New England Dogmatics - Maltby Geltson

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the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God. The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is something which, to the purposes of supporting the authority of the divine law, the dignity and consistency of the divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.71

      Clearly, from these statements, the idea of substitutionary atonement is part of the way Edwards Jr thinks about Christ’s work. Whether we can call this a full-blow doctrine of penal substitution remains to be seen. At most, we are left wondering just what Edwards Jr actually believes about the atonement, and specifically, how a substitutionary work plays into a non-substitutionary model of Christ’s work. It seems to us there are (at least) three possible answers. Consider that both the good Doctor was simply unconscious of the impact of the commitment they was making by trotting out such a claim—a case of category confusion. Given the relative precision of Edwards Jr’s account, this seems highly unlikely. If so, then perhaps he actually saw a theological way forward—a way that make the New England model of penal non-substitution unique to the rest of the moral government tradition—that we have yet to discover—a way that Christ can be both a substitute and a non-substitute that avoids what is an obvious logical contradiction. The most likely possibility, it seems to us, has to do with his construal of the nature of substitution. Notice that Dr. Edwards says nothing about Christ being a substitute for individuals. Notice also his emphasis on Christ’s substitutionary work as having a direct impact on the demands of the moral law, which, as we saw in the case of President Edwards is a public or societal matter—humanities offence is against the moral law, not God, strictly speaking. By implication, it looks like the solution (atonement) to the problem (transgression of the moral law) effects all humanity. How can this be? The answer may be that he augmented individual substitutionary atonement to some account of universal substitutionary atonement, in keeping with Crisp’s relatively recent suggestion that we ought to understand two things: First, the New England theologians were interested in doctrinal development and ought to be seen in this light (rather than some sort of doctrinal decline and fall, as has been the earlier trend). Second, their developments as it relates to the atonement tended toward expressions of some sort of hypothetical universalism, according to which Christ’s work extends in some sense to all persons—like we see here from Dr. Edwards. What then about the President Edwards? How do we make sense of the anomalous appearance of both substitutionary language, moral government language, and the oddities of his account of rectoral and retributive justice? Perhaps looking further down the historical road to Gelston will enable us to look back at Doctor and President Edwards with some greater clarity.

      II.4. Gelston on Atonement

      To this point we have challenged the idea that says that the moral government or penal non-substitution model of atonement was the atonement model of choice amongst the New England theologians from Dr. Edwards onward. Interestingly, our findings reveal that not only should we think of President Edwards’ account of the atonement as “thicker” than has hitherto been thought, but that we should also think of Dr. Edwards’ model of atonement as “thicker” than his most recent interpreter has made out. In what remains of this introduction, we aim to show that there is some data suggesting that Gelston himself inherited this otherwise odd, amalgamated tradition of holding to some aspect of both a penal and non-penal substitution model of atonement. To get at Gelston’s thinking about these matters, we have isolated the following list of atonement-specific questions and answers from his Systematic Collection:

      Question 152 [201]. Why was a satisfaction or atonement necessary to the dispensation of pardon?

      Question 153 [202]. Why was a satisfaction or atonement so great as that of Christ necessary to the dispensation of pardon?

      Question 154 [203]. In what consisted the essence of the atonement of Christ? In his obedience, or his sufferings, or in both?

      Question 155 [204]. In what sense did he satisfy divine justice by his sacrifice?

      Question 156 [205]. Was God under an obligation of justice to provide an atonement for sinners?

      Question 158 [207]. Did Christ redeemed all men alike, elect and non-elect?

      Question 171. [233]. Did Christ suffer and die in the stead as well as for the benefit of his people?

      Question 172. [234]. Could he have made atonement without suffering in stead of his people?

      Question 173 [235]. Did Christ pay the debt for the elect, so that they can claim salvation on the foot of justice?

      Question 174 [236]. Where the sufferings of Christ to the purpose of supporting the divine law equivalent to the endless torments of the sinner?

      Question 175 [238]. Do the sufferings and obedience of Christ proved to the divine law to be a just law?

      Let us take each question and answer in turn, offer some brief commentary, after which we will conclude with a series of implications from our findings along with some suggestions for further research. Gelston asks, in Question 152, “Why was a satisfaction or atonement necessary to the dispensation of pardon?” His response is as follows:

      Answer 152. In order to the dispensation of pardon and atonement, satisfaction is necessary because without this the law and the moral government of God must fall into contempt. If a law be made, and the penalty be not executed when broken, it is of no more consequence than if no penalty had been annexed. Indeed, the law is of no mere importance than mere advice in the view of all rational beings. It would be more contemptible than advice. For, it pretends to something which is not supported. Not only the law, but the character of the lawgiver must fall equally into contempt. This is the case in human governments, and this would be the case in the divine. If the honor of the law be not supported by a proper execution of its threatenings, the moral government of God would be subject to constant disorder and confusion. In this case, the rebellious may go on with impunity and with increasing wickedness. Nor would there be anything to deter others from the like. In this way, infinite mischief may be produced and be forever experienced without any diminution or relief.

      Either, therefore, the full penalty of the law must be executed or some atonement must be made which, in support of the divine law and government, will answer the like purposes with an infliction of the punishment. No pardon of consequences can be obtained without an atonement or satisfaction which is equivalent to the full demands of the law.

      There are several points worth highlighting here. Clearly Gelston is committed, like his mentor, Dr. Edwards, to the idea of the necessity of atonement. Notice also that Gelston frames the problem of the moral law’s demands in the context of divine honor. It interesting that he links these demands so intimately with the demands of the lawgiver. “If the honor of the law be not supported by a proper execution of its threatenings, the moral government of God would be subject to constant disorder and confusion.” This is quite a telling statement. For, either a payment must be rendered or atonement—a suitably equivalent payment—supporting the divine law and government be made. That said, it not altogether clear from Gelston’s answer what mechanism is explicitly at work in atoning for human sin. His use of the term “equivalent”—reminiscent of penal non-substitution—might be a clue. That he says, “Either, therefore, the full penalty of the law must be executed or some atonement must be made” is confirming of the same. However, notice the subtle distinction of the either-or clauses at play here. Gelston seems to be affirming that Christ’s atoning work assumes that Christ never actually paid the penalty of the law. In other words, his “suitably equivalent” payment is a sacrifice of a non-penal substitution, which is yet something new altogether. That said, his thinking of sin as an offense against the moral and God pulls in a different direction.

      In question 153, Gelston considers “why was a satisfaction or atonement so great as that of Christ necessary to the dispensation of pardon?” His answer is as follows,

      (Answer 153) The evil of sin is infinite, and in its nature and consequences tends to produce infinite

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