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of praise. It was rather the widespread method of learning, according to which young students were usually taught by several doctors, who often disagreed among each other and drew on diverse principles. This was hardly suitable for producing anything solid. Also, as tends to happen, friends and conversations with fellow students wasted many hours which could have been spent on studies and attending lectures.

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      §8. I rapidly became aware of this, however, and, putting that common proverb “we learn by teaching” into practice, I tried to fill the gaps and connect my different studies, which had often been interrupted. Thus, once I had graciously been granted a license to teach by the university authorities, I lectured a little on the Institutes of Justinian¹¹ to some of my fellow students. To others I explained the questions of Jan Klenck on the books of Grotius¹² in order to make an attempt at understanding this most noble discipline, to see what I could manage and what progress I would make by reading Grotius and Pufendorf.

      §9. Until then I had been an assiduous defender of the doctrines of the Moralists,¹³ and though in all other respects I liked Pufendorf very much, I set aside those aspects that were considered heterodox. In this opinion I was strongly confirmed by the “index of novelties,” a highly dangerous document, especially as it was received with applause by numerous people.¹⁴ There were further writings like this, which attacked Pufendorf as a common enemy. I was extremely pleased about their appearance, because I hoped that I would be able to learn from them how to reply to Pufendorf’s arguments. I noticed many arguments which begged the principle or were circular, yet I selected some with which I believed I would be able to strike or avert the blows for the sake of the common cause. I profusely thanked those authors, who were inspired by the love of orthodox truth to take up arms; and at the same time the multitude of syllogisms, which were often prolix and difficult to understand, excited my admiration. I believed that if Pufendorf were confronted with these arguments he would succumb to their enormous weight, and would not even dare to open his mouth to contradict such great men.

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      §10. I was, however, mistaken, for soon afterward the apologia of Pufendorf became available to us.¹⁵ When I read this I sensed that my weapons were inadequate to ward off his blow. At about that time I was beginning to dispel some of the clouds which had until then shrouded my understanding. For I had previously imagined that everything defended by the common opinion of the theologians was a proper part of theology, and that a good man should beware of listening to any heretic or innovator, two terms which were considered synonymous at the time. Yet, more careful meditation on the difference between theology and philosophy and a more diligent examination of the writings of authors on politics and public law had taught me that many views were upheld by the unanimous opinion of theologians and were generally held to be theological matters, although they did not belong to theology but to moral philosophy or jurisprudence. This was so because philosophers were content with their Aristotelian catalogue of eleven virtues and jurists with their glossators and so gave the theologians, first the papal theologians and then ours, the opportunity to seize the noblest part of wisdom, which was neglected and without a guide. This scrutiny had also taught me that the power to declare someone a heretic did not pertain to private persons, even though they might enjoy a lot of authority, but to the prince. And finally, it had taught me that the accusation of heresy did not necessarily imply the crime of heresy, and that this and the term heretic were very widely abused. I saw, however, that Pufendorf had demonstrated precisely these opinions to his adversaries and that their hopes of victory had rested to no very little degree on their erroneous principles.

      §11. Thus I began to doubt the moral doctrines of the Scholastics. For I had never been disposed to adhere to preconceived opinions so rigidly that I could not be torn away from them when the truth became evident. I saw more than once my father setting a laudable example by abandoning his earlier opinions, if the following day showed him something else to be

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      closer to the truth. But what had held me up in my pursuit of the truth had been above all the education in sectarian philosophy and the vain and unjust fear of suffering from a bad reputation if I diverged from the common opinion. When I noticed, therefore, that my judgment had gradually matured, and I reminded myself that I was a rational being like other humans, I became aware at the same time that I was sinning against the benignity of the Creator if I allowed myself to be led wherever it pleased others, like cattle wearing a muzzle. Therefore I closed the eyes of the mind, so that the brightness of human authority would not blind them, and cast aside all consideration of who or how great a person had written what I was reading. I examined only the arguments on either side and considered what this person asserted, that person criticized, another proved, and yet another replied. But above all I firmly impressed on myself the state of the controversy and noted how tenacious one person was, how another twisted and turned like an eel in order to elude his adversary and confuse him, until I concluded that I had to unlearn a lot and sensed that I had known nothing and that my knowledge was nothing but a confused chaos and a heap of many things, which were mixed with each other without any order.

      §12. But when I had thought about this carefully and managed to reduce the chaos to some order, I unintentionally became a deserter, in the sense of someone who having fled from a tyrant invading the liberty of a commonwealth takes up arms in defence of liberty against this tyrant. For clear reasons had triumphed over the otiose subtleties of scholastic moral philosophy. I was also ashamed of any longer taking the side of those who had been full of boasts as long as there was no enemy and had been the first or among the first to sound the signal for battle, but, when their veterans had at their encouragement attacked the enemy and perished miserably, and they themselves had been honestly summoned to battle and had been challenged several times, hid behind their walls and thus indicated either their fearfulness or the injustice of their cause. Finally I was horrified, because I saw that egregious injustices were committed under the pretence of Christian benediction by some whose duty it was to guide the flock of Christians. They interfered in battle, without being called to it or being equipped with appropriate arms, and, like blindfolded

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      gladiators, cut down anything which they encountered. I also noticed that they could not bear it if the smallest word of theirs had been ignored, as if a minister of the word enjoyed a privilege of inflicting injury and as if their holy office gave them immunity against enemies and allowed them [the ministers] to betray their office and provoke these enemies without a reason. Then I remembered a story which I had read, I know not where, of a beggar who had visited a bishop and had first asked for substantial alms; when these were denied he asked for a smaller amount, and when he failed to obtain these he asked for a very small amount. When all his requests had been in vain, he asked for a benediction. The bishop gave him that. The beggar, however, returned it to the bishop, saying that his benediction was not worth a penny, since he could not obtain a penny from the bishop before, in spite of his persistent requests.

      §13. From this time on, after shaking off the yoke of sectarian philosophy, I took great care to preserve the liberty I had once acquired. Thus, even though I did not consider it unbecoming to struggle for truth under an illustrious leader, even in the last ranks, I always acknowledged him as a leader, not as a ruler, although a good leader differs little from a ruler, insofar as he diverges from the truth only very rarely and then only unintentionally. Although I thought at first that once I had reduced the doctrine to some system I would be able to keep it forever, I sensed that like any other person who reduces a confused heap of things to a particular order, I too had to correct the order several times and improve it. For I continually detected new errors to be corrected, which are just an indication of human weakness.

      §14. In the meantime I perceived the rich fruits of cultivating such a noble doctrine. I ceased teaching it for a while, as soon as I sensed that the ideas I had previously believed rather than understood did not cohere with each other. Yet, when I returned home and there, having shaken off the original torpor, simultaneously devoted my efforts to civil jurisprudence, I noticed while I was teaching that with the help of natural jurisprudence I was able to explain the Pandects quite adequately. This was so although I had never previously studied them in their entirety. And, apart

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