LITMIR.BIZ

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statues, this alone would intitle him to insist, that the marble shaped by his own hands, and endowed by him with understanding, shall be subject to his will.———But God is the author of the matter and form of the parts of which our being is composed, and he has given them all the faculties, with which they are invested. To these faculties, therefore, he has a right to prescribe what limits he pleases, and to require that men should use them in such or such a manner, &c.”

      Examen of those opinions. 1. The sole superiority of power is insufficient to found a right of commanding.

      IV. Such are the principal systems on the origin and foundation of sovereignty and dependance. Let us examine them thoroughly, and in order to pass a right judgment, let us take care not to forget the distinction of physical and moral necessity, nor the primitive notions of right and obligation, such as have been above explained.^*

      1. This being premised, I affirm, that those who found the right of prescribing laws on the sole superiority of strength, or on an irresistible power, establish an insufficient principle, and which, rigorously <85> considered, is absolutely false. In fact, it does not follow, that because I am incapable to resist a person, he has therefore a right to command me, that is, that I am bound to submit to him by virtue of a principle of obligation, and to acknowledge his will as the universal rule of my conduct. Right being nothing else but that which reason approves, it is this approbation only which reason gives to him who commands, that is capable of founding his right, and, by a necessary consequence, produces that inward sense,¹ which we distinguish by the name of Obligation, and inclines us to a spontaneous submission. Every obligation therefore supposes some particular reasons that influence the conscience and bend the will, insomuch that, pursuant to the light of our own reason, we should think it criminal to resist, were it even in our power, and should conclude that we have therefore no right to do it. Now a person that alledges no other reason, but a superiority of force, does not propose a motive sufficient to oblige the will. For instance, the power which may chance to reside in a malignant being, neither invests him with any right to command, nor imposes any obligation on us to obey; because this is evidently repugnant even to the very idea of right and obligation. On the contrary, the first counsel which reason gives us in regard to a malignant power, is to resist, and, if possible, to destroy him.² Now, if we have a right to resist, this right is inconsistent with the obligation of obeying, which is evidently thereby excluded. True it is, that if we clearly see that all our efforts will be useless, and that our resistance must only subject us to a greater evil; we should chuse to sub-<86>mit, though with reluctance for a while, rather than expose ourselves to the attacks and violence of a malignant power. But in this case we should be constrained, though not under an obligation. We endure, in spite of us, the effects of a superior force, and whilst we make an external submission, we inwardly feel our nature rise and protest against it. This leaves us always a full right to attempt all sorts of ways to shake off the unjust and oppressive yoke. There is therefore properly speaking, no obligation in that case; now the default of obligation implies the default of right.^* We have omitted making mention here of the dangerous consequences of this system, it is sufficient at present to have refuted it by principles; and perhaps we shall have occasion to take notice of these consequences another time.

      2. Nor the sole excellence or superiority of nature.

      V. The other two opinions have something in them that is plausible and even true; yet they do not seem to me to be intirely sufficient. The principles they establish are too vague, and have need to be reduced to a more determinate point.

      2. And, indeed, I do not see, that the sole excellency of nature is sufficient to found a right of sovereignty.³ I will acknowledge, if you please, this excellency, and agree to it as a truth that I am well convinced of: This is the whole effect that must naturally arise from this hypothesis. But here I make a halt; and the knowledge I have of the excellency of a superior being does not alone afford me a motive sufficient to subject myself to him, and to induce me to abandon my own will, in order to <87> take his for my rule. So long as I am confined to these general heads, and am informed of nothing more, I do not feel myself inclined by an internal motion to submit; and without any reproach of conscience, I may sincerely judge, that the intelligent principle within me, is sufficient to direct my conduct. So far we confine ourselves to mere speculation. But if you should attempt to require any thing more of me, the question would then be reduced to this point: How and in what manner does this being, whom you suppose to surpass me in excellence, intend to conduct himself with regard to me; and by what effects will this superiority or excellence be displayed? Is he willing to do me good or harm, or is he, in respect to me, in a state of indifference? To these interrogations there must be absolutely some answer given; and according to the side that is chosen, I shall agree perhaps, that this being has a right to command me, and that I am under an obligation of obeying. But these reflections are, if I am not mistaken, a demonstrative proof, that it is not sufficient to alledge merely and simply the excellence of a superior being, in order to establish the foundation of sovereignty.

      3. Nor the sole quality of Creator.

      VI. Perhaps there is something more exact in the third hypothesis. “God,” say they, “is the Creator of man; it is from him he has received and holds his life, his reason, and all his faculties, he is therefore master of his work, and can of course prescribe what rules he pleases. Hence our dependance, hence the absolute empire of God over us naturally arises; and this is the very origin or first foundation of all authority.”<88>

      The sum of what is here alledged to found the empire of God over man, is reduced to his supreme power. But does it follow from thence only, and by an immediate and necessary consequence, that he has a right to prescribe laws to us? That is the question. The sovereign power of God enables him to dispose of man as he has a mind, to require of him whatever he pleases, and to lay him under an absolute necessity of complying: For the creature cannot resist the Creator, and by its nature and state it finds itself in so absolute a dependance, that the Creator may, if so is his pleasure, even annihilate and destroy it. This we own, is certain; and yet it does not seem sufficient to establish the right of the Creator. There is something more than this requisite to form a moral quality of a simple power, and to convert it into right.^* In a word, it is necessary, as we have more than once observed, that the power be such as ought to be approved by reason; to the end that man may submit to it willingly, and by that inward sense which produces obligation.

      Here I beg leave to make a supposition that will set the thing in a much clearer light. Had the Creator given existence to the creature only to render it unhappy, the relation of Creator and creature would still subsist, and yet we could not possibly conceive, in this supposition, either right or obligation. The irresistible power of the Creator might indeed constrain the creature; but this constraint would never form a reasonable obligation, a moral tie; because an obligation of this nature always supposes the concurrence of the will, and an approbation or an acquiescence on the part <89> of man, from whence a voluntary submission arises. Now this aquiescence could never be given to a being, that would exert his supreme power only to oppress his creature, and render it unhappy.

      The quality therefore of Creator is not alone and of itself sufficient to establish the right of command, and the obligation of obeying.

      True foundation of sovereignty: Power, wisdom, and goodness joined together.

      VII. But if to the idea of Creator we join (which Barbeyrac probably supposed, though he has not distinctly expressed it) the idea of a being perfectly wise and sovereignly good, who has no desire of exercising his power but for the good and advantage of his creatures; then we have every thing necessary to found a legitimate authority.

      Let us only consult ourselves, and suppose, that we not only derive our existence, life, and all our faculties, from a being infinitely superior to us in power; but moreover, that we are perfectly convinced that this being, no less wise than powerful, had no other aim in creating us, but to render us happy, and that with this view he is willing to subject us to laws: certain it is, that under these circumstances, we could not avoid approving of such a power, and the exercise thereof in respect to us. Now this approbation is acknowledging the right of the superior; and consequently the first counsel that reason gives us, is to resign ourselves to the direction

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