Napoleon - Vincent Cronin

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      Napoleon, in this context, had four such qualities. To start with, he possessed a particular kind of physique, distinguished by broad chest and big lungs. The big lungs inhaled deep chestfuls of air to oxygenate his blood, and this generous supply of oxygen in turn provided him with an unusually quick rate of metabolism. ‘Marry us quickly:’ that is one example from hundreds of a pulsating activity which made Napoleon desirous and capable of doing things with the utmost speed. Secondly, Napoleon was able to get along, for a few days at a time, on very little sleep. He made up for nights in the saddle by snatching half-an-hour of sleep when occasion offered. Since the first hour of unconsciousness rests the body as much as three hours in the middle of a full night’s sleep, Napoleon with quick naps was able to keep up his tremendous activity for eighteen and twenty-hour days.

      The third quality Napoleon brought to the Army of the Alps was an eye for topography. This was part of his Corsican heritage. In an island virtually without roads, to get fast from Ajaccio to Bonifacio, or from this village to that, one had to make use of every defile, every pass, every goat track. A wrong turning could cost you a night on the mountainside, or a bullet in the back. Napoleon therefore had evolved a ‘feel’ for country: from the shape and line of hills he could gauge exactly where and to what level the hidden valleys would fall.

      Finally, Napoleon was a gunner. He had few guns at present, but he was to use soldiers much as he used guns: concentrating them from several sides at once against a single point, and when that fell, moving them quickly against a second point.

      Napoleon, in his headquarters at Albenga, studied his map, with red pins marking enemy positions. The Austrian army numbered 22,000, the Piedmontese 25,000, so in this respect the enemy had the edge. Moreover, in mountain warfare, the defenders always hold the advantage. For three years French generals had tried to cross into Piedmont over the Maritime Alps. Passes being few, narrow and well protected, they had failed. Napoleon had already decided to abandon this route. Instead, he chose to move along the coast, make a feint to march through neutral Genoa, thus drawing the Austrian commander down from his mountain base at Alessandria. Then he would swing up from the sea, through the Cadibona-Carcare gap, which divided the Alps from the Apennines. Here he would strike fast and hard at an allied army which, in trying to protect Genoa, would have dangerously extended its lines. Through the gap he would debouch into Piedmont. Instead of crossing the Alps, he would turn them.

      Napoleon began by asking the Senators of Genoa for permission to march through Genoese territory against the Austrians, knowing that they would inform Beaulieu, the seventy-one-year-old Fleming who commanded the Austrian army. Napoleon then divided his army into three: one division under Massena, one under Augereau, a third under Sérurier. A small task force under La Harpe Napoleon flipped forward as bait to Voltri, fifteen miles short of Genoa. Beaulieu hurried down from the heights with 10,000 men. On 10 April he attacked La Harpe and drove him out of Voltri, while Beaulieu’s colleague, Argenteau, swooped down by another route, hoping to cut off La Harpe’s retreat.

      On 11 April Napoleon swung into action. He quickly drew back La Harpe to the Cadibona-Carcare gap, and moved Massena’s division to the same area. His third division he moved to the far end of the gap, to prevent any help from the Piedmontese. Meanwhile the Austrian general, Argenteau, had marched into the gap and was launching attacks on Napoleon’s decoy: the earth-fort of Montenotte, held by 1,200 picked French troops.

      On the morning of the 12th Napoleon ordered La Harpe to attack Argenteau in front, and Massena to attack him in the flank and rear. He had made it a rule that generals were to write on their messages the hour, not just the day; this was because his tactics, as now, depended on exact timing. The perfectly synchronized attack took Argenteau by surprise. One thousand feet up amid outcrops of grey schist Napoleon directed operations from a nearby ridge, watching his 16,000 ill-fed, ill-equipped troops in their blue uniforms attack, with musket-fire and bayonet charge, 10,000 white-uniformed Austrians who lacked nothing. With negligible losses they killed or wounded 1,000 Austrians and took 2,500 prisoners. Montenotte, fought in cold rain, was Napoleon’s first victory.

      Napoleon marched quickly up the gap to attack the Piedmontese before Beaulieu should have time to rejoin them. The Piedmontese army was in two parts, one at Ceva, the other, under General Provera, at Millesimo. Napoleon ordered Sérurier to launch feint attacks at Ceva, while he, at the head of Massena’s and Augereau’s divisions, marched on Millesimo. The battle of that name took place on the 14th and again, by quick marching, Napoleon had favourable odds of sixteen to ten. This time his victory was even more crushing, and he captured the whole of Provera’s corps. On the same day, leaving Augereau in front of Ceva to aid Sérurier, Napoleon led two divisions against 6,000 Austrians at Dego, and won his third victory. Next day, he defeated a further 6,000 Austrians dispatched by Beaulieu to help the Piedmontese.

      For ninety-six hours almost non-stop Napoleon had marched his army up and down the steep foothills of the Alps, across passes, and through defiles, and he had thrown them into four major battles. He had run circles round the enemy in a way never before known. Now they were dispersed and divided. While the Austrians fell back to protect their base in Pavia, the surviving half of the Piedmontese force dug in on the River Tanaro.

      Napoleon rested his men, then marched fast to the Tanaro. Crossing that river, on the 21st he defeated the Piedmontese near Vico and entered Mondovi. The Piedmontese fell back to the River Stura, with their left on the town of Cherasco, only thirty miles from their capital, Turin. Napoleon marched up to the Stura, prepared to cross it, and announced his terms for peace. It was all too quick, too bewildering for the King of the Dormice. From the palace of Turin he sent envoys to seek an armistice – Salier de La Tour and Costa de Beauregard, one of the last officers to quit Fort Mulgrave when Napoleon captured it during the siege of Toulon.

      They arrived at Napoleon’s lodgings, Count Salmatori’s palazzo in Cherasco, at eleven at night on 27 April. Berthier woke Napoleon, who came down in his general’s uniform, with high riding-boots, but without sword, hat or scarf. His chestnut hair was unpowdered and gathered in a pigtail, but with strands over his cheeks and forehead. He was pale and his eyes were reddened with fatigue.

      Napoleon listened in silence while Salier put forward proposals. Instead of answering, he asked curtly whether King Victor Amadeus accepted French terms, yes or no. Salier complained that they were very harsh, notably the surrender of Cuneo, key to their Alpine frontier. ‘Since drawing them up,’ Napoleon replied, ‘I have captured Cherasco, Fossano and Alba. You ought to consider them moderate.’ Salier mumbled a phrase about not wishing to desert the Austrians. Napoleon’s answer was to pull out his watch. ‘It is one o’clock. I have ordered an attack at two. Unless you agree to hand over Cuneo this morning, that attack will take place.’ The envoys exchanged a look, and said they would sign.

      They asked for coffee. Napoleon sent for some, then from the thin portmanteau in his bedroom took two porcelain cups. He had no spoons, however, and beside them placed brass army issue spoons. On the table lay black bread and a plate of cakes, a peace offering from the Cherasco nuns. When Costa de Beauregard remarked on this Spartan simplicity, Napoleon explained that the portmanteau was his only baggage: less than he used to carry as an artillery officer. The Austrians, he said, had too much baggage.

      Napoleon was feeling elated and unusually talkative. He told Costa he had proposed the plan he had just carried out as early as 1794, but it had been rejected by a council of war. Councils of war were merely an excuse for cowardice, and while he commanded none would be held. He took Costa on to the balcony to watch the sun rise, and there questioned him about Piedmont’s resources, artists and intellectuals, surprising Costa by his knowledge, especially of history. Among Napoleon’s orders from Paris was one charging him to secure works of art for the enjoyment of the French people, and referring to the treaty just signed Napoleon said, ‘I thought of demanding Gerard Dou’s painting of The Woman with Dropsy, which belongs to King Victor, but itemized alongside the fortress of Cuneo, I was afraid it would appear a bizarre innovation.’ This is a significant little remark. Fearless innovator on the battlefield, when it came to a treaty Napoleon was afraid of risking ridicule by doing something unusual.

      At six in the morning Saliceti arrived. As government commissioner with the Army of the Alps, he wore a more splendid uniform

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