state is maintained, by virtue of the present proposition, then, it is evident enough of what sort those laws ought to be that nations ought to agree to, consequently may be presumed to have agreed to. No difficulty will appear in establishing a law of nations which does not depart altogether from the necessary law of nations, nor in all respects observe it, as will appear in what follows.

      § 12. How individual nations are bound to the whole and the whole to the individuals

      § 28, part 8, Jus Nat.

      §§ 9 and fol., part 8, Jus Nat.

      Inasmuch as nations are understood to have combined in a supreme state, the individual nations are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, but the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for the especial good of the individuals. For if a state is established, individuals bind themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, and the whole binds itself to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for adequate life, for peace and security, consequently for the especial good of the individuals. Inasmuch then as nations are understood to have combined in a supreme state, individual nations also are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, and the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for the especial good of the individuals.

      § 7, 9.

      Note, § 635, part 7, Jus Nat.

      Nature herself has brought nations together in the supreme state, and therefore has imposed upon them the obligation which the present

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      proposition urges, that because they ought to agree, they may be presumed to have agreed, or it may rightly be assumed that they have agreed, just as something similar exists in patriarchal society, which we have said is valid as a natural quasi-agreement. But if all nations had been equipped with such power of discernment as to know how effort might be made for the advantage of themselves, and what losses might be avoided by them, if the individual nations performed the duty of a good citizen, and their leaders did not allow themselves to be led astray by some impulse of passion, certainly there would be no doubt that in general all would expressly agree to that to which nature leads them, which produces and maintains harmony even among the ignorant and unwilling. But this must be shown by us, how nature provides for the happiness of the human race in accordance with the human lot. For humans ought not to be imagined to be what they are not, however much they ought to be so. And for this reason it will be plain from what follows, that laws which spring from the concept of the supreme state, depart from the necessary law of nations, since on account of the human factor in the supreme state things which are illicit in themselves have to be, not indeed allowed, but endured, because they cannot be changed by human power.

      § 13. Of the law of nations as a whole in regard to individual nations

      § 29, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 9.

      § 12.

      § 23, part 1, Jus Nat.

      In the supreme state the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the individual nations, if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation, or should show themselves negligent in it. For in a state the right belongs to the whole of coercing the individuals to perform their obligation, if they should either be unwilling to perform it or should show themselves negligent in it. Therefore since all nations are understood to have combined into a state, of which the individual nations are members, and inasmuch as they are understood to have combined in the supreme state, the individual members of this are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, since moreover from the passive obligation of one party the right of the other arises; therefore the right belongs to the nations as a whole in the supreme state also of coercing the individual nations, if they are unwilling to perform their obligation or show themselves negligent in it.

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      This will seem paradoxical to those who do not discern the connexion of truths and who judge laws from facts. But it will be evident in what follows that we need the present proposition as a basis of demonstration of others which must be admitted without hesitation. And in general it must be observed that our question is one of law, for which men are fitted in their present state, and not at all of facts, by which the law is either defied or broken. For there

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