LITMIR.BIZ

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nine o’clock on the evening of Tuesday, 14 May, Anthony Eden, Great Britain’s newly-appointed Secretary of State for War, began his broadcast to the nation on the BBC’s Home Service:

      I want to speak to you tonight about the form of warfare which the Germans have been employing so extensively against Holland and Belgium – namely the dropping of troops by parachute behind the main defensive lines … [I]n order to leave nothing to chance, and to supplement from sources as yet untapped the means of defence already arranged, we are going to ask you to help us in a manner in which I know will be welcome to thousands of you. Since the war began the government have received countless inquiries from all over the Kingdom from men of all ages who are for one reason or another not at present engaged in military service, and who wish to do something for the defence of their country. Well, now is your opportunity.

      We want large numbers of such men in Great Britain, who are British subjects, between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five, to come forward now and offer their services in order to make assurance [that an invasion will be repelled] doubly sure. The name of the new Force which is now to be raised will be ‘The Local Defence Volunteers’. This name describes its duties in three words … This is … a spare-time job, so there will be no need for any volunteer to abandon his present occupation … When on duty you will form part of the armed forces … You will not be paid, but you will receive uniform and will be armed … In order to volunteer, what you have to do is to give in your name at your local police station and then, as and when we want you, we will let you know … Here, then, is the opportunity for which so many of you have been waiting. Your loyal help, added to the arrangements which already exist, will make and keep our country safe.³

      Now there could be no turning back: eight months into the war, and four days after the commencement of Germany’s offensive in the West, Britain was set to launch the largest, most quixotic and, in a way, least militaristic volunteer army in its history.⁴

      The government, in truth, had never been keen on its formation, believing, to begin with, that such a force would find itself with far too little to do, and then later fearing that it might find itself trying to do far too much. There was one prominent political figure, however, who had supported the idea right from the start: Winston Churchill. On 8 October 1939, Churchill – then newly installed as First Lord of the Admiralty – had written to Sir Samuel Hoare, the Lord Privy Seal, with a proposal:

      Why do we not form a Home Guard of half-a-million men over forty (if they like to volunteer) and put all our elder stars at the head and in the structure of these new formations? Let these five hundred thousand men come along and push the young and active out of all their home billets. If uniforms are lacking, a brassard would suffice, and I am assured there are plenty of rifles at any rate.⁵

      Nothing came of the suggestion, however, as the military’s chiefs of staff were of the opinion that any danger of invasion or raids was slight so long as sufficient naval and air forces were guarding the sea approaches to Britain, and, as all of the belligerents settled into the six-month stalemate that came to be known as the ‘Phoney War’,⁶ it seemed as if Churchill’s notion of an army of ageing amateurs had been left to die a quiet death. Then, quite suddenly, things changed: on 9 April 1940, the Allies were startled by the first in a series of sudden and strikingly effective enemy thrusts when German units moved in to occupy Denmark and Norway; barely a month later, as the Allies were still struggling to come up with a suitable response to the events in Scandinavia, the main offensive began in earnest when Germany took control of both The Netherlands and Belgium. These developments transformed the public mood; now that it appeared possible that most, if not all, of the Channel coastline might soon be under German occupation, the prospect of England being invaded suddenly seemed startlingly real.

      Anxiety swiftly took the place of apathy. There were fears of a fifth column, and fears of airborne landings. Facts may have been scarce but there was an abundance of rumours, and soon newspapers were full of speculation regarding the possibility that enemy agents were already operating inside the nation. The intelligence division of the Ministry of Information, which had been set up to monitor civilian opinion and morale, noted that such talk of espionage and sabotage was causing widespread unease, and ‘the situation in a few places has become slightly hysterical’.⁷ The prospect of parachute landings was, if anything, the source of even greater anxiety. The Home Office distributed a distinctly unsettling circular to the public informing them that ‘German parachutists may land disguised as British policemen and Air Raid Wardens’,⁸ and The Times ran a sobering editorial warning its readers that these enemy paratroopers ‘might speak English quite well. Some might be sent over in civilian dress to act as spies. The general public must be alert.’⁹

      Something, clearly, had to be done, and, whatever it was, it had to be done quickly. The government had initially been reluctant to contemplate any policy which involved ordinary citizens being allowed to take matters into their own hands instead of relying on the orthodox forces of security and public order – namely, the Army and the police – but it soon found itself placed under mounting pressure from both Parliament and press to do precisely that.¹⁰ When reports started to reach the War Office concerning the appearance up and down the country of ‘bands of civilians … arming themselves with shotguns’,¹¹ the time had arrived for a serious rethink. Without pausing to determine whether its ultimate goal was to sustain or suppress this burgeoning grass-roots activism, the War Office proceeded to improvise some plans and, as one observer put it, evoked ‘a new army out of nothingness’.¹²

      On Sunday, 12 May, at a hastily arranged meeting, a way forward was agreed. A breathless succession of ad hoc decisions followed throughout the next day until, at 8 p.m., all of the essential details had been assembled and readied for dispatch. It was originally intended that the first news of the novel force would be broadcast on the wireless by the man most responsible for the shape it was set to take – namely, General Sir Walter Kirke, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces – but Anthony Eden, recognising an early opportunity to impose his presence upon the public’s consciousness, decided that he should be the one to address the nation on this subject. As he sat down on that Tuesday evening and faced the microphone, he had two aims in mind: the first was to demonstrate that the government was responsive to popular opinion, and the second was to promote a policy which he hoped would curb any public propensity for spontaneity. He succeeded in doing the former, but the latter would prove far harder to accomplish.¹³

      Before Eden’s broadcast had concluded, police stations up and down the country found themselves deluged with eager volunteers. On the Kent coast, the most threatened area, men were still queuing at midnight. Early the following morning the lines once again began to form, and throughout the rest of the day they grew longer and longer. Over the country as a whole 250,000 men – equal in number to the peacetime Regular Army – registered their names within the first twenty-four hours. One of those responsible for enrolling the applicants in Birmingham recalled his experience:

      The weather was sweltering and we were allotted the small decontamination room in the police station yard … Applicants seemed to form a never-ending stream. They started to queue up as soon as they could leave their work and by 11 p.m. there were still scores of them waiting to enrol. Every night we worked until the small hours of the morning, trying to get some sort of shape into the organisation in preparation for the next day’s rush. Within a few days the platoon was three or four hundred strong and it seemed that if every police station [in the city] were experiencing the same influx, all the male population of Birmingham would be enrolled within a week or two.¹⁴

      Form

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