LITMIR.BIZ

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also of that body which exerciseth the legislative power—or in other words, when the same person is a judge and [at the same time] a member of one branch of the legislative body. [Montesquieu’s] meaning, I conceive, is no more than this: that the body which exerciseth the legislative power should be composed of members, a majority (or if it be more agreeable to T.Q., a large majority) of whom should have no share in the exercise of the judiciary power. I confine myself at present to the legislative and judiciary powers; the executive will be considered presently.

      The sense in which T.Q. does, and must, understand this maxim, if he would avail his argument of it, is this (viz.): “There is no liberty where the legislative and judiciary powers are not kept so entirely separate, that the same person is not a judge and [at the same time] a member of the legislative body.” Now if my construction be right, it is evident, I think, that all arguments against the judge’s being of His Majesty’s Council, founded upon the foregoing maxim of Baron Montesquieu, are sophistical and inconclusive. To the easy task of proving my construction to be right, I proceed therefore in very few words.

      Let it be observed then, and kept in mind, that the chapter of The Spirit of the Laws from which this maxim, and most of T.Q.’s other quotations, are taken is that wherein the Baron is professedly treating of the constitution of England. Let it also be observed that by the constitution of England the Lords Temporal, who sit in Parliament by reason of their dignities held by descent or creation, are not deprived of their seats or voices in Parliament by being made Chancellors or Judges of any other courts in the kingdom; but continue to sit and vote there notwithstanding such commissions. Let it be farther observed that from the first institution of the courts of Westminster-Hall to this day, it has been no uncommon thing for the Chancellors and Lord Chief Justices of the courts of Kings-Bench and Common Pleas to be created Peers of the Realm by patent or summons, at or after the time of their appointment to their respective offices. These are facts so well known to all who have the least acquaintance with the constitution of England that it would be needless to produce authorities in support of them. However, if any one doubts the truth of them, let him consult the 4th Institute and Rapin’s, or any other good history of England. It may not be amiss here just to mention, as a recent instance of this last kind, that the present Lord Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench in England was created a Peer, Anno 1756, by the title of Lord Mansfield of Mansfield; and has now a seat and voice in the House of Lords, and is, to all intents and purposes as completely a member of that branch of the legislative body, as any one member of that august house. Once more, let it be observed that the House of Lords is the supreme court of judicature in the nation, to whom appeals lie from decrees given in chancery, and before whom writs of error are brought upon judgments given in the court of King’s-Bench. Now can it be supposed that the great Montesquieu, who had but just before observed that the English nation “has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty,” and was now professedly describing the constitution of England, should yet lay it down as a maxim that: “there is no liberty where the legislative and judiciary powers are not entirely separated,” in T.Q.’s sense? Or can it be supposed that the Baron was unacquainted with facts so notorious and so essentially incompatible with his grand maxim (as T. understands it) as the foregoing are? Or will it be said that the legislative and judiciary powers are not separate, and consequently that there is no political liberty in England? No man, I think, who has read The Spirit of the Laws will suppose the former; and no Englishman in his senses, I am sure, will say the latter. Therefore I conclude, and I think very fairly, that T.Q. has essentially misapprehended the Baron’s meaning—i.e., that Judges may be members of the legislative body in perfect consistency with the constitution of England and with Montesquieu’s maxim. I will only add here that if my argument is conclusive with respect to England, which I presume cannot be denied, it is so a fortiori in regard to this Province because our Board of Councellors is not the Supreme Court of Judicature here, as the House of Lords is there.

      I come now to consider “whether a Lieut. Governor can with any propriety be chosen a Councellor.” I must here first premise that to assert: “There can be no liberty where he who exerciseth the executive power, has any share in the legislative”—is such a mistake as I cannot suppose the great Montesquieu to be guilty of; because it is well known, that by the constitution of England, of which (it must be remembered) he is speaking, the King, who has the sole exercise of the executive power and is therefore by our English lawyers called “the universal judge of property”—“the fountain of justice”—“the supreme magistrate of the kingdom, intrusted with the whole executive power of the law,” and the like,—has also an essential share in the exercise of the legislative power; namely, the power of rejecting. Therefore when this great writer says: “the executive and legislative powers ought not to be united,” he must be understood to mean, as he often expresseth himself, “the whole executive, and the whole legislative powers ought not to be united” as they are in the republics of Italy—or in other words, a majority of the body which exerciseth the legislative power should have no share in the executive. Understood in this sense, and in no other, the Baron speaks like himself—a man of superior genius, and extensive knowledge. And so long as the legislative and executive powers are kept thus separate, they are an effectual check upon each other; which is the reason assigned by this great writer, why they ought not to be united.

      I readily agree with T.Q. that “there would be an impropriety in choosing the commander-in-chief a Councellor,” though not for the reason which he assigns, namely, that “this would be evidently to unite the legislative and executive powers in one person.” For I deny that the whole or the major part of the legislative power would in this case be in the commander-in-chief. And consequently [I deny] that the two powers would in reality, or could with any propriety of language, be said to be united in him any more than they are now because he exerciseth the executive power and hath also the power of rejecting or negativing in the legislative—which, as has been shown, is precisely conformable to the constitution of England.

      The same answer may be given to this objection applied to the Lieut. Governor upon the supposition of his becoming Commander-in-Chief by the absence of the Governor. And so long as his Excellency is resident in the province, I can conceive no objection to the Lieut. Governor’s being of the Council, unless a bare title without power, disqualifies him—which, as it has not been, so I presume it will not be pretended.

      But it is objected that “in case of the absence of the commander-in-chief, the Lieut. Governor fills his place, and then the province must either lose one of its Councellors or else the same Gentleman must act as Governor and Councellor.” To this I answer: (1) This is a contingent event which may or may not happen—and to deprive ourselves of an able councellor forever for fear we should some time or other be deprived of him for a short space of time, would be as if we should starve ourselves this year for fear we should not have an abundance twenty years hence. (2) Considering Councellors as councellors or advisers to the commander-in-chief, the objection is grounded on a wrong supposition for, in the case put, we should not in fact be deprived of one of our able councellors unless it be said that because he is commander-in-chief, therefore he must not consult his own understanding. (3) Considering them as legislators, the most that can be said is that in this case we should have but twenty-seven of twenty-eight members in one branch of the legislative body, a case which often happens without any apprehensions of danger to our political liberty. Whether this mere possibility be a sufficient reason for our depriving ourselves of an able counsellor, I leave to all reasonable men to judge. The objection, as it supposeth an unconstitutional union of the legislative and executive powers, is answered by adding to what is said above: that if the chief command should devolve upon the Lieut. Governor, in such case his Honour would not act as a Councellor, considering them as legislators.

      Thus I have endeavored, in compliance with T.Q.’s desire, “to conciliate the minds of the good people of this province” by showing that his Honour the Lieut. Governor, and the honourable justices of the Superior Court, may be of His Majesty’s Council in perfect harmony with the great Montesquieu’s eternal maxim of truth: “there is no liberty where the legislative, executive and judiciary powers are not kept separate.”

      Some other positions in T.Q.’s piece should be considered; but

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