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108.

      § 362, part 2, Jus Nat.

      Since nations whose territories have the river as their boundary have the right of alluvium, the right which they have in the river is not changed by alluvium; since the river, as the natural boundary separating their territories, does not disappear but remains, on which ever side the alluvium increases or decreases the territory. Therefore, if a river shall have belonged wholly to one nation, it retains the entire ownership and sovereignty after the alluvium is made; but if the ownership and sovereignty extend to the middle line from either side, they still will extend to the middle line of the river after the alluvium is made.

      In a doubtful case territories which are separated by some river are presumed to have the river as their boundary, since for marking their boundaries nothing is better than that which is not easily crossed. And

      [print edition page 93]

      those things which we have said of rivers are likewise understood of mountains which divide territories, but not with the same pertinence of forests, especially open ones, where the matter must be determined by agreements.

      § 110. Of the building of a bridge on a river, belonging half and half to neighbouring nations

      § 120, part 2, Jus Nat.

      If a river separating two territories belongs half and half to the nations dwelling on either side of the river, a bridge cannot be built upon the river without the consent of each nation, for since the owner by the right which he has in the property excludes all others who have not the right of ownership in it, a nation which has ownership only of half of a river, the other half of which belongs to the neighbouring nation, cannot build a bridge. If then a bridge is to be built upon the river, that cannot be done except with the consent of each nation.

      The same is plain concerning any other thing which ought to be done in regard to the half which is understood to belong to the neighbouring nation, as e.g. the construction of a dam across the river for the purpose of building a mill.

      § 111. Of the right of anticipation in the use of public property or that of a corporation

      § 180, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      If public property or that of a corporation does not admit of simultaneous use by all, he who is in fact using it cannot be deprived of this use by another, but the other ought to wait until the use shall have been ended. For if public property or that of a corporation does not admit of simultaneous use, it is impossible for all who have the right of use, to use the property at one and the same time. But he who is in fact using it is exercising his right. Therefore, since no man has the right of preventing another from using his own right, no one can prevent him from using it who is in fact enjoying the use; consequently although the right of using the thing belongs to one, never theless he ought to wait until the use of the other shall have been ended.

      Thus if any one is in fact drawing water from a common well, which is the property of a corporation, or shall have been the first to start to draw it, you cannot put him away so as to draw it first yourself,

      [print edition page 94]

      but you must wait until he has drawn the water and made place for you. In like manner if any one is in fact fishing in a public river, you cannot prevent him from fishing in that place, but you ought to wait until he has ended his fishing, if you wish to fish in the same place.

      § 112. The same further considered

      § 111.

      If public property or that of a corporation does not admit of a use except such as consists in consumption, that is, if the use consists in the taking of things which are consumed in the use, he who is in fact taking the thing or is starting first to take it, cannot be restrained from taking it. For if the use consists in the taking of things of the sort which are consumed in the use, it is impossible that several who have the right of using take the same thing. Therefore then, as appears before, he who in fact is taking the thing or is starting first to take it, cannot be restrained from taking it, so that you may take it.

      §§ 35, 36, part 2, Jus Nat.

      § 88.

      Thus if he who has the right of cutting timber in a forest ripe for cutting, is in fact cutting it, or is coming first to cut, you cannot prevent him from cutting this timber for the reason that you prefer to cut the same. The same thing is understood, if any one cuts grain with a sickle in a common meadow. The same law holds as in the original common holding. For the use of public property and of the property of a corporation, since it is common to the people as a whole and to the individuals of a corporation, imitates the use of things in the original common holding, nay, is in harmony with it.

      § 113. Laws and agreements to be made concerning the use and preservation of public property and that of a corporation

      § 9, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 88 h.

      § 969, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 813, part 8, Jus Nat.

      The ruler of the state can pass laws concerning the use of public property and that of a corporation and concerning the preservation of the same, as far as this shall be to the advantage of the people or the corporation, and concerning the use of the property of a corporation and its preservation those who belong to the corporation can also arrange by agreements. For the use of public property pertains to the common good of the state, and since corporations belong to the state, the use of them also pertains

      [print edition page 95]

      to the good of the state. Therefore, since civil laws prescribe the means by which the good of the state is obtained, and legislative power belongs to the ruler of the state, the ruler of the state can make laws concerning the use of public property and that of a corporation. Which was the first point.

      But since the use cannot continue unless the substance of the thing is preserved, it is thus plainly evident that the ruler of the state can pass laws concerning preservation of public property and that of a corporation. Which was the second point.

      § 495, part 1, Jus Nat., and § 88 h.

      And because public property ought to serve the advantage of the whole state, and the property of a corporation the advantage of the corporation, such laws ought to be passed concerning the use of public property and that of the corporation as will be to the advantage of the people or of the corporation. Which was the third point.

      § 94.

      § 118, part 2, Jus Nat.

      § 698, part 3, Jus Nat.

      § 393, part 3, Jus Nat.

      § 788, part 3, Jus Nat.

      Finally, since the use of the property of a corporation belongs to the corporation, moreover, since any one can dispose of his own property as he likes, those who belong to a corporation can agree together concerning the use of the property of the corporation, and that such use can be enjoyed, they can agree concerning the preservation of the same, and since they are not able to bind themselves one to the other except by a promise, they can enter into agreements. Which was the fourth point.

      § 532, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 585, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 966, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Cap. 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      §§ 395, 982, part 8, Jus Nat.

      In the particular case particular reasons are given why laws are to be passed, and of what sort, concerning the use and preservation of public property and of that of a corporation. But they are taken from general public law, which we have set forth in the eighth part of “The Law of Nature.” So it is plain that it ought to be the concern of the ruler of a state that each should be saved from the wrong of others. Therefore, if it is to be feared that in the use of public property or that of a corporation one may easily wrong another, the use must be limited by a law by which care is taken that wrong may not be done thereby, and a penalty sufficient for restraining a transgression of the law must be added

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