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divine identity in distinction from the Father. As we have already said, this perspective on the Son who is Jesus is so firm and full that we are caused to marvel at the equally strong assertions of his full humanity. But human he is.

      As for his deity and humanity in his activity, there has always been a tradition of assigning certain roles or activities to either his deity or his humanity. It is not to pass judgment against all such readings to observe that Hebrews itself is more inclined to assign the Son’s work to his full identity: the Son’s work is carried out as the Son—as God-man—from his incarnation (an act of obedience in his role as our representative, an act that is uniquely his prerogative as the one who can chose to accept his body) to his exaltation (taking a place which properly belongs to God, not merely an exalted human; but doing so as one of us). The same must be said of the atoning work that spans these points. Likewise, his life won through resurrection is somehow improperly separated from (even if it might be distinguished from) his eternality by nature. The comparison with Melchizedek that launches 7:1–28 characterizes him as “without father or mother or genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life” suggesting that the “indestructible [endless] life” of 7:16 is somehow owing to something intrinsically indestructible as much as it is to what is shown to be and won as indestructible in the resurrection (cf. John 10:18).

      In the Son both God and the chosen seed of Abraham keep covenant, as was fitting and necessary. In him, and as the Son, God takes responsibility for his creation and works salvation, as he alone was able (Isa 59:16; 63:5). He does so as the one who created all things for himself, acting in faithfulness to his handiwork and with transcendent power. He does so as the one whose saving work is his speech and whose speech is the act of salvation, communicated by the Spirit in the word of the gospel. He does so by giving us himself, who alone is life. Yet he does so as one of us, so that by sharing in him, the heir of all things, we receive the promised inheritance.

      Jesus and the Old Testament Witness

      In the course of our exposition we will be led to account for Hebrews’ appropriations of the OT Scriptures and the challenges these pose for modern sensibilities. At present we wish only to take up the thread we let drop above and suggest a broad way of thinking about what is happening for what it is worth.

      It will not do to expect easy correspondence. Where we find the most compelling foreshadowing we find the most striking dissimilarities. He is not so much answerable to the patterns as they to him, and yet he commands us to see him in them and it is clear that we cannot see him in himself without them. They are the clothing of his glory, the revelation of his person and work.

      It is not that the modernist demand to reduce all things to reason—defining “reason” in a somewhat limited way—is a wrong approach as such, and it is one that must be respected in any earnest attempt to translate the gospel in compelling ways for a modernist (and “post-modernist”) audience. It is rather to say that what is actually happening in the gospel cannot finally be reduced to those particular tests of “reason” (of the modernistic type) and the insistence on doing so will distort our perceptions. It is not the purpose of this commentary to explore this question in its own right, but we cannot avoid acknowledging it in this general fashion if we are to read Hebrews sympathetically and properly.

      Jesus and the Heavenly Tabernacle

      At more than one point (e.g., 4:14–16) we will register the view that the pattern shown Moses was none other than the Son and that the copies and shadows corresponded to him and his work more than to heavenly architecture and furniture. This requires at least a brief justification and explanation.

      There are ways of affirming a given writer’s beliefs about heavenly objects—however they may be imagined ontologically—that can share in the same modernist assumptions about things and language as do denials of those beliefs. To illustrate: a modernist, scientific mindset might find it more agreeable to imagine that Hebrews intended the language about the heavenly tabernacle as “figurative” rather than “literal.” We might insist in opposition that this is anachronistic. What is agreeable to us is irrelevant; the ancients “would have” (naturally, we suppose) taken the language “literally,” for which parallels can be marshaled. And yet upon inspection it may turn out that the latter view is guilty of assuming that only what is not “modern” (meaning, some belief held by modern people) can be “ancient,” which is a back door sort of way of imposing modernism on antiquity. It may in fact be equally mistaken to assert that a particular ancient thinker either did or did not believe that things “were” (or “are”) as imagery like that of Hebrews presented them. Self-consciously, these were symbolically freighted ways of talking about what exists in the most serious of ways, ways that were normatively determinative for right and wise conduct within empirical history.

      Yet it stands to reason that then as now—think of the differences of views even among modern Christians!—individuals may have intended such language as that of Hebrews more or less symbolically,

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